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Abstract 
Many companies today rely heavily on specialized information technology (IT) 
suppliers for fulfilling their IT demands. However, external provision, i.e., 
outsourcing, of IT services is a risky endeavor, and expectations are frequently not 
met. This dissertation addresses the challenge of successfully managing outsourcing 
relationships between clients and IT suppliers. 
The dissertation begins by presenting results from a multiple case study that 
analyzes the organizational design of the management of supplier relations in the IT 
organizations of five client companies. These results contribute to research in this area 
and show IT decision makers on the client side efficient ways of organizing the ‘client-
supplier interface’. 
Special attention is paid to the risks associated with outsourcing arrangements that 
should be addressed as part of successful relationship management. From a client’s 
perspective, excessive dependence on the IT supplier is viewed as a major outsourcing 
hazard. However, research from related disciplines suggests not only analyzing a 
client’s dependence but also incorporating the supplier’s dependence on the client in a 
dyadic exchange relationship. Differences between the dependency levels of the client 
and the supplier can lead to a power advantage for one party that can then be used to 
the detriment of the dependence-disadvantaged party. 
The dissertation investigates different dependence and power constellations in 
outsourcing relationships using a case study approach. The investigation results in 
conceptualizations and measurement instruments for client and supplier dependence in 
outsourcing relationships. The dissertation ends with a large-scale empirical survey 
that analyzes the effects of different combinations of dependencies and power use on 
the contractual partners’ satisfaction with the exchange performance. Taken together, 
the results advance knowledge about the successful management of outsourcing 
relationships and, more specifically, they enable clients and IT suppliers to capture and 
optimize dependence relations. 
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Kurzfassung 
Aufgrund vieler ökonomischer Vorteile ist die teilweise bis vollständige 
Fremdvergabe der Unternehmens-IT (IT-Outsourcing) heute integraler Bestandteil 
unternehmerischer Praxis. Mit IT-Outsourcing gehen aber auch Risiken einher und 
häufig werden die Erwartungen an solche Vorhaben nicht erfüllt. Diese Dissertation 
widmet sich der Herausforderung eines erfolgreichen Managements von Outsourcing-
Beziehungen zwischen Kunde und IT-Anbieter.  
Zunächst werden Ergebnisse einer Fallstudie in IT-Organisationen von fünf 
Kundenunternehmen vorgestellt, die hinsichtlich der organisatorischen Ausgestaltung 
des Beziehungsmanagements zu IT-Anbietern untersucht wurden. Die Ergebnisse 
liefern einen Beitrag zur Forschung in diesem Bereich und zeigen IT-Entscheidern auf 
Kundenseite Möglichkeiten zur effizienten Gestaltung der „Kunden-Anbieter-
Schnittstelle“ auf. 
Da ein erfolgreiches Management von Outsourcing-Beziehungen insbesondere 
deren Risiken berücksichtigen sollte, wird diesem Aspekt in der Arbeit besondere 
Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt. Aus Kundensicht gilt eine Abhängigkeit vom IT-Anbieter 
als eines der größten Risiken. Doch Arbeiten aus verwandten Forschungsdisziplinen 
legen nahe, nicht nur die Kundenabhängigkeit sondern auch die umgekehrte 
Abhängigkeit des Anbieters vom Kunden in einer dyadischen Austauschbeziehung zu 
betrachten. So können Unterschiede in den Abhängigkeiten beider Parteien 
insbesondere zu einem Machtvorteil einer Partei führen, welcher zum Nachteil der 
abhängigeren Partei genutzt werden kann. 
Die vorliegende Dissertation untersucht verschiedene Abhängigkeits- und 
Machtkonstellationen in Outsourcing-Beziehungen mit einem Fallstudienansatz. Es 
werden Konzeptualisierungen der Kunden- und Anbieterabhängigkeit sowie 
Vorschläge zu deren Messung im Kontext des IT-Outsourcings erarbeitet. Der letzte 
Teil der Dissertation untersucht in einer großzahligen, empirischen Umfrage den 
Einfluss unterschiedlicher Abhängigkeitskonstellationen sowie der Nutzung von 
Machtpositionen auf die Zufriedenheit der Parteien mit der Geschäftsbeziehung. 
Zusammenfassend leisten die Ergebnisse einen Erkenntnisbeitrag zum erfolgreichen 
Management von IT-Outsourcing-Beziehungen und unterstützen Kunden und IT-
Anbieter insbesondere bei der Erfassung und Optimierung der 
Abhängigkeitsverhältnisse. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Problem Description and Motivation 
Many client companies today rely heavily on specialized information technology 
(IT) suppliers for fulfilling their IT needs. External provision, i.e., outsourcing, of IT 
services is a common practice that has become a fixture on many CIO agendas. Market 
reports underscore this development – the German IT services market for consulting, 
outsourcing, and software, for example, has shown a sustained growth over the last 
few years and is expected to reach a market volume of approximately 54 billion euros 
in 2013 (BITKOM 2012; BITKOM 2013). 
This thesis focuses on information systems (IS) outsourcing, viewed as a business 
practice in which a client company contracts its information systems out to specialized 
IT suppliers (Hu et al. 1997, p. 288). Clients hope to derive many advantages from IS 
outsourcing, including cost reduction, concentration on core capabilities, access to 
expertise/skills in global markets, improvements in business performance, flexibility, 
and the enhancement of innovation (Lacity et al. 2009; Oshri et al. 2011b; Oshri and 
Kotlarsky 2009). For over two decades, these benefits have been studied in IS 
research, along with the associated risks, the optimal degree of outsourcing, and the 
determinants of success (see e.g., Lacity et al. 2010). 
However, even though the external provision of information systems is extensively 
practiced and has been the subject of extensive research, some have expressed a 
concern that client firm expectations of their IT suppliers and their services are often 
not met (Butters 2005; Deloitte Consulting 2012; Oshri et al. 2011b; Qi and Chau 
2012). For example, a recent study found that in 2013, 50% of IT managers were not 
satisfied with their IT providers (Urbach and Würtz 2013). Thus, the success of 
outsourcing arrangements cannot be taken for granted; some arrangements suffer from 
underperformance, and some are even (prematurely) terminated. And while it is often 
clients who terminate the arrangement, the possibility of termination by suppliers 
should not be overlooked (Suang et al. 2009). 
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As a consequence, researchers and consulting firms have explicitly drawn client 
firms’ attention to the importance of ‘managing an outsourcing relationship’ in order 
to make the outsourcing arrangement successful (Butters 2005; Hild 2008; Oshri et al. 
2011a; Qi and Chau 2012), and a large amount of research has shifted to studying the 
later stages of outsourcing endeavors. This research involves thoroughly exploring, for 
example, how trust, open communication, and cooperation develop as the ‘relational 
governance’ of a relationship (Goles et al. 2005; Heiskanen et al. 2008; Kern and 
Willcocks 2000; Lee and Kim 1999). A second governance mechanism, ‘contractual 
governance,’ involves the adequate design of contracts (Fitoussi and Gurbaxani 2012; 
Goo et al. 2009) and the use of formal actions and control (e.g., Lee and Cavusgil 
2006) to govern a relationship (Huber et al. 2011). Much debate surrounds the 
interplay of these two forms of governance (Gopal and Koka 2012; Huber et al. 2011; 
Lacity et al. 2009; Poppo and Zenger 2002). Focused research has also been devoted to 
the successful transfer of knowledge between the parties (Krancher and Dibbern 2012; 
Park and Lee 2013) and the development of capabilities on the client and supplier 
sides (Feeny and Willcocks 1998; Karimi-Alaghehband and Rivard 2012; Lacity et al. 
2010) such as successfully monitoring and controlling activities within the business 
relationship (Gregory et al. forthcoming; Herz et al. 2013). 
Successful relationship management requires addressing the risks associated with 
outsourcing arrangements. Research has identified excessive client dependence on the 
IT supplier as a major IS outsourcing hazard (Gonzalez et al. 2005; Lacity et al. 2009; 
Martens and Teuteberg 2009). Consulting firms and independent market researchers 
point to the potential loss of bargaining power resulting from a high degree of 
dependence (BSI 2005; Deloitte Consulting 2005; Experton Group 2008). The 
concerns associated with being strongly dependent in IS outsourcing endeavors 
include being unable to switch to another IT supplier or to backsource the IT service, 
being subject to the dictation of pricing, suffering from low service quality, and being 
forced to adhere to the supplier’s terms in contract renegotiations or renewals. 
While dependence is known to be a serious outsourcing risk for clients, the 
investigation of dependence in the setting of IS outsourcing is still in its early stages 
and scant attention has been paid to the findings of fundamental dependence research 
in reference disciplines (Cook 1977; Emerson 1962; Gaski 1984; Kumar et al. 1995). 
This is made clear by the majority of IS outsourcing research, which a) treats the 
concept of client dependence quite superficially, b) fails to adopt a dyadic perspective 
that simultaneously considers the exchange partner’s (in this case the supplier’s) 
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dependence – which is necessary for several reasons, including correctly deriving and 
explaining implications for the parties and their bilateral relationship, and c) pays little 
attention to the interconnections between dependencies and other IS concepts and 
theories. As prior research (e.g., Emerson 1962) suggests, dependencies should be 
viewed as a critical (risk) facet of client-supplier relationships that must be borne in 
mind during all stages of an outsourcing endeavor to ensure satisfaction and success. 
To that end, this thesis focuses on interdependence and its management in IS 
outsourcing relationships. 
The following chapters discuss in detail the research gaps that have been identified 
and address these with a mix of qualitative and quantitative studies. The expected 
overall contribution of this thesis is to advance research about the successful 
management of IS outsourcing relationships in general and about interdependence in 
these relations in particular. 
1.2 Objectives, Benefits, and Research Questions 
To meet the challenges presented by the current state of IS outsourcing research and 
practice, this thesis pursues three major goals with five research questions. This 
section briefly presents the research goals and questions and discusses the associated 
research benefits. The following chapters will present both the related literature and 
the research gaps that have led to this thesis’ research agenda in greater detail. 
The first major goal of this thesis is to contribute to a better understanding of firm-
level management issues regarding outsourcing relationships. As explained in section 
1.1, the management and governance of outsourcing relationships are viewed as 
critical success factors in IS outsourcing endeavors. To enrich our understanding of 
recent developments in and approaches to the management of supplier relations, a 
multiple case study that investigated design questions from a holistic perspective was 
conducted in five IT organizations of large-scale companies. The study underscores 
the importance of outsourcing relationship management. It adopts the perspective of 
the client side and addresses the following research question: 
Research Question 1: How can IT supplier relationship management be efficiently 
organized on the client side? 
 The thesis then focuses on a key relational aspect of outsourcing arrangements, 
namely, the different dependence structures between client and supplier firms, with 
two goals comprising four research questions. One of these goals is to enhance our 
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understanding of the dependencies on both sides of an outsourcing dyad and to derive 
proper conceptualizations of these. We identify the determinants and influencing 
facets of client as well as supplier dependence, as reflected in research questions 2 
and 3: 
Research Question 2: What are the determinants and influencing facets of a client’s 
dependence in IS outsourcing relationships? 
Research Question 3: What are the determinants and influencing facets of a 
supplier’s dependence in IS outsourcing relationships? 
Based on the resulting conceptualizations, the fourth research question goes one step 
further and addresses ways of measuring client and supplier dependence in IS 
outsourcing relationships. 
Research Question 4: How can client and supplier dependence be adequately 
measured in the context of IS outsourcing relationships? 
After capturing and measuring dependence, the third major goal concerns the 
consequences that dependencies have for outsourcing relationships. In particular, the 
fifth research question investigates the effects of different combinations of client and 
supplier dependencies on the quality and exchange performance of an outsourcing 
relationship: 
Research Question 5: How do different combinations of client and supplier 
dependence affect the quality and exchange performance of a relationship? 
1.3 Research Context and Fundamentals 
This section presents the research context for this thesis and introduces basic terms 
and concepts. Section 1.3.1 is devoted to the fundamentals of IS outsourcing and 
management of client-supplier relationships. Section 1.3.2 presents the basics of 
dependence research. 
1.3.1 Management of Client-Supplier Relationships in IS Outsourcing 
The sourcing literature is replete with jargon, buzzwords and acronyms (Oshri et al. 
2011b). This section offers definitions for some of the terms used throughout the 
following chapters. 
The general term sourcing refers to “the act through which work is contracted or 
delegated to an external or internal entity that could be physically located anywhere” 
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(Oshri et al. 2011b, p. 7). It encompasses various insourcing (internal provision) and 
outsourcing (external provision) work arrangements (Dibbern et al. 2004; Oshri et al. 
2011b). Furthermore, three outsourcing models can be distinguished based on the 
degree of outsourcing, often measured as the proportion of outsourced services in a 
company’s IT budget (Lacity and Willcocks 1998): 
• total outsourcing, which involves transferring more than 80% of the IT budget to 
external provider(s), 
• total insourcing, which involves retaining more than 80% of the IT budget within 
the organization, and 
• selective sourcing, which involves externally sourcing selected functions while still 
providing for 20 to 80% of the IT budget internally. 
 Another important aspect of outsourcing relates to the tasks that are being 
outsourced. As mentioned above, this thesis focuses on relationships built on the 
outsourcing of information systems, which means that a company contracts all or some 
of its IS-related tasks to one or more specialized IT suppliers (Hu et al. 1997). In this 
context, an information system can be described as interrelated components working 
together to collect, process, store, and distribute information to support, for example, 
decision making and coordination in an organization (Laudon and Laudon 2013). 
Typical activities that might be sourced externally include tasks involved in the 
development, maintenance and operations of an IS. Development tasks include 
analysis, design, and IS implementation (Xia and Lee 2005). After the system’s go-
live, maintenance and further development tasks involve correcting and optimizing the 
system (e.g., fixing bugs), as well as making functional enhancements (Basili 1990; 
Dekleva 1992). The purpose of IS operations is to perform all day-to-day operational 
activities necessary for delivering system services at agreed-upon levels to business 
users and customers (Taylor et al. 2007). These activities include the performance of 
backups and restores, ongoing management of technical infrastructure, and the 
detection and elimination of system failures and performance problems. 
Turning to supply configurations, different models of varying degrees of complexity 
can be distinguished. From a client’s perspective, information systems can be sourced 
from one or several external suppliers (single- vs. multi-sourcing). The supply base 
represents the set of contractual relationships with suppliers at a given time (Su and 
Levina 2011). In a simple model, a single supplier might provide an IS to the client 
(supplier A, IS1, Figure 1-1). However, sourcing of an IS might also involve multiple 
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suppliers – e.g., one supplier operates the IS while a second takes over its maintenance 
(e.g., suppliers B and C, IS3, Figure 1-1). An external supplier might also be involved 
in providing different information systems to the same client, resulting in a network of 
multiple exchange relationships between the two parties (supplier C, IS2 and IS3, 
Figure 1-1). 
 
Figure 1-1: Different IS Supply Configurations 
Ideally, such outsourcing relationships are managed from both sides of the client-
supplier dyad. From the supplier perspective, these outsourcing relationships require 
customer relationship management. Similarly, on the client side, IT supplier 
relationship management (IT SRM) is often in place. As will be outlined, IT SRM 
covers a variety of activities, ranging from identifying potential IT suppliers to 
developing and monitoring supplier relationships and terminating underlying 
outsourcing contracts (see chapter 2). The importance of the management of external 
suppliers has long been recognized in research disciplines other than IS. For example, 
writing about the automotive industry, Cusumano and Takeishi (1991) stated: 
“Supplier relations and management are crucial areas for any firm that subcontracts 
portions of components design and production because of the dependence this creates 
on the skills of outside organizations” (p. 563). Along with the fundamental 
importance of supplier relationship management, this observation stresses (the client’s) 
dependence on external sources – which brings us to the main topic of this thesis. 
1.3.2 Dependence Structures and Power Advantages 
In a client-supplier dyad, both the client and the supplier have a certain degree of 
dependence (ranging from low to high) on their exchange partner. A party’s 
dependence on its partner is the “need to maintain the relationship in order to achieve 
desired goals” (Frazier 1983, p. 158). Furthermore, dependence is interlinked with the 
concept of power: the dependence of a party A on a party B is equal to the power B 
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holds over A (Emerson 1962) and thus B’s ability to influence A’s behavior (Jasperson 
et al. 2002). 
Combining the individual client and supplier dependencies allows adopting a dyadic 
perspective and fully explicating dependence structures between the parties. Research 
in reference disciplines has proposed a distinction between two constructs: relative 
dependence, or the difference between the two organizations’ dependencies on each 
other, and joint dependence, or the sum of the dependencies (Casciaro and Piskorski 
2005; Gulati and Sytch 2007; Kumar et al. 1995). The first construct, relative 
dependence, allows for distinguishing between a balance (or symmetry) and an 
imbalance (or asymmetry) of the dependencies (Emerson 1962). When the difference 
between the individual firm dependencies is zero, the dependence structure is fully 
balanced (indicated by the diagonal line in Figure 1-2a). Theoretically, in this case 
there is no dominant party in the relationship; the parties have equal power and interact 
at eye-level. When the relative dependence is not zero, either the client or the supplier 
is in a more powerful position (recognizable by a data point that does not lie on the 
symmetry line in Figure 1-2a; Emerson 1962). In this case, either the client or the 
supplier in the dyad possesses a dependence (or power) advantage, namely, the partner 
that has the lesser dependence. Calculated as the sum of the individual partners’ 
dependencies (Casciaro and Piskorski 2005; Gulati and Sytch 2007; Kumar et al. 
1995), joint dependence ranges from low (light grey area), to medium (medium grey 
area), to high (dark grey area) in Figure 1-2a. 
As an example, 𝑧1 denotes a configuration of equal dependencies in Figure 1-2a, 
where both parties have a medium dependence on the other. When the configuration 
changes to 𝑧2, the supplier’s dependence decreases while the client’s dependence 
increases. The outcome is a relationship in which the supplier possesses a dependence 
advantage. However, note that the degree of joint dependence has not changed during 
the shift from 𝑧1 to 𝑧2, since the changes in the individual dependence scores balance 
each other.  
Holding relative dependence constant, joint dependence between the parties can still 
vary. Turning to Figure 1-2b, we start again from a fully balanced relationship with a 
medium joint dependence (𝑧1). Both parties’ dependencies increase from moderate to 
high levels when the configuration changes to 𝑧3. This results in an increased joint 
dependence. While not shown in the figures, changes in individual dependencies can 
also result in simultaneous changes to both relative and joint dependence. 
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Figure 1-2a: Dependence Map Showing an 
Increase in Relative Dependence (Holding  
Joint Dependence Constant) 
Figure 1-2b: Dependence Map Showing an 
Increase in Joint Dependence (Holding 
Relative Dependence Constant) 
Research questions 2–5, which address dependence in IS outsourcing relationships, 
can be well understood in terms of the dependence maps. Research questions 2 and 3, 
offering the conceptualizations, will enable us to determine the degrees of 
dependencies and thus understand how different configurations arise. Further, they 
involve the question of how changes in the degrees of dependence occur and which 
factors influence clients’ and suppliers’ dependence positions in the matrix. Research 
question 4 concerns how to reliably and correctly measure a party’s dependence and 
thus how to determine the mapped coordinates in the dependence map. Research 
question 5 investigates the consequences of different dependence combinations, as 
reflected in relative and joint dependence. 
1.4 Outline and Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis as a whole is organized into eight chapters (see Figure 1-3). Following 
this introductory chapter, chapters 2 to 7 address the five research questions and (with 
the exception of chapter 7) present previously published scientific articles. Overall, the 
thesis comprises one empirical paper on IT SRM from the client perspective (paper A), 
three empirical papers on dependencies and their antecedents in IS outsourcing 
relationships (papers B, C, D), and one conceptual paper on the consequences of 
relative and joint dependence in IS outsourcing relationships (paper E). The model 
developed in paper E is further tested with a survey sample, and the as-yet unpublished 
results are presented in chapter 7. Finally, chapter 8 presents the thesis’ conclusion and 
summarizes its theoretical and practical contributions. A brief summary of the contents 
of the main chapters and how they correspond to the research questions follows. 
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Figure 1-3: Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 (paper A) shows that the management of contractual relationships in 
IS/IT outsourcing has not only been receiving greater attention in academic research, 
but that it has also become a focus of companies with high degrees of outsourcing. 
This shift in attention to relationship management is accompanied by observable 
changes in the design of IT organizations’, which reveals a relatively unexplored but 
promising research topic. While prior research has predominantly explored single 
aspects of managing these relationships, for example, supplier selection or relationship 
building, this chapter takes a more holistic approach to IT SRM with a focus on 
organizational design. A conceptual framework covering three core elements of 
organizational design – strategy, structure, and process – guided a multiple case study 
on IT SRM in five client IT organizations. The chapter discusses the designs and 
potential benefits of different organizational models in detail, providing empirical 
examples. The multiple case study points to issues that have barely been examined and 
that are promising directions for future research in the field.  
Chapter 3 (paper B) addresses this thesis’ second research question and presents a 
cornerstone for the following chapters on dependencies in IS outsourcing 
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relationships. To advance the conceptualization of dependence in IS research, the 
chapter investigates five outsourcing relationships with respect to the interdependence 
in the dyad. As its contribution, the chapter aims to explain different client positions in 
the dependence structures. The dependence construct is therefore broken down into its 
constitutive facets. In addition to the importance of the delivered IS and the 
substitutability of the supplier, spillover effects emerged as an unanticipated third 
determinant of dependence. Originating from other exchange relationships with the 
same partner, spillover effects can distort the dependence structure in the focal 
relationship. 
Chapter 4 (paper C) addresses the supplier side of an IS outsourcing dyad and 
investigates supplier dependence in the case study’s five outsourcing relationships 
with two-sided data. The chapter identifies influencing facets and categories to 
propose a conceptualization of supplier dependence, thus answering research question 
3. In addition, the chapter applies the two central dyadic constructs from reference 
disciplines, relative and joint dependence, to the five investigated relationships. 
Building upon the insights of chapters 3 and 4, chapter 5 (paper D) follows a multi-
method approach to develop two multidimensional ‘dependence’ constructs that reflect 
both sides of the IS outsourcing dyad, i.e., client and supplier dependence. This is 
important because although dependence is viewed as a major risk in IS outsourcing 
relationships, to date little attention has been paid to fully and unambiguously 
capturing the complex nature of this phenomenon and specifying how to measure it. 
This chapter aims to contribute to and extend inter-organizational IS studies and also 
to support client and supplier firms in monitoring and influencing dyadic dependence 
structures. As such, this chapter is devoted to research question 4. 
The conceptual chapter 6 (paper E) presents a research model encompassing 
anticipated effects of interdependence on IS outsourcing relationships. The chapter 
discusses expected effects of relative and joint dependence on relationship quality and 
exchange performance. While joint dependence generally yields positive outcomes, 
high relative dependence and the exercise of exploitative power by the dominating 
party might produce two countervailing effects: use of a power advantage is theorized 
to be beneficial for the dominant party, as it allows that party to structure the exchange 
to its benefit, yet a possible detrimental side effect arises because power use can 
diminish the relationship’s value-generating potential and decrease performance 
outcomes for both parties. This leads to the question of whether and to what extent it is 
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reasonable to leave power potentials untapped. Thus, this chapter addresses the 
conceptual part of research question 5. 
To address research question 5 empirically, chapter 7 uses data collected from 100 
IS outsourcing relationships, with each relationship assessed by either a client or a 
supplier representative, to test the research model developed in chapter 6. Partial least 
square analyses largely confirm our hypotheses and underline the critical role of 
dependencies and power for exchange performance. As a theoretical contribution, the 
model adds to findings in other research disciplines and extends our knowledge of IS 
outsourcing relationships. Additionally, the results yield several implications for 
outsourcing practice.  
1.5 Research Design and Methods 
This section discusses the overall research program for the thesis’ content-related 
components from a method-centric perspective. Deciding which method(s) to use in a 
research endeavor is central to any research design (Creswell 2009). However, given 
the plurality of research methods, the decision is often not an easy one. It has generally 
been suggested that the selection of research methods should be driven by the research 
problem and derived questions (Corbin and Strauss 2008; Creswell 2009).  
Research methods can be classified in many different ways. The most common 
distinction is between quantitative and qualitative research methods (Myers 1997). 
Both are well-accepted methods in the IS discipline. Quantitative methods include 
surveys, laboratory experiments, formal approaches, and numerical methods such as 
mathematical modeling (Creswell 2009; Myers 1997). While quantitative research 
methods were originally developed in the natural sciences to study natural phenomena, 
qualitative research methods stem from the social sciences (Myers 1997). Examples of 
qualitative methods are action research, case study research, ethnography and 
grounded theory studies (Creswell 2009; Myers 1997). 
Both quantitative and qualitative methods have different benefits and shortcomings. 
For example, quantitative research methods are valuable because of careful 
measurement, generalizable samples, experimental control, and statistical tools (Miles 
and Huberman 1994). Qualitative methods are designed to help researchers access 
well-grounded, rich descriptions and explanations of phenomena in real-world 
contexts (Corbin and Strauss 2008; Miles and Huberman 1994; Myers 1997).  
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Quantitative and qualitative methods need not be viewed as incompatible, and many 
researchers advocate that the two types of research methods and data can be usefully 
combined to provide a rich, contextual basis for interpreting and validating results 
(Creswell 2009; Kaplan and Duchon 1988; Mingers 2001). As Miles and Huberman 
(1994) put it, “we have to face the fact that numbers and words are both needed if we 
are to understand the world” (p. 40). Research that links quantitative and qualitative 
approaches is often referred to as mixed methods research (Creswell 2009; Venkatesh 
et al. 2013). Venkatesh et al. (2013) highlight that a mixed methods approach is 
especially then involved when quantitative and qualitative methods are combined in a 
single research inquiry. Such a single research inquiry might be a research program 
spanning multiple papers, or multiple studies can be reported in a single paper 
(Venkatesh et al. 2013). While mixed methods research has received much attention in 
the social and behavioral sciences (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2010), little research in IS 
has employed mixed methods in an overall study design (Ågerfalk 2013; Venkatesh et 
al. 2013). 
However, recent work strongly encourages IS researchers to use mixed methods 
(Ågerfalk 2013; Mingers 2001; Venkatesh et al. 2013). There are multiple reasons for 
such studies, including complementarity, completeness, development, expansion, 
corroboration/confirmation, compensation, and diversity (see Table 1-1). Mixed-
method studies often simultaneously fulfill several of these purposes (Venkatesh et al. 
2013). 
Table 1-1: Purposes of Mixed Methods Research (adapted from Venkatesh et al. 2013) 
Purpose Description 
Complementarity Mixed methods are used in order to gain complementary views about the same phenomena or relationships. 
Completeness Mixed methods designs are used to ensure that a complete picture of a phenomenon is obtained. 
Development Questions for one strand emerge from the inferences of a previous one or one strand provides hypotheses to be tested in the next one. 
Expansion Mixed methods are used in order to explain or expand upon the understanding obtained in a previous strand of a study. 
Corroboration/ 
Confirmation 
Mixed methods are used in order to assess the credibility of inferences 
obtained from one approach (strand). 
Compensation Mixed methods enable compensation for the weaknesses of one approach by using the other. 
Diversity Mixed methods are used with the hope of obtaining diverse views of the same phenomenon. 
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It is also important to note that while qualitative-quantitative linking can be applied 
at the level of the overall study design, i.e., to connect various studies of different 
types, it can also appear at lower levels, for example, at the level of data types, where 
qualitative information (perhaps from an interview) can be compared to numerical data 
(such as from a questionnaire filled out by the same person; Miles and Huberman 
1994). 
This thesis applies a mixture of qualitative and quantitative research methods 
depending on the research questions and objectives involved (see Figure 1-4). 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 follow a case study approach (Yin 2008). While case study 
research is traditionally viewed as a qualitative research method, researchers have 
suggested using ‘multiples sources of evidence’ (Dubé and Paré 2003; Yin 2008). For 
this reason, many case studies use a combination of qualitative (e.g., interviews) and 
quantitative (e.g., questionnaires) data sources to provide a richer look at the 
phenomenon under investigation (Dubé and Paré 2003). Each of the three case studies 
presented in this thesis employ a mix of qualitative and quantitative data collection and 
analysis methods to corroborate, complement and expand findings. Qualitative and 
quantitative data were mainly collected concurrently (or in close succession) and 
integrated for analysis (Creswell 2009; Venkatesh et al. 2013). 
 
Figure 1-4: Research Design and Employed Research Methods 
In the transition from chapter 2 to chapters 3 and 4, a content specialization takes 
place, from looking at the overall management of outsourcing relationships to focusing 
on dyadic dependencies between firms. The latter were investigated during a multi-
step research inquiry, starting with the case studies on the client (chapter 3) and 
supplier (chapter 4) side. 
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Subsequent to the case studies, surveys were predominantly used to additionally 
study the phenomenon from a pure quantitative perspective. The sequential series 
serves the different purposes of mixed method research as described in Table 1-1.  
Development and validation of our dependence constructs (chapter 5 and future 
work) build on the facets, the determinants, and their relationships identified during 
the previously conducted case studies (developmental purpose). The collection of 
quantitative data is believed to ultimately confirm the findings from the previous 
qualitative interviews (confirmatory purpose). Furthermore, application of the survey 
method follows a compensatory purpose by aspiring to a larger sample size, necessary 
for assessing the relevance and significance of the dependence determinants and their 
facets. 
The second strand, development and testing of a model of consequences of relative 
and joint dependence (chapters 6 and 7), can also be seen as an advancement of the 
case studies, in which survey questions emerged from the previous mainly qualitative 
findings (developmental purpose). Additionally, the final research model captures 
further causal relationships to expand our initial understanding of the phenomenon 
(expansionary purpose). 
The mixed methods approach in this thesis is intended to provide a holistic 
understanding (Venkatesh et al. 2013) of its subject, on which extant IS outsourcing 
research is fragmented and inconclusive. The following chapters will present the 
different gaps in the research and apply the mix of methods explained above to answer 
this thesis’s research questions. 
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2 Paper A: Organizational Design of IT Supplier 
Relationship Management - A Multiple Case 
Study of Five Client Companies1 
2.1 Introduction 
IT organizations face enduring demands to drive down cost and increase efficiency. 
As a preferred strategic option, many rely on outsourcing arrangements with 
specialized IT suppliers, which fulfill a substantial part of their IT services. The 
management of these outsourcing relationships has become one of the key issues, 
which mostly plays a crucial role in IS/IT outsourcing. 
A thorough exploration of successful client-supplier-relationships has also become a 
newer focused theme in IS/IT outsourcing literature, which has shifted research away 
from the exploration of initial steps in a sourcing process, for instance outsourcing 
decision making (see e. g., Hirschheim et al. 2008, pp. 9f.). However, management of 
external suppliers is not solely an issue in IS/IT outsourcing. The general importance 
of supplier relationship management (SRM) was already stated in 1991 by Cusumano 
and Takeishi, when presenting results from a survey of automobile plants in Japan and 
the US: “Supplier relations and management are crucial areas for any firm that 
subcontracts portions of components design and production because of the dependence 
this creates on the skills of outside organizations” (Cusumano and Takeishi 1991, p. 
563). As the example shows, the concept of SRM has also evolved in other fields of 
research, such as supply chain management (SCM), highlighting its cross-industry 
wide importance. 
In this paper, we adopt a client perspective regarding the management of supplier 
relationships. In this context, IT SRM covers a variety of activities, ranging from 
identifying potential IT suppliers through developing and monitoring supplier 
                                              
1  This is the accepted author’s version of the following article: Kaiser, J. and Buxmann, P. 2012. 
“Organizational Design of IT Supplier Relationship Management: A Multiple Case Study of Five 
Client Companies,” Journal of Information Technology (27:1), pp. 57–73. The definitive publisher-
authenticated version is available online at: doi:10.1057/jit.2011.30. 
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relationships, to terminating an underlying outsourcing contract. Thus, IT SRM has 
many facets and researchers have tried to address them. A wide range of contributions 
has appeared in the respective subphases, covering, for example, important elements of 
contract negotiations (Lacity and Hirschheim 1993) or contract design (Fitzgerald and 
Willcocks 1994), as well as factors that influence the duration of an outsourcing 
arrangement (Goo et al. 2007). To further manage outsourcing relationships, it has 
been argued that firms need sourcing competencies and capabilities to succeed (Cohen 
and Young 2005, p. 12; Feeny and Willcocks 1998; Willcocks et al. 2006). 
Furthermore, the role of two modes of governance – formal control (e.g., written 
contracts) and relational governance (e.g., unwritten, practice-based mechanism) – 
have been studied in research (e.g., Goo 2009; Poppo and Zenger 2002). Further work 
was done by McFarlan and Nolan (1995) who identified areas within a company that 
are crucial for managing external suppliers. Another contribution in this context 
explored formal vs. informal approaches to the management of supplier relationships 
(Heckman 1999). An overview of relevant articles published from 1988 through 2000 
is provided by Dibbern et al. (2004). Recent work to the implementation phase of 
outsourcing is revealed in follow-up literature reviews (Alsudairi and Dwivedi 2010; 
Gonzalez et al. 2006; Lacity et al. 2010).  
The purpose of the paper at hand is to explore IT SRM from a more holistic 
perspective, extending prior research that primarily focused on single subphases, for 
example, supplier selection or relationship building. More precisely, we pay attention 
to the client’s organizational design to manage outsourcing relationships. It is widely 
believed that organizational design can positively impact corporate performance, as 
long as organizational design decisions fit to certain contingency or context factors, 
such as a company’s strategy (Drazin and Van de Ven 1985; Galbraith et al. 2002). In 
IS/IT outsourcing, the role of organizational design at the ‘client-supplier interface’ 
(Willcocks and Lacity 2006) is, however, an under-researched topic. One exception is 
the work of Jimmy et al. (2011), which recently examined the organizational design of 
the ‘customer interface’ on the supplier side. This paper contributes to IS outsourcing 
relationship literature by addressing a client’s organizational design choices on the 
interface to its suppliers. Filling this gap in research helps to pave the way to a better 
understanding about how to ‘fit’ organizational design to a given company’s context, 
thereby contributing to IT SRM effectiveness and, ultimately, IS/IT outsourcing 
success. 
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Literature on organizational design was used to guide the study on organizational 
design of IT SRM. The following research question guided the research process and 
analysis: “how can IT supplier relationship management be efficiently organized on 
the client side?”  
To answer the research question, the remainder of the paper is organized as follows: 
The next section reviews literature on organization design in general and provides the 
conceptual background of this study. With a description of our empirical study design, 
we illustrate our chosen research approach. Third, the results of a multiple case study, 
conducted in the IT organizations of five large-scale enterprises, are presented along 
our research framework. The article closes with a discussion of findings, limitations, 
and possible directions for future research. 
2.2 Conceptual Framework 
Organization design is often simplifying thought of organizational structure, but it 
goes far beyond the step of drawing boxes and lines in organizational charts 
(Champoux 2000). There is a long tradition on organization research that gave rise to 
several theories and frameworks in the past 60 years (Snow et al. 2005). For example, 
Galbraith (1977) proposed his star model, a framework composed of strategy, 
structure, processes, human resources, and reward systems. A similar model was 
offered by Peters and Waterman (1982) called the 7-S model which contained seven 
major organizational components. Miles and Snow (1978) empirically examined 
relationships among organizational strategy, structure and process, and they identified 
three commonly occurring configurations called the prospector, defender and analyzer. 
Despite some differences in the frameworks, scholars stress the importance of an 
alignment of the components (Drazin and Van de Ven 1985). In this paper, we guided 
our study on the star model offered by Galbraith et al. (2002) (see Figure 2-1): 
Strategy encompasses the company’s vision as well as short- and long-term goals 
and depicts the ‘cornerstone’ in the organization design process. Consequently, design 
decisions should be in accordance with strategy. 
The second component of the star model addresses organizational structure. 
Organizational structure determines the location of formal power and authority within 
an organization. Designing an organization’s structure determines organizational 
components and defines their relationship and hierarchical structure.  
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After strategy and organizational structure have been defined, the framework 
continues with process design. According to Galbraith et al. (2002), each 
organizational structure creates ‘silos’ that might in turn be harmful when 
collaboration across organizational units is needed. Defined processes as well as lateral 
connections (e.g., informal networks, cross-boundary teams) present mechanisms to 
create collaboration of structurally separated organizational units. 
The last two components are reward systems and people practices. Reward systems 
“define expected behaviors and influence the likelihood that people will demonstrate 
those behaviors” (Galbraith et al. 2002). The following four components were deemed 
essential for a successful reward system: performance metrics, desired values and 
behaviors, monetary and non-monetary rewards. The final point on the star model 
comprises people practices that include human resources systems and policies within 
an organization. As typical elements, selection and staffing, performance feedback 
mechanisms, training, and career development are included. 
 
Figure 2-1: Conceptual Framework of Organizational Design (adapted from Galbraith et al. 2002) 
In this paper, we investigate three aspects of organization design that also occurred 
frequently in other evolved frameworks: strategy, structure, and process. Although 
organizational design is often primarily thought of as being relevant for the customer 
interface, a company is also challenged to build organizational design on the 
procurement and supply side (Trent 2004). Given the focus on IT SRM in this article, 
we discuss these three components from an IT organization’s perspective. Thereby, we 
focused on several constructs, for example, degree of outsourcing, required to assess 
appropriately the respective organizational components in the context of IT SRM (see 
Figure 2-1). 
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2.2.1 Strategy 
A company’s IS/IT sourcing strategy is ideally derived from corporate strategy 
(Lasch and Janker 2005) and basically covers decisions on what to outsource and what 
to insource. Furthermore, a sourcing strategy may determine preferred suppliers and 
guidelines on how they should be contracted (Feeny and Willcocks 1998). Therefore, 
ideally, a company’s IT SRM activities, for example, supplier selection and contract 
negotiation, are in accordance with the overall sourcing strategy. Two crucial 
determinants of a firm’s sourcing strategy are the aspired degree of outsourcing and 
the number of external sources or suppliers involved in the provision of IT services 
and products, often also discussed as single vs. multi-sourcing. 
The degree of outsourcing has been an element of various empirical studies (e.g., 
(Lacity and Willcocks 1998; Lee et al. 2004) and is often measured as the proportion 
of outsourced services of a company’s IT budget (Lacity and Willcocks 1998). 
Researchers have introduced several theories to explain outsourcing and decision 
making, for example, resource-based theory, transaction cost theory or agency theory 
(e.g., Dibbern et al. 2004).  
From a transaction cost economics view (Coase 1937; Williamson 1981; 
Williamson 1985), a sourcing or ‘make vs. buy’ decision can be seen as a “tradeoff 
between production costs and coordination or transaction costs” (Malone et al. 1987, 
p. 485). This idea is based on two fundamental observations. First, competition and 
economies of scale typically lead to lower production costs in markets (‘buy’) than in 
hierarchies (‘make’). Contrarily, transaction costs are, in general, higher in markets 
than in hierarchical arrangements (Williamson 1981; Williamson 1985, referring to 
Coase 1937). Transaction costs encompass a variety of costs, such as costs for 
searching for an adequate supplier, negotiating a contract and controlling and 
monitoring a supplier’s performance. Precisely, these costs limit the number of 
suppliers that can be managed by a customer; in other words, it may be assumed that 
when adding a supplier to an organization’s supplier base, the sum of transaction costs 
increases (Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1993, p. 39). However, transaction cost theory is 
only one perspective that has been adopted to study ‘the optimal number of suppliers.’ 
When reviewing literature, many statements can be found that address differing 
strategic benefits by either decreasing or even increasing the number of suppliers. 
Table 2-1 lists a short selection that was adopted from a literature review of Levina 
and Su (2008). 
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Table 2-1: Selected Literature of Supplier Base Strategies (adapted from Levina and Su 2008) 
Author (year) Recommendation and Implications 
Rottman and Lacity (2006) 
Firms should employ a relatively small number of suppliers 
(but at least two) to reduce strategic and operational risk and 
increase competition. 
Cousins (1999) 
Focusing on fewer suppliers helps build high-dependency 
relationships, shares technological advantages, and allows time 
to build relationships, which improves resource utilization and 
reduces costs. Focusing on a few suppliers risks missing 
critical changes in supplier markets, reduces ﬂexibility, and 
increases dependency. 
Lacity and Willcocks (1998) Employing multiple providers and fostering competition 
among them can help ﬁrms maximize ﬂexibility and control. 
Richardson and Roumasset (1995) Single sourcing supplier policy creates lock-in and increases costs due to the lack of supplier competition. 
Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1993) 
Firms should limit the number of employed suppliers to induce 
suppliers’ investments in ‘noncontractibles’ such as quality, 
responsiveness, and innovation. 
A related research area worth mentioning is the development of theoretical models 
at the beginning of the 1990s that investigated the impact of an increased use of 
information technology on the extent of a supplier base. Early research predicted that 
the use of IT may reduce client’s coordination costs with suppliers (Malone et al. 
1987), their search costs (Bakos 1991) and costs for supplier performance monitoring 
(Clemons et al. 1993, p. 14). In consequence, an extensive use of IT would tend to 
increase the optimal number of IT suppliers (Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1993, p. 39). 
However, it was hard to find empirical evidence for these early assumptions. Driven 
notably by studies of the automobile industry that reported a move to fewer suppliers 
(e.g., Cusumano and Takeishi 1991), further theoretical considerations were made. 
Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1993) showed that when suppliers’ commitment is needed, 
such as certain investments in innovation or quality, it can be optimal to rely on a 
small number of suppliers in order to increase their incentives to make such non-
contractible relationship-specific investments. Clemons et al. (1993) argue that an 
increased use of IT will lead to a higher degree of outsourcing. They argue that IT 
decreases not only coordination costs, but additionally the risks associated with an 
outsourcing endeavor. On the basis of these considerations, they advanced their ‘move 
to the middle’ hypothesis: In light of the favorable effects of information technology, 
firms will increase their outsourcing degree but will rely on fewer suppliers, taking 
advantage of long-term relationships that allow for steeper learning curves and 
economies of scale. 
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The discussion shows that strategies are generally not static and are subject to alter 
over time due to changes in markets, external environment factors or dissatisfaction 
with current performance (Johnson and Leenders 2001; Markides 1999). However, 
dynamic studies of changes in IT sourcing strategies are scarce. One exception is the 
study of Aral et al. (2010), which examined companies’ IT sourcing decisions over a 
five-year-period, revealing that companies globally prefer to rely on long-term 
relationships with known IT suppliers. In this study, sourcing strategy was also 
assessed dynamically to better understand the ‘cornerstone’ of the remaining 
organizational dimensions, structure and processes. 
2.2.2 Structure  
As the famous statement ‘structure follows strategy’ (Chandler 1962) stipulates, 
ideally, the organizational structure of IT SRM should be in line with the IS/IT 
sourcing strategy. In general, five common ways of structuring an organization exist, 
namely, grouping by function, by geography, by product, by customer/markets, or by 
workflow processes (Galbraith et al. 2002). While doing so, it has to be determined 
where decision-making authority and power is located (Galbraith et al. 2002). This 
task refers to the classic issue of centralization vs. decentralization (Monczka et al. 
2010; Pugh et al. 1968). Organizations position themselves on a continuum with 
complete centralization at one end and complete decentralization on the other, 
choosing thereby a specific degree of centralization. With our study’s focus on IT 
SRM, a centralized unit that has the authority for the majority of SRM activities can be 
envisioned on one extreme. Similarly, we might encounter more decentralized 
organizations where the majority of SRM responsibilities have been assigned to 
divisional sub-units within the IT or purchasing departments. There may be 
organizations that do not lie at these extremes but rather rely on a combination of a 
centralized and decentralized approach, called hybrid (Monczka et al. 2010). Given 
that IT SRM is a boundary-spanning activity in the sense that interaction with 
suppliers from the company’s external environment is needed, it appears to 
additionally be a challenging task to determine which activities should be centrally 
lead and which should be assigned to operating units. The challenge arises because 
each fundamental structure, centralized or decentralized, has advantages and 
disadvantages. For example, centralized structures can often more easily obtain cost 
savings, efficiencies, and decisions with increased clout, while decentralized structures 
are known for an increased speed of response, easier coordination, and a better 
opportunity of reacting to unique requirements. 
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In the context of IT SRM, the approach of a centralized or hybrid structure is related 
to the organizational concept of a ‘Vendor Management Office’ (VMO), a term 
primarily discussed in publications for IT professionals, such as CIO Magazine or 
Computerworld. According to Guth (2007), the first VMOs appeared in 2000 and were 
first adopted by IT departments of large companies, like Cisco Systems. According to 
a study by Forrester Research, centralized SRM models have been widely 
implemented in companies, either in the IT or purchasing department (Connaughton 
2011). However, profound literature about VMOs is lacking. Functions that a VMO 
should ideally fulfill, their potential added value as well as organizational structure 
have to the best of our knowledge not yet been addressed by academic studies.  
One might now be reminded of a related organizational entity seen in many 
companies, the Project Management Office (PMO). The Project Management Institute 
(2008) defines a PMO as “an organizational body or entity assigned various 
responsibilities related to the centralized and coordinated management of those 
projects under its domain. The responsibilities of the PMO can range from providing 
project management support functions to actually being responsible for the direct 
management of a project.” The definition is broad and empirical cases show that in 
practice structure, function, and roles of a PMO vary to a high degree (Artto et al. 
2011), similar to what one might expect in the case of a centralized unit (CU) for IT 
SRM. 
However, organizations need not solely rely on resources within an organization to 
carry out their SRM (pure in-house model). Theoretically, companies have various 
‘sourcing alternatives’ for IT SRM (mode of SRM sourcing). As in initial IS/IT 
outsourcing of, for example, IS development or operations, it might also be 
conceivable here to outsource the subsequent management of IT suppliers completely 
(or more likely to a certain degree) to a specialized third party. In case of an 
outsourced IT SRM, four different structural types can be differentiated. First, SRM 
may be assigned to either (I) an internal provider, for example, a subsidiary company, 
or (II) to a provider external to the company. Second, we can distinguish whether (a) 
the focal company has still direct contractual relationships with its suppliers or (b) 
whether the provider acts primarily as a prime contractor for the focal company and 
has a number of subcontractors further down the supply chain. 
While the case of contracting a prime contractor (type b, internal or external) is 
already a well-known outsourcing configuration in IS/IT outsourcing literature (e.g., 
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Cullen et al. 2005), especially the approach of contracting a ‘specialized’ provider for 
the management of the company’s remaining IT suppliers opens up various 
opportunities for future research (type a). One central question that arises here is: To 
which degree it is advisable to outsource the management of IT suppliers to a third 
party? Accordingly, this model can be combined with a retained internal organization 
(centralized, decentralized or hybrid) to fit a company’s needs and strategy. 
Figure 2-2 aggregates the aforementioned organizational structures for IT SRM, 
varying upon degree of centralization and mode of SRM sourcing. The results of our 
multiple case study give further insights into the shape of these models in practice. 
 
Figure 2-2: Organizational Structure Models of IT Supplier Relationship Management 
 
2.2.3 Process 
As a third dimension of organization design, the process layer of IT SRM is now 
examined (see Figure 2-1). At the beginning, we introduced IT SRM, ranging from 
selecting potential IT suppliers through developing and monitoring supplier 
relationships to terminating an underlying outsourcing contract. This section takes up 
this idea and outlines nine core activities that were deemed to be central to IT SRM.  
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This selection of core activities is based on a generic supplier management process 
proposed by Lasch and Janker (2005). Herein, the concept encompasses the 
identification, limitation, analysis, and rating of potential suppliers, as well as the 
ongoing management and controlling of client-supplier relationships. Thus, this 
understanding encompasses a broad range of tasks, beginning with the identification of 
potential suppliers subsequent to an outsourcing decision. SRM is embedded in an 
overall sourcing process that further includes a strategy phase, where a sourcing 
strategy is derived from corporate strategy (Lasch and Janker 2005), the feasibility of 
outsourcing is evaluated, and the outsourcing endeavor is finally planned (Brown and 
Wilson 2005, p. 25).  
In a first step, market research often needs to be conducted in order to identify 
potential suppliers that might provide the required product or service. However, in an 
overall selection process it is often not possible to analyze and evaluate all potential 
suppliers identified in this step. Therefore, clients seek further information from 
suppliers, for example, by requesting a self-assessment questionnaire or ‘request for 
information’ (Koppelmann 1998, p. 81; Lasch and Janker 2005, p. 411). The result is a 
short list of pre-qualified suppliers that is used for the subsequent analysis and rating 
steps. We abstract these steps in the first phase and summarize them under the first 
core activity ‘identifying and preselecting suitable IT suppliers.’ In supplier analysis, 
results from market research and self-information, and if necessary from additional 
audits, are collected and processed to the following rating or evaluation step 
(‘analyzing and evaluating the performance of potential IT suppliers’). Evaluation 
should be conducted systematically and be based on key factors relevant to supplier 
choice. Many methods for evaluating and supporting decision making are discussed in 
literature (e.g., Lasch and Janker 2005, p. 411). A typical tool is the supplier scorecard 
that lists the selection criteria, assigns weightings and is filled out with quantitative 
and/or qualitative data gained from supplier analysis (Monczka et al. 2010, p. 175). 
The evaluation process is normally followed by a contract negotiation phase 
(‘conducting contract negotiations’) with one or more short-listed suppliers, where the 
design of a contract itself is seen as a very critical issue (van Weele 2009, p. 171). The 
future outsourcing parties need to agree upon, for example, type and scope of contract, 
terms of agreement, and pricing and fee structure (van Weele 2009, p. 172). With the 
final supplier selection and the signing of an outsourcing contract (‘selecting IT 
supplier for service provision’), the pre-contractual and contractual phases are 
completed. 
2.2 Conceptual Framework 25 
 
Once a contract has been signed and the supplier has started contract fulfillment, 
monitoring and controlling of supplier performance need to be carried out 
(‘monitoring and controlling contractually agreed IT services’). In order to encourage 
suppliers to improve their service, companies can take corrective measures such as 
incentives or sanctions (‘taking measures (incentives, sanctions) to manage external 
service provision’) (Lasch and Janker 2005; Sparrow 2003, p. 109). In SCM literature, 
additional concepts, for example, supplier advancement, supplier development or 
supplier integration are often discussed (Lasch and Janker 2005; Monczka 2000, pp. 
47 f.). We did not go into depth on this point. However, we see opportunities for future 
studies to explore, for example, relevance and shape of these concepts in the IS/IT 
outsourcing context. The next step covers ‘maintaining IT supplier relationships’ in 
terms of relationship building and care. 
So far, we have derived seven core activities of IT SRM from SCM literature. In a 
second step, we compared our activities with the ‘supplier management process’ 
introduced in ITIL (IT Infrastructure Library), a recognized framework of best 
practices for IT Service Management worldwide (Office of Government Commerce 
2010, p. 3). Inherently, the process steps explained therein were already ‘IT-related.’ 
However, the described ITIL process is quite similar to our process, derived from 
‘generic’ SCM literature and encompassing four core activities ranging from 
evaluation of new suppliers/contracts up to contract renewal and termination (Office of 
Government Commerce 2007, p. 151). Since it seemed reasonable to include the step 
‘contract renewal or termination’ as well, we extended our process with 
‘renewing/terminating active contracts.’ Furthermore, ITIL recommends the 
establishment of a supplier/contract database to increase consistency and effectiveness 
in the implementation of overall supplier strategy and policies. Therefore, we included 
a more ‘administrative,’ ongoing task with ‘maintaining an IT supplier and/or contract 
database.’ Based on literature, we finally derived nine major activities of IT SRM (see 
Figure 2-3).  
The process described is by its nature ‘cross-functional’ and involves several people 
with different competencies and skills, who are typically active in different 
organizational entities throughout an organization. On a department level, the 
following five entities are conceivable as relevant stakeholders in IT SRM within 
large-scale client firms (Heckman 1999, p. 61; Office of Government Commerce 2007, 
p. 150): (1) A business department demanding a specific IT product or service, (2) the 
IT department fulfilling the IT needs of their internal customers (typically with the 
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support of IT suppliers), and (3) the purchasing department with its traditional tasks, 
like the identification of potential sources of supply, bid and contract preparation, 
negotiations, and supplier performance evaluation. (4) Legal departments might also 
be involved in the SRM process, since they typically handle a company’s legal issues 
and act as advisers, for example, in drafting contracts with suppliers. And finally, (5) 
the financial department in charge of organizing financial and accounting information 
necessary to make sound business decisions. 
 
Figure 2-3: Core Activities of IT Supplier Relationship Management Process 
 
In order to achieve the involvement of these usually separated departments, at least 
two ways exist to bridge boundaries established by an organization’s structure, here 
referred to as mechanisms for collaboration (Galbraith et al. 2002). First, a company 
can formalize its processes, that is, documenting activities and clearly defining and 
articulating roles and responsibilities. In addition to process formalization, lateral 
connections can be used to bridge barriers. Informal networks, as well as cross-
business teams, can help to foster work collaboration. Especially when selecting an 
appropriate supplier, a temporary, cross-functional purchasing team may be assembled 
to combine skills of different stakeholders (Johnson et al. 2001, p. 127; Sparrow 2003, 
pp. 70 f.). 
2.3 Research Approach 
2.3.1 Research Design 
Relating to our main research question ‘how’ IT SRM is organized with regard to 
strategy, structure and process, the case study approach was deemed particularly 
appropriate (Yin 2003, p. 13). Despite traditional criticism, for example its lack of 
generalizability, the case study method has seen extensive application in the IS field 
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(Dubé and Paré 2003; Gonzalez et al. 2006). Since IT SRM has not yet been studied 
from an organizational research perspective, the case study approach was deemed 
especially appropriate because it allows researchers to thoroughly study the 
phenomenon of interest from different sources of evidence. 
Given that multiple cases usually yield more general results, a multiple-case design 
was chosen (Yin 2003). Relying on multiple individual cases ensures that “the events 
and processes in one well-described setting are not wholly idiosyncratic. At a deeper 
level, the aim of multiple case study is to see processes and outcomes across many 
cases, to understand how they are qualified by local conditions, and thus to develop 
more sophisticated descriptions and more powerful explanations” (Miles and 
Huberman 1994, p. 172). According to this rationale, five cases were selected for this 
study, which allow us to deepen our understanding of organizational design in relation 
to IT SRM. The investigation of five cases complies with the evaluation of Eisenhardt 
(1989), who considers a number between 4 and 10 cases appropriate for most 
purposes. Furthermore, by the end of the fifth case, little new knowledge about the 
research object was acquired and we deemed the number sufficient with regard to 
‘theoretical saturation’ (Eisenhardt 1989). 
This utilization of case study research methodology follows a widely recognized 
positivist research approach, which assumes that the researcher plays a passive, neutral 
role and does not intervene in the phenomenon under study (Dubé und Paré 2003). 
According to Yin (2003), case studies can further be of exploratory, explanatory and 
descriptive nature. The objective of this case study approach is to compare each 
individual case with the a priori developed organizational design framework. 
Although the theoretical background of the framework has been discussed, it is not the 
primary aim of this case study to establish or to test causal relationships. Thus, our 
case study approach is best described as a descriptive one.  
Within our five cases, IT organizations of large-scale client companies form the 
units of analysis. The sample of enterprises covers different industry sectors, such as 
Automotive, Finance, Transport, Travel, and Logistics. Apart from this sectoral 
variation, we tried to raise homogeneity in our selection and focused on companies 
with headquarters in Germany. Furthermore, our selection was driven by criteria that 
point to similar challenges with regard to IT sourcing and SRM. In addition to a 
comparable size and complexity (the cases had IT budgets in the region of three-digit 
million Euro in 2010), all investigated IT organizations have outsourced activities such 
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as the development and/or operation of their information systems to a substantial part 
to IT suppliers, leading to a degree of outsourcing ranging from 60 to 80%. To justify 
this limitation in our selection, it can be argued that the proportion of in-house 
production is inherently interrelated with the number and types of contracted IT 
suppliers, as well as the role that IT SRM might play in the respective organization. 
With this in mind, the selection of cases follows theoretical and literal replication (Yin 
2003, p. 47). Basically, we ensured that the basic conditions just explained were 
similar in each case (literal replication). Apart from that, cases were selected to predict 
contrasting results due to differing case conditions, for example, whether or not a large 
in-house provider was in place (theoretical replication).  
2.3.2 Data Collection 
The whole study was conducted in a time period of three months, starting in January 
2011. For data collection, we relied on multiple sources, because data triangulation is 
highly recommended in case study research (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 534; Yin 2003, pp. 
97-101). Altogether, a questionnaire, five in-depth interviews and company 
documentation were used to raise confidence in our findings (Yin 2003, p. 86). 
Qualitative data was interlinked with quantitative data to elaborate our analysis later 
on (Miles and Huberman 1994, pp. 40-43). 
The questionnaire consisted of seven pages, comprising qualitative and quantitative 
questions. The structure was related to our research questions and divided into four 
sections. In the first section (two pages), we queried general information about size, 
core activities, and organizational structure of the IT organizations under study. The 
second section (one page) contained questions about the past and current 
developments in IS/IT sourcing strategy. The process activities of IT SRM and the 
involvement of different stakeholders was the subject of the next section (two pages). 
The last section covered questions with regard to the organizational structure of SRM 
(two pages). A pretest of the questionnaire with three respondents was initially 
conducted, discussing reactions to the form, wording, and order of the questions. 
The key-informant method was then used to obtain knowledge on organizational 
design in our case study companies (e. g., Bagozzi et al. 1991; Campbell 1955). The 
key informants were staff members of the respective IT organization, relatively high in 
hierarchy (most of them with direct reporting to the CIO) or entrusted by their CIO to 
conduct the study with us. The experts had several years of experience in the 
company/within the IT organization and were suitable contact persons for our study 
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subject. In a first step of data collection, the key informants were asked to send us a 
completed version of the questionnaire. An early analysis of responses proved that 
using a standardized questionnaire was fruitful in revealing first similarities and 
irregularities between the five cases. In a subsequent step of data collection, the 
contact persons were available for semi-structured face-to-face interviews. Here, we 
used the completed questionnaire as a guideline for more detailed questions. In one 
case, due to time and availability constraints, the questionnaire had to be filled out 
during the in-depth interview. In almost all cases, we were able to collect additional 
information material encompassing, for example, organizational charts and process 
descriptions. In this way, potential errors and biases resulting from our key informants’ 
judgments were reduced. 
During data collection, a case study protocol and database supported our research 
and helped to raise the reliability of our study (Yin 2003). The protocol was 
established prior to data collection and recorded the objectives of our study, 
procedures, as well as the questionnaire design. Therefore, it was easier to ensure that 
data collection followed the same guidelines in each case. Our case study database 
kept all relevant data in one place. It contained raw material, including completed 
questionnaires, interview transcripts and company documentation, as well as data 
displays and analysis results. 
2.3.3 Data Analysis 
After transcription of the audio-taped interviews, the data gained from the three 
collection techniques were interlinked and analyzed. In a first step, each case was 
analyzed separately along our conceptual framework. Data from the three sources were 
brought together and checked for consistency. Case analysis meetings with two 
research assistants, priorly involved in data collection, were frequently held, 
discussing the data and interpretations to create a common understanding of the 
respective cases (Miles and Huberman 1994). Various data displays (Miles and 
Huberman 1994) of the qualitative and quantitative data were created and assigned to 
the conceptual organizational design framework, also allowing for the identification of 
patterns from cross-case analysis. 
During the different phases of research, we attempted to increase validity in several 
ways, as recommended by Yin (2003) among others. As already mentioned, we relied 
on multiple information sources during data collection to enhance construct validity. 
For the same purpose, we sent a result report in anonymized form to all companies 
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participating in the study and discussed it specially with experts from one case 
company in depth. To enhance external validity, we used replication logic in our 
multiple-case design. Furthermore, our underlying framework was built upon existing 
literature and theories, raising both the conceptual level and comprehensibility of our 
work (Eisenhardt 1989, pp. 544f.).2 
2.4 Empirical Findings 
In the following, the findings that emerged during case study analysis are presented 
along the conceptual framework of organizational design. Thus, the findings on our 
research question, how IT SRM is organized across the five cases, as well as the 
observable reasons that lead to a specific organizational design, are discussed in the 
following three sections.  
2.4.1 Strategy 
To assess strategy as the first component of organizational design of IT SRM, the 
study examines the degree of outsourcing and the number of contracted IT suppliers as 
two major determinants of an IT department’s strategy that have naturally a high 
impact on the shape of IT SRM. 
2.4.1.1 Degree of Outsourcing 
The current degree of outsourcing was measured as the proportion of IT budget in 
2010 spent on outsourcing (see Table 2-2). In three of the five companies, the degree 
was measured exactly with the reported numbers of total IT budget and purchasing 
volume. For the remaining two companies (cases D and E), the degree of outsourcing 
in relation to the IT budget was estimated by our key informants or calculated by 
themselves. The current degree of outsourcing was relatively high in all five 
companies, ranging from 60 to 80%. As described earlier, a high outsourcing degree 
was a selection criterion in our study, since it seems reasonable that companies with a 
high outsourcing degree are particularly challenged to set up an efficient SRM.  
Since strategies, and hence the degree of outsourcing, are subject to change, an 
attempt was made to capture a dynamic view of the underlying sourcing strategy. 
While analyzing the responses towards past and future trends in the degree of 
outsourcing, it was striking that except for company E, no one reported an increased 
outsourcing within the last five years. During interviews, however, we gained the 
                                              
2 A detailed assessment of the case study can be found in Table A-1 in the appendix. 
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impression that the general degree of IT outsourcing has already been on a high level 
for more than five years in all five companies. A further significant increase of 
outsourcing was not expected in the next years. Companies B, C and E in particular 
started to reduce their in-house activities approximately 10 years ago, shifting the 
provision of IT services and products towards external sources. Case A reported that 
the degree of in-house activities was increased during the financial crisis in the last 
years. However, now, they again pursue an opposite strategy and are increasing 
outsourcing. Furthermore, company D reported that its in-house IT supplier would 
increase outsourcing with regard to coding and testing activities. 
2.4.1.2 Number of Suppliers 
To assess the current status of companies’ IT supplier bases, the number of active IT 
suppliers (based on purchase orders in 2010) was queried. Four of five companies have 
implemented a ‘multi-sourcing’ model and purchased from a multitude of IT suppliers, 
ranging from 60 up to ‘several hundred’ in 2010. Case A had difficulties in indicating 
the exact number of its suppliers. Whereas the number of external IT suppliers 
operating their information systems was well-known with 7, the number of IT 
suppliers supporting IS development was not exactly determinable. The total number 
here was estimated to reach several hundred IT suppliers, whereby the key informant 
adopted a group perspective. Case B was able to exactly indicate the number of IT 
suppliers in their division, mainly because the number was ‘manually’ determined by 
the company with great effort prior to this study. The number includes one in-house 
provider that accounts for a substantial part of total IT spending. Case C reported that 
they contracted about five large outsourcing partners and about 35 medium-sized 
businesses. A large number of smaller IT suppliers are purchased through a general 
contractor, resulting in a total of 60 suppliers. Compared with the other cases, case D 
was particular. A subsidiary company receives 90–95% of the total IT spending yearly, 
that is, a ‘single sourcing’ model was basically adopted here.  
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Table 2-2: Overview of IT SRM Findings on Strategy, Structure, and Process 
     A: Automotive B: Travel C: Logistic D: Transport E: Finance 
Strategy 
Degree of 
Outsourcing 
Current (2010) Percentage of Total IT 
Budget 69% 76% 63% 80% 60% 
Significant increase in the last 5 years? no no no no yes 
Future development slight increase rather constant rather constant (provider:) increase / 
Number  
of IT 
Suppliers 
Total (2010) ‘several hundred’ (group-level) 182 60 
basically 1 in-house 
provider 
5-10 large & 50-100 
smaller suppliers 
Significant reduction in the last 5 years? yes no yes no yes 
Expected change in the next years? further reduction reduction/ consolidation rather constant rather constant 
similar strategy as 
before 
Structure 
Degree of Centralization hybrid (one central unit) 
decentralized 
(planning to establish 
a central unit) 
hybrid (two central 
units) rather decentralized 
hybrid (several 
central units) 
Mode of SRM Sourcing 
hybrid  
(in-house SRM & 
outsourced SRM,  
type IIb) 
hybrid  
(in-house SRM & 
outsourced SRM,  
type Ib) 
hybrid  
(in-house SRM & 
outsourced SRM,  
type Ib and IIb  
pre-dominantly 
outsourced SRM  
(type Ib)  
pre-dominantly pure 
in-house SRM 
Process 
Degree of Involvement* 
      
Mechanisms for Collaboration 
process 
formalization, 
cross-functional 
teams 
process 
formalization, 
cross-functional 
teams 
process 
formalization, 
workflow 
management 
system, cross-
functional teams 
process 
formalization, 
cross-functional 
teams 
process 
formalization, cross-
functional teams 
Notes: 
* data for activity ‘maintaining an IT supplier and/or contract database’ was not available in case E. Scale: 0 ‘not at all’ to 3 ‘very intensive’. 
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Finally, our key informant of case E indicated that they basically relied on 5-10 
large IT suppliers on a group-level. Although the informant was not able to indicate 
the exact total, the number of more smaller IT suppliers was estimated to range 
between 50 and 100.  
Three of our five companies surveyed indicated that they had decreased their 
number of IT suppliers noticeably in the last five years. Among these was company A 
that significantly reduced the number of suppliers contracted for operating their 
information systems: the number decreased here from 270 to 7 in 2008. In the domain 
of information systems development, a comparable reduction was not yet achieved. 
Owing to an increased ‘level of complexity’ resulting basically from the process-
oriented structuring of the IT organization, a significant decrease is therefore 
considered more difficult. However, first approaches were made: One large IT supplier 
was contracted to act like a prime contractor. This prime contractor then contracted 
further suppliers that had previously had direct contractual relationships with company 
A. Thus, the number of ‘direct suppliers’ was decreased in this case by a form of 
‘subcontracting’ from company’s A perspective. Similar changes were reported in case 
C. The logistics company reduced their numbers from 250 in 2003 to 60 in 2010. 
Again, a substantial part of this reduction was achieved by ‘subcontracting,’ also 
known as ‘tiering’ in SCM literature: the “tiering approach reduces the number of 
suppliers that the organization deals with directly, but does not necessarily reduce the 
total number of suppliers in the supply chain” (Ogden and Carter 2008, p. 9). The third 
company (case E), which has streamlined its supplier base, explained its strategy as 
follows:  
“We have strategically concentrated our purchasing to a few suppliers. In the bidding procedure we 
have guidelines of preferred suppliers. When you have niche products or projects then we might 
involve smaller suppliers. But we have followed the overall strategy to a few larger suppliers within 
the last years.” (case E) 
With regard to future changes in the supplier bases, several forward-looking 
statements were gained. Whereas case A expects a further decline in their supplier base 
in the next years, C’s supplier base is expected to remain rather stable. Our key 
informant in company E was more unsure on how to predict an outcome for his 
company and commented cautiously that the future number would depend on changes 
in markets and project volumes. However, for the coming years he expects that the 
desired trend towards a few strategic partners would continue. Although the companies 
B and D have not significantly reduced their supplier bases in the last years, case B at 
least expects a move to fewer outsourcing relationships in the upcoming years. 
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Company D sees no imminent shift in strategy and expects to continue contracting 
almost exclusively through its subsidiary company. 
Taken all together, we observed that many companies still deal with a large number 
of IT suppliers. However, when trying to interpret these numbers we have to keep in 
mind that our cases were based on large-scale companies, where IT needs cannot be 
compared to mid- or small-sized companies. Whether the large number of suppliers 
was a strategic decision or whether the supplier bases had grown uncontrolled was not 
subject to our study. Nevertheless, we found evidence that some IT organizations have 
realized a substantial reduction of their supplier bases (cases A, C, and E) or have 
planned to do so in the next years (case B). In addition, as described earlier, all 
companies had a high degree of outsourcing at the time of the survey. Although we 
have not explored the favoring role of increased use of IT, we might notice that some 
companies have started a ‘move to the middle’ approach (increase of outsourcing but 
to fewer suppliers) expected by Clemons et al. (1993). However, the two parts of the 
approach – increased outsourcing and reduction of supplier numbers – do not seem to 
occur in parallel. The findings suggest that strategic decisions that can be dated back to 
more than five years ago lead to today’s high outsourcing degree in the investigated 
companies, and have seemingly reached a ‘steady state’ now. In contrast, significant 
reductions in the IT supplier bases appear to have taken place in the last five years 
and/or to be taking place in the next few years. From a cost perspective, it might be 
argued that in the past few years the case study companies have turned their attention 
towards potential cost savings that reside in supplier base reductions, instead of relying 
solely on ‘optimal’ outsourcing decisions. 
2.4.2 Structure 
With regard to the second organizational design element, structure, the case study 
companies have implemented various models for the management of their IT 
suppliers. In the following, the findings on degree of centralization and implemented 
mode of SRM sourcing are presented. 
2.4.2.1 Degree of Centralization 
The majority of the five companies surveyed have implemented a centralized unit 
for SRM, pursuing a hybrid approach (cases A, C, E). Case B still has a ‘decentralized’ 
structure in place, but is also considering implementing a central unit within the next 
years. The internal structure of case D to carry out the management of its large in-
house provider also follows rather a ‘decentralized’ approach. The three companies 
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that have implemented a centralized SRM point to a high heterogeneity regarding 
organizational position, structure and the responsibilities of a centralized unit (see 
Figure 2-4). The central units were established in a time period from 2000 to 2009 and 
encompass at least 10 people today. 
 
Figure 2-4: Characteristics of Central Units in Hybrid Supplier Relationship Management Models 
Beginning with case C, the company decided to even implement two separated units 
for SRM, one dealing with ‘build’-suppliers, that is, suppliers contracted for IS 
development, and one addressing ‘run’-suppliers, responsible for IS operations. The 
separation was explained as follows: 
“We separated the tasks into two units. One is dealing with a large number of development 
suppliers and one is dealing with a small number of IS operations suppliers. […] Furthermore, we 
have different levels of service depths in each unit. In the first unit, staff members of the purchasing 
department and business departments are more involved than in the second unit.” (case C) 
 
The organizational unit that manages suppliers for IS development has a specific 
‘controlling function’ and therefore involves stakeholders central to the SRM process: 
“They [staff members of the unit] ensure that the purchasing department concludes an appropriate 
contract. Besides, they involve the business departments’ ideas and call the legal department in 
legal matters.” (case C) 
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The second organizational entity focuses on the management of contracts/licenses in 
the domain of IS operating and is orientated towards ITIL’s service agenda for 
‘supplier management.’ 
Company A established a centralized unit within its IT department two years ago and 
takes a similar approach to that followed by company C. Again, a unit, reporting to the 
head of IT infrastructure, was established to fulfill the management of suppliers 
providing IT operations. Alongside carrying out license and contract management, the 
unit is responsible for monitoring supplier performance. However, a similar unit for 
the management of suppliers for IT development has not been established yet.  
Company E established one unit with a direct line reporting relationship to the Chief 
Organizational Officer of IT and assigned ‘strategic tasks,’ for example, development 
of sourcing strategy and maintaining relationships to strategic outsourcing partners. In 
addition, a central unit was established within each of several CIO divisions, carrying 
out more ‘operative’ tasks, for example, monitoring suppliers’ performances and 
conducting contract negotiations. 
Across all three cases, perceived benefits that resulted from the implementation of 
one or more central units for IT SRM were reported to be the following: 
• facilitating the development and enforceability of guidelines and standards for IT 
sourcing/SRM, for example, procedure models or security guidelines, and their 
check of compliance; 
• raising transparency of a company’s contractual relations with one supplier across 
different divisional units; 
• helps leveraging synergy potentials and cost savings by bundling activities and 
optimal utilization of resources. 
2.4.2.2 Mode of SRM Sourcing 
With regard to our second structure variable, mode of SRM sourcing, our case 
companies relied on different alternatives previously discussed theoretically. As 
described earlier, we found that during supplier base reduction, a ‘tiering’ approach 
was often chosen (cases A and C): multiple contractual relationships to smaller IT 
suppliers were terminated and they were now serving as subcontractors to one general 
company contractor. From a SRM perspective, we might expect that a substantial part, 
if not all, of the management of these ‘second tier’ suppliers was assigned to the prime 
contractor in this way (type IIb – external provider, focal company has no direct 
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contractual relationships with suppliers). Subsidiary companies, internal to the group, 
are in place in cases B, C and D (type Ib – internal provider, focal company has no 
direct contractual relationships with suppliers). In the latter case, the in-house provider 
is considered to be primarily responsible for IT SRM for the group. Except for the 
management of this in-house provider and a small number of direct commissioned 
external suppliers, the IT organization is significantly relieved from the management 
of IT suppliers.  
To a lesser extent, cases B and C have an in-house provider in place, whereby the 
directly commissioned suppliers are still managed in-house. Case E follows a pure in-
house model, in which the SRM of external IT suppliers is predominantly fulfilled by 
client staff.  
The theoretical consideration that companies may still have contracts in place with 
various IT suppliers (types Ia and IIa), but have delegated their management to an 
internal or external party was not predominantly observed in our case companies. 
However, this scenario is not unrealistic. To increase professionalism or realize cost 
savings, companies might choose to contract a specialized third partner for, e.g., 
supplier selection or performance monitoring. We see at least specialized suppliers in 
the market, offering a broad range of SRM activities. As mentioned above, further 
research is specifically needed here to understand the shape, benefits, and limitations 
of this model from a theoretical and empirical point of view.  
2.4.3 Process 
The whole process of IT SRM described above was expected to be cross-functional 
and involve resources, skills and competencies that are located most likely in different 
organizational entities, such as the purchasing or IT department.  
2.4.3.1 Degree of Involvement 
A dedicated section in our questionnaire tried to capture the relevance of the derived 
nine core activities, as well as the involvement of the five stakeholder departments 
within the organization. To achieve this, the case study respondents were asked to rate 
the intensity of stakeholder involvement throughout the process. The five departments 
included were IT, purchasing, legal and financial departments, as well as the 
respective business departments representing internal customers. For each activity and 
stakeholder department a four-point intensity scale, ranging from ‘not at all’ to ‘very 
intensive,’ was provided to indicate the degree of involvement. Table 2-2 shows the 
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average involvement of the five departments in IT SRM across the five cases. Here, 
we coded the response options with integers, ranging from 0 (‘not at all’) to 3 (‘very 
intensive’) and calculated the arithmetic mean across all nine activities.  
Beginning with case D, due to its ‘unique conditions’ in our case selection, the 
involvement of the purchasing department (2.7) was in average rated here much higher 
than the involvement of the retained internal IT department (1.1). An essential reason 
is that the internal IT department of case D has transferred a substantial part of SRM to 
its in-house provider. In other words, the in-house provider is basically in charge of 
selecting and contracting new suppliers, as well as managing the ongoing contractual 
relationship. Nevertheless, the in-house provider’s activities are controlled by the 
remaining IT organization of the group. The interplay between D and its subsidiary 
company was exemplarily explained regarding strategy development as follows: 
“Our in-house provider is in charge of further developing our IT sourcing strategy. Of course, it 
needs to be accepted by our CIO, but the provider is the driving force here.” (case D) 
 Apart from a variance in the absolute degree of involvement, the results in the 
remaining four cases, which fulfill still significantly SRM activities in-house, show a 
similar distribution: the IT department (arithmetic mean 2.3) and purchasing 
department (arithmetic mean 1.6) are the departments being most involved in the 
management of a company’s IT suppliers. A predominant role in IT SRM was often 
attributed to the IT department. Legal and business departments play a supporting role. 
In particular, financial departments seem to play a minor role in IT SRM.  
Looking more closely at the average involvement in the nine core activities of IT 
SRM within these four cases, the findings suggest the following (see Table 2-3):  
• The role of an IT department is predominant regarding the following tasks: 
identification and preselection of suitable IT suppliers, monitoring and controlling 
suppliers’ performance as well as taking measures to improve service provision. 
• The steps of analyzing and evaluating the performance of potential IT suppliers, 
conducting contract negotiations, as well as the final selection of an IT supplier are 
jointly fulfilled by an IT and purchasing department. 
2.4 Empirical Findings  39 
 
 
 
Table 2-3: Average Rating in Nine Core Activities of IT Supplier Relationship Management 
 
 
Notes: Scale 0 ‘not at all’ to 3 ‘very intensive’ 
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However, these results must be interpreted carefully. The rating was solely done 
from an IT organization’s perspective, that is to say: for example, a purchasing 
manager might have rated the involvement of his department differently (see 
limitations of our study). 
2.4.3.2 Mechanisms for Collaboration 
The star model of Galbraith et al. (2002) suggests that organizations need to find 
ways to bridge structural boundaries that might especially exist between IT and 
purchasing departments in this context. The IT organization of case B shows a good 
example of how formalization and the use of teams, as a more lateral connection, 
facilitates the collaboration across structurally separated departments. Similar to the 
remaining cases, B has developed guidelines for the whole sourcing process, ranging 
from development of a sourcing strategy through selection of suppliers to the 
termination of a contract. A formal process description governs the sequence of steps 
and the involvement of the purchasing department. In addition, it defines when a 
temporary purchasing team with representatives from, for example, a project as well as 
the purchasing and controlling department needs to be established. In case C, it was 
reported that their SRM process was even supported technologically by a workflow 
management system, facilitating an active control of the process steps across 
organizational boundaries. Thus, in the five case companies, process formalization and 
the use of cross-functional teams were the observed predominant means of 
guaranteeing the exchange of information in the context of IT SRM. While not focused 
in our study, we expect informal networks to be additionally in place within the 
companies, favoring also cross-functional collaboration in IT SRM.  
2.5 Conclusion 
This paper can be classified as a research paper paying attention to an emerging 
issue in IS research: the management of outsourcing relationships. Organizational 
design decisions on the client side were selected as the focus of this study to provide 
better insights into effective ways to manage IT supplier relationships. Three core 
elements of organization design, strategy, structure and process, were examined in five 
IT organizations of large-scale enterprises. The findings suggest that IT SRM is widely 
perceived as an important aspect in IS/IT outsourcing leading to various changes in IT 
organizations’ design. 
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2.5.1 Discussion of Key Findings 
As the star model of Galbraith et al. (2002) suggests, companies’ underlying 
sourcing strategies that have an essential influence on IT SRM, were first explored. 
Here, we focused on two aspects: outsourcing degree and number of suppliers. In 
general, all companies surveyed have a relatively high outsourcing degree and have 
outsourced a substantial portion of their IS development/operating to third parties. 
Except for one company, which contracts almost exclusively to its subsidiary 
company, the number of IT suppliers was from 60 up to ‘several hundred’ IT suppliers 
across all remaining cases large. However, we partially observed a sharp reduction in 
the supplier bases within the last few years. While the automotive industry is the 
classic example where a significant reduction of the number of suppliers has been 
observed (Clemons et al. 1993; Cusumano and Takeishi 1991; Lemke et al. 2000), 
similar investigations of a company’s reaction to a very large number of contracted IT 
suppliers are very scarce in today’s academic research. One exception is a recent study 
of Willcocks et al. (2010), which also indicated that some client companies have 
started working on a reduction and consolidation of their supplier bases. Here we have 
brought the ‘move to the middle’ hypothesis to mind which predicted a move to more 
outsourcing but with fewer suppliers (Clemons et al. 1993). A dynamic view on 
companies’ sourcing strategies suggests that the investigated IT organizations have 
recently aimed much effort at an efficient management of their contractual 
relationships instead of relying solely on ‘optimal’ sourcing decisions. 
This shift of emphasis does not only affect sourcing strategies, but leads to changes 
in organizational structure as well. Our conceptual framework distinguished between 
different organizational models of IT SRM, varying upon the degree of centralization 
and mode of SRM sourcing. The two extremes on a continuum, ‘decentralized supplier 
relationship management’ and ‘centralized supplier relationship management,’ present 
ways to structure SRM intra-organizationally. The outsourced SRM model covers an 
alternative where a company decides to outsource (a part of) its SRM to a third party. 
Our case studies covered these structural models and showed examples of their 
practical implementation. The predominant in-house model was a hybrid (centralized-
decentralized) structure, where IT organizations have established one or more 
centralized units for a part of the related activities, stressing the importance of IT 
SRM. Although a great variety of design and responsibilities of these centralized units 
appear to be in place in practice, two ways to efficiently structure the units emerged 
from our case companies: Separating either strategic and more operative tasks, or 
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separating units, dealing with suppliers contracted for IS development or IS 
operations.  
The last section addressed the process layer of organization design and studied the 
core activities and stakeholders involved in IT SRM. Conceptually, we derived nine 
core activities from a generic process gained from SCM literature and the best-practice 
framework ITIL. These activities basically constitute a process, ranging from 
identification of potential suppliers through building relationships and performance 
monitoring to the termination of contractual relations. Owing to the process’ wide 
scope, several competencies and skills need to be involved. Therefore, companies 
usually need to involve staff members from IT, purchasing, and legal departments etc. 
throughout the process. We shed some light on the distribution of IT SRM tasks, 
showing that IT and purchasing departments play the major role (from IT perspective) 
here. Formalizing SRM processes and relying on lateral connections, for example, 
purchasing teams, presented two predominant ways to bridge barriers between 
different organizational entities, that is, departments central to IT SRM (Galbraith et 
al. 2002). 
Not reported so far, our study tried additionally to provide the total number of 
people (full time equivalents, FTE) involved in the described SRM process within the 
IT organizations. However, our case companies had great difficulties to provide such a 
number. Since we do not want the reader to be deprived of the ‘lessons learned,’ we 
try to briefly summarize the reasons, why our attempt did not prove successful. First of 
all, as already mentioned, companies that followed a hybrid approach and established 
central units, were able to provide us the number of people devoted to SRM centrally 
(10 people and more). When trying to get the number of people also involved in SRM, 
but active in more decentralized organizational entities, the key informants could only 
give us relatively little information. Even the attempt to estimate the number of people 
involved in SRM turned out to be difficult, but revealed some further characteristics of 
today’s SRM implementation in practice. First, there still seems to be a large extent of 
people across the IT organization involved in the SRM process only part-time and 
temporary, which itself shows that the extent of people needed for SRM changes 
dynamically. Therefore, the need of people for SRM does not only depend on a given 
contract size, but seems also to be depending on, for example, type of contract (fixed-
price, etc.), the subject of the contract and the activities that are retained in-house (IS 
operations, development, etc.), as well as the delivered quality and know-how level of 
the commissioned suppliers. Given the lack of transparency and the partially dynamic 
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involvement in SRM activities, it is likely that there is a further great potential for 
companies to streamline their SRM activities to reach a more mature IT SRM. 
Bundling and centralization of further SRM activities might be one way to do this, but 
we expect companies thereby facing a major challenge in finding their optimal degree.  
2.5.2 Limitations and Future Work 
To advance research in the field of IT SRM, we conducted a multiple case study into 
the IT organizations of five large-scale German enterprises, attempting to understand 
how IT SRM has been implemented from an organizational design perspective. The 
multiple case study pointed out the barely examined issues in research and we will 
now briefly discuss promising directions for future research in the field.  
Although we did not conduct a single case study but studied a total of five cases, 
there is still a need for other studies to discuss, argue or confirm our findings. One 
major limitation arises from the fact that we applied the single key informant method. 
Despite our attempt to compensate this limitation by relying on, for example, data 
triangulation, future studies could extend research by for example adopting 
additionally a purchasing or legal perspective. Second, a larger empirical basis is 
needed to gain a representative picture of current shape and trends in IT SRM. Owing 
to our relatively small case number, we were, for example, not able to explore cultural 
or sectoral differences. Determining whether there is a remarkable trend towards a 
significant reduction in IT supplier bases, as well as studying the spread of centralized 
units appear to be worthwhile research areas. Future studies are needed to study, for 
example, conditions, success factors, risks and benefits of these concepts to support 
companies planning to implement them.  
Further research efforts should be made to additionally consider the remaining two 
organizational elements of the star model, reward systems and people practices, along 
with the potential benefits companies might reap from an alignment of these 
organizational design facets. At this point, one should remember contingency theory 
which suggests that there is no universal best way of organizing, but that the optimal 
organization design is rather contingent upon various internal and external constraints 
(Donaldson 2001; Galbraith 1973). In this context, our case organizations suggest the 
following conclusions: Centralized units seem to ‘fit’ especially well into 
organizations with a certain size and favoring strategic conditions, such as a high 
outsourcing degree and/or a large supplier base. The most straightforward reasons 
might be the eventually increased ability to handle the complexity that arises out of 
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these aforementioned contingency factors. And secondly, given the variety of activities 
necessary for IT SRM and the number of different organizational entities needed to 
carry them out, they call for a clear regulation of responsibilities, or in other words, 
process formalization. To further generalize these initial and other assumptions, 
additional empirical studies are needed, elaborating on the applicability of 
organizational contingency theory in the context of IT SRM, and its influence on IS/IT 
outsourcing success. 
Another field that is deemed to valuably contribute to IS outsourcing research is a 
thorough investigation of the organizational model of ‘outsourced supplier relationship 
management,’ that is, outsourcing (a part) of SRM activities to specialized third-party 
providers. Many pros and cons can be named for both alternatives, pure in-house vs. 
outsourced SRM. That is, for example, independency and control keeping on one side 
and the further leverage of economies of scale and concentration on business core 
competencies on the other. In our opinion, it would be worthwhile to view this model 
through different theoretical lenses and studying it in empirical studies, verifying it’s 
potential to succeed in the IS/IT outsourcing market. 
In the beginning, we pointed to the fact that SRM has already been well studied in 
SCM literature, albeit not with a focus on IT suppliers. Some principles known in 
SCM, for example, ‘supplier base reduction’ or ‘tiering’ were observed in our cases. 
Another interesting direction for future study would be to evaluate whether further 
SRM concepts from ‘mature’ industries, such as the automobile industry, can be 
applied to the IT/software industry. Furthermore, an additional look at differences 
between the industries, for example the fact that spatial proximity is less important in 
the software industry, could further point to particularities in the management of IT 
suppliers. 
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3 Paper B: Positioning Clients in Dyadic 
Dependence Structures of IS Outsourcing 
Relationships – Conceptualization and 
Empirical Findings3 
3.1 Introduction 
Today, many client companies have to a large extent outsourced their information 
systems (IS) to specialized IT suppliers. Since the early beginnings of IS outsourcing 
research, an excessive dependence on suppliers is perceived as a main risk for client 
companies (Gonzalez et al. 2005; Lacity et al. 2009). The concerns of being unable to 
switch to another IT supplier or subjected to a dictate of pricing, are only two of the 
aspects that clients associate with a strong dependence in IS outsourcing relationships. 
Compared to dependence research in other disciplines, investigations of dependence in 
IS outsourcing are, however, still in the early stages. 
In other research disciplines, dependence has been identified as an essential attribute 
of a relationship between two or more organizations (Emerson 1962). Traditional 
dependence literature suggests to assess both, client and supplier dependence, i.e., 
taking a dyadic perspective, in order to draw adequate conclusions (Emerson 1962). 
The reason behind it is that the aspired power advantage by one party arises from a 
dependence asymmetry, i.e., the difference between the two organizations’ 
dependencies (Emerson 1962). The opportunity to exercise such a power potential in 
an unbalanced dependence structure, represents a threat for the weaker party’s 
business performance (e.g., Gulati and Sytch 2007; Lacity et al. 2009). For example, a 
more powerful position of the supplier might induce lower service quality to the 
detriment of the client. On the other side, supplier performance losses appear when a 
more powerful client bullies its supplier and puts pressure on prices. 
                                              
3  This is the accepted author’s version of the following article: Kaiser, J., Widjaja, T., and Buxmann, 
P. 2012. “Positioning Clients in Dyadic Dependence Structures of IS Outsourcing Relationships - 
Conceptualization and Empirical Findings,” in International Conference on Information Systems 
Orlando, USA. The definitive publisher-authenticated version is available online at: 
http://aisel.aisnet.org/. 
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Losing sight of managing organizational dependencies, companies expose 
themselves to opportunistic behavior by their exchange partners or they fail to reap 
benefits by remaining in a disadvantageous dependence position. An understanding of 
dyadic dependencies enriches the stream of literature regarding the successful 
management of client-supplier relationships. Given the fact that IS outsourcing 
research has up to now treated this concept quite superficially, as will be outlined 
below, we focus on two main contributions: First, an extension of existing IS 
outsourcing relationship research by adopting the dyadic concept of dependence from 
other disciplines. This step will provide valuable conceptual and empirical insights 
which could not been obtained when addressing only one side of the dyad. Second, a 
comprehensive conceptualization of client dependence, paying attention to the 
peculiarities of the IS outsourcing domain. As a complex construct, dependence is 
determined by various factors which prior research has not clearly differentiated. The 
conceptual work presented herein will prove useful in future studies to explain, e.g., a) 
levels of perceived dependence, b) why companies remain in suboptimal relationships, 
c) differences in the levels of mutual trust and commitment to a relationship, as well as 
occurrence of conflicts and coercive strategies, which are assumed to influence d) 
relationship quality and IS outsourcing success. 
This paper is organized as follows: The next section introduces the topic of dyadic 
dependencies, refers to dependence research and theoretical frameworks. In the third 
section, the chosen research approach is described. Subsequently, we propose a 
framework of dependence determinants and present findings for five client-supplier 
relationships in IS development/maintenance outsourcing. This article closes with a 
discussion of findings, limitations and possible directions for future research. 
3.2 Theoretical Background 
3.2.1 Dyadic Dependencies in Exchange Relationships 
Contrary to IS outsourcing research, dyadic dependencies have received greater 
attention in supply management and relationship marketing literature (Frazier 1983; 
Kumar et al. 1995; Palmatier et al. 2007). Many contributions in this field have been 
inspired by the seminal work of Emerson (1962), who illustrated that the concepts of 
dependence and power are strongly interlinked: “The power of A over B is equal to, 
and based upon, the dependence of B upon A.” Many researchers have built on 
Emerson’s dependence conceptualization, in which each party’s dependence is 
determined by (1) the importance of the relationship to achieve desired goals and (2) 
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the extent to which there are alternatives to achieve these goals. Studies based on this 
view usually adopt a pluralist perspective, in which involved parties pursue differing 
objectives and power is a party’s ability to influence other’s behaviors (Jasperson et al. 
2002). 
Investigations of the dyadic nature of dependence is very popular in these 
disciplines and has led to the distinction of two constructs, namely joint dependence, 
or the sum of two organizations’ dependencies on each other, and relative dependence, 
i.e., the difference in the dependencies as described above (e.g., Casciaro and Piskorski 
2005). Researchers have used them to measure the impact of dependence on e.g., 
relationship quality and the involved partners’ performances in an exchange 
relationship (e.g., Palmatier et al. 2007). In a high joint dependence structure, i.e., both 
partners are highly dependent on each other, both face high exit barriers and can cause 
serious damage to each other. Thus, due to the mutual desire to maintain and perhaps 
further deepen the relationship, such dependence combinations usually show positive 
outcomes reflected in e.g., higher levels of joint action, commitment and trust (e.g., 
Gulati and Sytch 2007; Kumar et al. 1995). In contrast, dependence asymmetry has 
been shown to lead to decreasing trust and commitment as well as increasing conflict 
(Kumar et al. 1995). Diverging interests, opportunistic behavior and coercive use of 
power are more likely in asymmetric relationships and proved aversive to the 
development of relationship quality. 
3.2.2 Dependence in IS Outsourcing Relationships 
Turning to IS outsourcing, here understood as a “business practice in which a 
company contracts all or part of its information systems operations to one or more 
outside information service suppliers” (Hu et al. 1997), a different picture emerges. 
Prior research has acknowledged that dependence pertains to the ‘behavioral 
dimension’ (Currie and Willcocks 1998; Kern and Willcocks 2000) or to the 
‘attributes’ (Goles et al. 2005) pervading the working atmosphere of an IS outsourcing 
relationship. Surprisingly, apart from studies that mention the term ‘dependence,’ 
mostly to refer to it as a risk for the client (e.g., Aubert et al. 2005; Gonzalez et al. 
2005), literature is largely silent about its dyadic nature and its specific effects on 
outsourcing relationships. 
Some exceptions, predominantly case-based research, lead us to assume that 
organizational dependence is highly relevant throughout the whole lifecycle of an IS 
outsourcing relationship. By signing the outsourcing contract, a specific dependence 
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setting is initialized, albeit quite often still on a small scale. Various factors usually 
lead to a change in dependencies over time. In the service delivery phase, 
dependencies are likely to influence the efforts put into the relationship, stipulating 
power-play and influencing relationship outcomes. For example, in an experimental 
setting, Swinarski et al. (2004) found a positive relationship between a client’s power, 
i.e., a supplier’s dependence on the client, on its motivation to comply with contractual 
obligations, its willingness to cooperate and to invest additional resources in the 
relationship (Swinarski et al. 2004). A similar study investigated the impact of an 
outsourcing deal’s importance to a supplier on relationship quality and outsourcing 
success (Blumenberg et al. 2009). Additionally, a few case studies provided insights 
into the dynamics of dependence (Lonsdale 2001; Willcocks and Currie 1997; 
Willcocks and Kern 1998), indicating that the structure might often shift to an 
imbalance over time in favor of the supplier. Dependence and exercise of power are 
also highly relevant in the final phase of supplier switching and transition (see e.g., 
Chua et al. 2012; Whitten and Wakefield 2006). A client facing a high dependence on 
its supplier might be unable to terminate the contract due to high switching costs 
(Whitten and Wakefield 2006) or a lack of market alternatives (Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978). Imbalanced relationships might also lead to opportunistic behavior by the 
outgoing supplier, posing a threat for the client’s business in this critical phase (Chua 
et al. 2012). Dependence has also been discussed in the context of multi-sourcing. 
Relying on multiple suppliers instead of contracting a single supplier, is widely seen as 
a means to reduce a client’s dependence on each individual IT supplier. However, 
often to the detriment of higher management and coordination costs (Huang et al. 
2004; Levina and Su 2008; Sia et al. 2008; Willcocks and Lacity 1999). 
A study that addressed dependence between client and supplier in a survey-based 
approach is of Lee and Kim (1999, 2005). Herein, a positive relationship between joint 
dependence and quality of outsourcing relationships was posited. Inconsistent to 
findings in other disciplines (Gulati and Sytch 2007; Kumar et al. 1995), a negative 
relationship was found which was argued to arise due to particularities in the Korean 
market. While comparing their measures with those used in relationship marketing and 
so forth, the findings might have also been affected by 1) a strong focus on client 
dependence without referencing to supplier side and 2) no differentiation between 
balance and imbalance of dependencies. 
Based on our literature review, we argue that power and dependence contribute to 
the evolution, duration and success of IS outsourcing relationships, but are yet under-
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researched and need further clarification in our field. The vast majority of IS 
outsourcing literature mentions ‘dependence’ in passing, without recognizing its more 
complex nature. This reasoning is underpinned by findings from an extensive literature 
review in ITO (Lacity et al. 2010) that identified only one article (Lee and Kim 1999) 
dealing with ‘mutual dependency’ as relationship characteristic. Especially, a dyadic 
perspective which includes a simultaneous incorporation of relative and joint 
dependence is needed. With a thorough conceptualization of client dependence within 
a dyadic outsourcing setting, we hope to lay a foundation for a more prospering use 
and analysis of these concepts in our discipline. Thereby, we will build on the 
profound dependence literature and traditional theories as being referred to in the 
following. 
3.2.3 Theories to Explain Dependence 
To explain dependence in relationships, several theories can be used, mainly, 
resource dependence theory (e.g., Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), transaction cost 
economics (e.g., Williamson 1981) and social exchange theory (Thibaut and Kelley 
1959). 
Dependence is a key element in resource dependence theory (RDT). Herein, firms 
are described as open systems that must transact with their environment in order to 
obtain resources necessary for survival. Dependence arises from the circumstance that 
an organization cannot possess all resources needed itself. Furthermore, dependence 
on another organization is influenced by the importance of the obtained resource and 
the degree to which that resource is controlled by relatively few organizations (Pfeffer 
and Salancik 1978). 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) deals with the comparison of production and 
transaction costs to achieve economic efficiency (Coase 1937; Williamson, e.g., 1981). 
Transaction costs are defined as “comparative costs of planning, adapting, and 
monitoring task completion under alternative governance structures” (Williamson 
1981, p. 552 f.). The theory describes the conditions of a transaction that lead to an 
optimal governance structure between market (external), hierarchy (internal) and 
hybrid. One major factor that influences the efficient governance form is the level of 
specific assets. Heide and John (1988) introduced transaction-specific investments as 
“those human and physical assets (tangible and intangible) required to support 
exchange and which are specialized to the exchange relationship” (p. 21). Specific 
assets cannot be redeployed in other exchange relationships without losing value. In 
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case of high specific investments, TCE suggests that internal production will enjoy 
greater advantages and will be more efficacious than markets (Williamson 1981). 
When still relying on the market option, however, asset specifity creates dependence 
for the investing party, opening up room for opportunistic behavior for the exchange 
partner and reducing its replaceability (Heide and John 1988). 
Social exchange theory (SET), originally developed to investigate interpersonal 
relations (Thibaut and Kelley 1959), has also been used to study dyadic relationships 
between organizations (Anderson and Narus 1984). A central construct in SET are 
outcomes obtained from a relationship, reflecting the difference between rewards 
received and costs incurred. To evaluate these outcomes, two further constructs have 
been posited, namely the comparison level (𝐶𝐿) and the comparison level for 
alternatives (𝐶𝐿𝑎𝑙𝑡). Whereas 𝐶𝐿 represents the expected outcomes from that kind of 
relationship based on experience, 𝐶𝐿𝑎𝑙𝑡 reflects the average outcomes that are 
available from the best alternative relationship (Thibaut and Kelley 1959). If a firm 
obtains outcomes from an exchange relationship that exceed those available from 
alternatives, its dependence on the current partner increases (Anderson and Narus 
1984; Thibaut and Kelley 1959). Even though, dependence arises here from more 
positive conditions (Scheer et al. 2010). 
Besides these three theories, another related perspective but rarely explicitly 
mentioned, is the switching costs perspective (see e.g., Bourantas 1989; Kumar et al. 
1995). The term ‘switching costs’ (SC) is often used to describe the costs incurred by a 
substitution of a supplier (Bourantas 1989; Caniëls and Gelderman 2005; Heide and 
John 1988). Today’s literature defines and operationalizes “switching costs in terms of 
economic (i.e., monetary) expenditures and intangible (i.e., psychological or 
relational) costs associated with changing an exchange relationship” (Whitten and 
Wakefield 2006, p. 266). Switching costs thus also address barriers to switching that 
create dependence on a current exchange partner. 
3.3 Research Approach 
3.3.1 Research Design 
To thoroughly investigate a client’s dependence in dyadic IS outsourcing 
relationships, the case study approach was deemed particularly appropriate (Yin 2003, 
p. 13). Our research objectives are based on ‘what, why and how’ questions which 
render the case study approach as an advantageous research method. More precisely, 
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this study applies an inductive research approach with the aim to reach predominantly 
exploratory conclusions (Yin 2003). Recommendations and guidelines for case study 
research were considered to enhance the rigor of this study (Dubé and Paré 2003; Yin 
2003). 
To get access to dyadic outsourcing relationships, an IT organization of a large-scale 
client enterprise (over 40,000 employees) operating in the passenger transportation 
sector was initially chosen. This IT organization was well suited for our study, because 
it has sufficient experience in IT outsourcing (over 70% of IT budget outsourced in 
2010) and follows a multi-sourcing strategy which renders it representative (Yin 2003) 
for a number of other client companies (Kaiser and Buxmann 2012a). 
Table 3-1: Overview of Cases 
  Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 
Short 
Description 
‘Sales 
Platform’ 
‘Self-Service 
Platform’ 
‘Core Service 
System’ 
‘CRM 
Platform’ 
‘GUI for 
Customer 
Service’ 
Supplier 
Description 
(approx. 
values) 
global 
presence, 
400,000 
employees, 
revenue 
100 billion 
USD 
presence 
across Europe, 
1,300 
employees, 
revenue 150 
million Euro 
global 
presence, 
10,000 
employees, 
revenue 2.5 
billion Euro 
international 
presence, 
500 
employees, 
revenue 200 
million Euro 
in-house 
provider, global 
presence, 3,000 
employees, 
revenue 600 
million Euro 
Contract 
Period 2009–2015 2009–2011 2005–2020 2008–2020 2011–2015 
Contract Type 
and Volume 
usage-related, 
20 million 
Euro 
framework 
contract, 2.9 
million Euro 
framework 
contract, 400 
million Euro 
fixed price 
volume, n. a. 
fixed price,  
> 10 million 
Euro 
Current Phase 
in  
IS Lifecycle 
maintenance end of development 
development/ 
maintenance 
development 
maintenance, 
supplier 
transition 
 
Together with two contact persons directly reporting to the top-level management of 
the client’s IT organization, current outsourcing relationships were screened. The 
contractual relationships, i.e. cases, were chosen for enabling literal and theoretical 
replication logics (Yin 2003). As a prerequisite it has been requested that the 
respective supplier is commissioned for the development and/or maintenance of one of 
the client’s information systems. Furthermore, all contracts already had a minimum 
running time of at least one year at the time of investigation. In this way, we ensured 
that the basic settings of the contractual relationships were the same in each case 
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(literal replication). For theoretical replication, we aimed to include different levels of 
dependence asymmetry/symmetry as well as high/low values to see how variations in 
the determinants influence the overall dependence. This initial evaluation was based 
on the gatekeepers’ perceived dependencies. This selection procedure resulted finally 
in five IS outsourcing relationships involving differing suppliers, which form 
respectively the unit of analysis. Since our study extends beyond the boundaries of a 
single company, it is best described as to follow a multiple-case design which ensures 
that findings are not fully idiosyncratic (Miles and Huberman 1994; Yin 2003). Table 
3-1 gives a descriptive overview of the selected outsourcing relationships. Beside 
descriptive characteristics, the table shows the current lifecycle phase of the IS, i.e., 
development or maintenance. Please notice, that case 5 is specific in that sense that a 
supplier transition is currently taking place. 
3.3.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
The study was conducted in a time period of eight months, starting in September 
2011. Since data triangulation is highly recommended in case study research, data 
collection was relied on multiple sources (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2003). Altogether, 
company documentation, in-depth interviews, and a questionnaire were used to raise 
confidence in our findings (Yin 2003). The study started with a screening of company 
documentation that provided background information of the five contractual 
relationships, i.e., details about the IS, engaged people and suppliers. This initial data 
collection phase was followed by two major waves. The first wave was of qualitative 
nature and the second one involved the collection of quantitative data to strengthen our 
findings (Miles and Huberman 1994). 
In the first major wave, we conducted a total of 10 face-to-face interviews with 12 
interviewees across five different sub-departments on client side. To complete the 
dyadic perspective, we then contacted the five suppliers. In total, seven interviewees, 
encompassing project managers, team members and key account managers were 
involved here. All interviews were based on a pre-tested interview guideline 
encompassing semi-structured, open-ended questions. Different aspects were 
addressed herein: First, general information about the contractual relationship and the 
background of the interviewees. Next, an estimate of client and supplier dependence 
was questioned along with an explanation whether the dependencies were perceived to 
be balanced or not. This was followed by a discussion of influencing factors, their 
interplay as well as consequences. Whenever appropriate, we relied here on the 
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laddering technique which follows a process of digging deeper by asking further 
questions (Reynolds and Olson 2001). This discussion was not limited to the chosen 
relationship, rather, interviewees drew on their experience already gathered in other 
contractual relationships (with other clients/suppliers) to enhance the generalizability 
of findings. 
Table 3-2: Overview of Interviewees Across Cases 
 
Client side 
 
Supplier side 
  Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5  Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 
Division 
manager - - - 1/* - 
Project 
Manager - 1/* - 1/* 1/* 
Team 
Member 1 1 1/* - 1 
Team 
Member - - - - - 
Team / 
Project 
Manager 
2/* 1/* - 1 1 Account Manager 1/* 1 1/* - 1 
Contract 
Manager - - 1 - 1/*  
Subtotal 3 2 2 2 3 Subtotal 1 2 1 1 2 
Total: 19 interviewees in 16 interviews in first round and 10 questionnaires collected for second 
round (*participant) 
Altogether, the interviews of the first round lasted about 20 hours and produced 382 
pages of transcribed text. On average, one interview took 73 minutes. The text was 
encoded and structured using a qualitative data analysis (QDA) software. The coding 
procedure was undertaken as follows (Corbin and Strauss 1998; Miles and Huberman 
1994): A coding list was initially developed by two researchers. During the coding 
process still omitted codes were added to the list after agreement. The interview data 
revealed a large set of factors influencing client dependence which were iteratively 
regrouped, aggregated and redefined. Different streams of literature and theories (see 
section 3.2) were used to facilitate the causal mapping and to raise the conceptual level 
of our work (Eisenhardt 1989). Within this analysis step, the main tasks were the 
separation into direct and indirect influencing factors, as well as to avoid an 
overlapping (mutual exclusiveness), while, at the same time, striving to reach a high 
degree of completeness (exhaustiveness). Case analysis meetings with a research 
assistant, previously involved in data collection, and the co-author, not involved in 
data collection, were frequently held, discussing the interpretations to create a 
common understanding of the respective cases and emerging categories (Miles and 
Huberman 1994). 
54 3 Paper B: Positioning Clients in Dyadic Dependence Structures  
 
 
A second wave of data collection involved a questionnaire survey which queried 
client and supplier dependence as well as the derived determinants with different items 
on a 7-point Likert scale. A pre-test of the questionnaire with two respondents was 
initially conducted, discussing reactions to questions form, wording, and order. In this 
final round, one representative of the five relationships on each side, client and 
supplier, was respectively asked to fill in the questionnaire (see Table 3-2). This 
procedure was accompanied by an interviewer who recorded the feedback and the 
reasons for a specific ranking. 
3.4 Framework of Client Dependence in IS Outsourcing Relationships 
To facilitate the presentation of our empirical results, we first pre-structure the 
concept of client dependence by proposing a generic framework of dependence 
determinants.  
Reviewing literature in the field of dependence reveals that slightly differing 
perspectives on an organization’s dependence evolved over time. Jacobs (1974), 
recalling Emerson’s two-fold view, suggests differentiating between ‘essentiality’ of a 
resource and its ‘availability’ to assess dependence. For the latter, he proposes to take 
the number of available alternatives for supplying a product or service into account. 
However, the mere number of existing supply alternatives seems to fall short under 
some specific circumstances. Namely, when there are further barriers that bind an 
organization to its partner. It is stated that dependence is further influenced by the 
“difficulty involved in replacing the incumbent exchange partner” (Heide and John 
1988). Scholars in dependence research have therefore incorporated factors to reflect 
barriers of a source’s substitutability. For example, when the organization has made 
significant transaction-specific investments (Heide and John 1988) or when the 
outcomes associated with alternatives are lower than those in the current relationship 
(Anderson and Narus 1984), dependence is increased as a consequence of the 
difficulties to replace the exchange partner with an existing alternative. To estimate the 
dependence of an organization A on an organization B, with regard to a resource R, it 
is argued, that there is a multiplicative relationship between importance (or 
essentiality) of the resource R and its substitutability with a source other than B 
(Bourantas 1989, following Pfeffer and Salancik 1978): 
Dependence(A on B)𝑅  = ImportanceR,A ∗ (1 − SubstitutabilityB,R) 
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Conceptually, both constructs, importance and substitutability, can be based on a 
scale from 0 to 1. Hence, the product, i.e., dependence, ranges also from 0 to 1, 
whereas a value of 0 signifies that there is no dependence and 1 reflects the maximum 
possible dependence (Bourantas 1989). If the resource R has no importance or the 
incumbent exchange partner is fully substitutable, the dependence will be close to or 
equal to zero, showing that it is very low or inexistent (Bourantas 1989; Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978). 
Basically, the two determinants proved to be also central facets of client dependence 
in our discipline. To capture, however, the peculiarities of IS outsourcing, we propose 
the following models. At the left of Figure 3-1, a single sourcing model is considered, 
in which the supplier delivers the whole functionality for the IS. This particular IS is 
further assumed to support one or more of the client’s business processes. The covered 
functionality by the IS has a certain degree of importance (ImpIS,Client) for the company. 
It is low, if, for example, a relatively unimportant back-office process is concerned, or 
very high, if the IS covers the company’s sales process. To incorporate the second 
facet, the substitutability of the incumbent supplier (Subst), i.e., efforts to replace it 
with an alternative supplier to provide the IS functionality, is considered. In this 
regard, different options are possible, e.g., a supplier that takes over the current IS or 
even a supplier which brings in an alternate IS (different product, technology etc.) but 
with comparable functionalities. While not focused on in our study, apart from an in-
house alternative (subsidiary company), backsourcing could also represent a valid 
supply alternative. For instance, when the IS turns out to be highly specific in the 
sense of TCE, managing the IS internally can be the most efficient solution. A decision 
maker will weigh up the viable options against each other, all of which, are 
determining the substitutability of the incumbent supplier.  
 
Figure 3-1: Framework of Client Dependence Determinants 
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Since multiple suppliers are often involved in developing an IS, we extend the 
model to reflect a multi-sourcing setting. Substitutability, Subst, is assumed to be 
higher in a multi-sourcing arrangement, since supplier A accounts for a smaller part of 
the IS compared to single sourcing. With regard to importance, we adjust the previous 
model slightly. The previous Imp expressed the importance of the covered 
functionality by the (whole) IS for the client company. To be more precise, we rename 
this variable to ImpIS,Client. Components delivered by the supplier are called IS’. To 
express the importance of IS’ for IS, we introduce a new variable ImpIS’,IS. Please note 
that the use of these two variables is not compulsory. Equally, the overall importance 
of supplied components to the client company can be measured directly. This 
separation is, however, helpful when a detailed breakdown across hierarchy levels is 
needed. 
In this study, we focused on perceived dependence, e.g., client’s self-perceived 
dependence, rather than on actual dependence. The latter is hard to gather since 
necessary data to establish a fully objective measure is seldom available. Despite a 
potential discrepancy, we don’t see a big drawback in this point. Perceived dependence 
is assumed to govern a decision maker’s behavior and is therefore of primary concern 
here. While, theoretically, a multiplicative relationship between the two determinants 
is plausible, we relax this condition for perceived dependence and use a still to be 
determined function f in our domain: 
Perceived dependence (Client on Supplier)𝐼𝑆′ = f ��ImpIS,Client ∗ ImpIS′,IS�, �1 − SubstSupplier,𝐼𝑆′��  𝑓′�ImpIS,Client ∗ ImpIS′,IS� > 0 and 𝑓′�1 − SubstSupplier,𝐼𝑆′� > 0 and min 𝑓 = 𝑓(0,0) = 0 and max𝑓 = 𝑓(1,1) = 1  
3.5 Empirical Findings from IS Development/Maintenance Outsourcing  
With our goal to determine and explain a client’s position within a dyadic 
dependence structure, the empirical findings are structured into four parts, making 
extensive use of data collected from both perspectives, client and supplier. The first 
part uses relative and joint dependence with dyadic data to illustrate a client’s 
positioning in comparison to its supplier’s. The following sections then focus on 
explaining a specific client dependence position. In the second section, collected data 
is used to assess and verify the relationship between the two central determinants, IS 
importance and supplier’s substitutability, as proposed by the previously provided 
framework of client dependence. In an exploratory manner, the third section presents 
identified factors to influence client dependence in our domain and refines our 
3.5 Empirical Findings from IS Development/Maintenance Outsourcing 57 
 
conceptualization. Finally, these factors are quantified and used to explain in more 
detail the respective client dependencies across the cases. 
3.5.1 Perception of Dyadic Dependence Structure 
To obtain a dyadic perspective, we firstly incorporate a client’s dependence on its 
respective suppliers and vice versa. Basically, to collect dyadic data, two ways have 
evolved in literature. First, data can be collected on only one side, i.e., client or 
supplier, but using estimated dependence values for the other side. The second 
approach, which has become known as ‘full dyadic,’ involves collection of 
dependence data on both sides of a dyad. We followed the latter which particularly 
allows for a comparison of perceptions between client and supplier. 
 
Figure 3-2: Dependence Maps from Client and Supplier Perspective 
 
Figure 3-2 shows two dependence or power maps (Caniëls and Gelderman 2005; 
Cox et al. 2003) of the five outsourcing relationships investigated. The left one 
illustrates the client perspective (CP) on the dyadic dependencies, the right one the 
respective suppliers’ perspective (SP). In both figures, the abscissa depicts the 
perceived client dependence, ranging from low ([0-0.33[), over medium ([0.33-0.66[) 
to high ([0.66-1]). Accordingly, perceived supplier dependence is shown along the 
ordinate. In this step, dependence was respectively measured by three reflective items 
(see Table 3-3). 4 
                                              
4  Supplier and client dependence are measured by taking the average score on three reflective 
measured items respectively. These were based on Frazier’s and Emerson’s conceptualization of 
dependence. A party’s dependence is the “need to maintain the relationship in order to achieve 
desired goals” (Frazier 1983). Relative dependence is measured on a scale from - 1 (maximum 
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From the client perspective, own dependence currently ranges from medium, as in 
case 1 (0.44) to high, as in case 4 (1.00). Perceived supplier dependence is respectively 
lower or equal to the self-perceived dependence, whereas the highest gap is given in 
case 5 with 0.33. Thus, the relative dependence is quite small across the cases. There 
are even two cases (case 1 and 4) where a dependence symmetry is perceived on client 
side, i.e., the relative dependence is equal to zero. According to Emerson (1962), 
neither party should be able to obtain a power advantage in these two cases. In the 
remaining cases, the client perceives a structure in favor for the supplier with a relative 
dependence of 0.22 (in case 2) and 0.17 (in case 3). Consequently, there is no case in 
which the client sees himself in a more powerful position. Table 3-3 also shows values 
for joint dependence. The lowest joint dependence is given in case 1 with 0.89. In 
contrast, case 4 shows the highest possible joint dependence with 2.00. It is striking, 
that in three cases (2, 3 and 4) joint dependence is relatively high, reflecting that client 
and supplier face high exit barriers. Additionally, no case is positioned in the cell of 
low joint dependence (reflecting both, low client and supplier dependence), 
demonstrating that no relationship is loosely coupled and characterized by a mutual 
flexibility in switching to alternatives. 
Table 3-3: Values of Perceived Client and Supplier Dependence, Relative and Joint Dependence 
 Client perspective (CP) Supplier perspective (SP) 
(Self-
perceived) 
Depend. 
(1) 
Perceived 
Supplier 
Depend. 
(2) 
Relative 
Depend. 
(1)-(2) 
Joint 
Depend. 
(1)+(2) 
Perceived 
Client 
Depend. 
(1) 
(Self-
perceived)  
Depend. 
(2) 
Relative 
Depend. 
(1)-(2) 
Joint 
Depend. 
(1)+(2) 
Case 1 0.44 0.44 0.00 0.89 0.67 0.22 0.44 0.89 
Case 2 0.89 0.67 0.22 1.56 0.61 0.39 0.22 1.00 
Case 3 0.89 0.72 0.17 1.61 0.83 0.83 0.00 1.66 
Case 4 1.00 1.00 0.00 2.00 0.50 0.83 -0.33 1.33 
Case 5 0.67 0.33 0.33 1.00 0.83 0.61 0.22 1.44 
Comparing the client’s perception of the outsourcing relationship with the suppliers’ 
perceptions (Figure 3-2, on the right), provides further insight. Whereas the 
interviewees on client side perceive balanced dependencies in cases 1 and 4, the 
respective suppliers observe an imbalance in favor for the client in case 4 and a 
supplier dominance in case 1. This means, for instance, that the supplier’s dependence 
                                                                                                                                             
supplier's dependence) to + 1 (maximum client's dependence). Joint dependence is measured on a 
scale from + 0 (minimum dependence) to + 2 (maximum dependence). 
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is perceived higher by the client (0.44) than in the self-perception of the supplier 
(0.22). In case 5, the supplier perceives its own and the client’s dependence higher. 
The opposite applies to case 2, in which both sides received a lower rating. The case 
evidence reveals a significant incongruence in the perception of dependencies between 
client and supplier. In case 3, a high joint but balanced dependence structure is 
perceived on supplier side. 
Since we investigated only five cases, any conclusions from their distribution in the 
map should be carefully drawn. However, it is striking that on both sides, client and 
supplier, medium to high dependencies were predominantly found. Low dependencies 
were rare, only the self-perceived supplier dependence in case 1 is located in the lower 
quadrant. Moreover, also from both perspectives, suppliers are mostly seen to be in a 
more powerful position. Our case study shows that the dyadic perspective being 
common in dependence research is transferrable to our domain and extends the 
prevailing unilateral view. To know whether a client has a low or high dependence is 
essential, but the integration of supplier dependence is more accurate and completes 
the dependence structure. It further reveals power potentials and the degree of joint 
dependence, which cannot be elucidated when addressing only one half of the dyad. 
3.5.2 Assessment and Impact of Client Dependence Determinants 
With our second goal to conceptualize client dependence, the next sections are 
dealing with a better understanding of the different client positions in the dependence 
structures. Based on our derived framework in the previous section, Table 3-4 shows 
the values of the dependence determinants that were respectively assessed by 
representatives of the contractual relationships.  
Table 3-4: Assessment of Client Dependence Determinants from Client and Supplier Perspective 
  Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 
  CP SP CP SP CP SP CP SP CP SP 
Overall Importance (ImpIS,Client, 
ImpIS’,IS) 
0.50 0.83 0.83 0.83 1.00 0.83 0.83 1.00 0.83 1.00 
(1-Substitutability) 0.33 0.67 0.83 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 1.00 1.00 
Client Dependence 0.44 0.67 0.89 0.61 0.89 0.83 1.00 0.50 0.67 0.83 
Again, we tried to include both assessments, from client (CP) and supplier 
perspective (SP). The first row shows perceived overall importance, reflecting the 
importance of delivered IS components. While we will present the disaggregated 
values later on, the results here show that the overall perceived importance in all cases 
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is very high except for case 1, ranging from 0.83 to 1.00. With regard to 
substitutability efforts necessary to switch to an alternative supplier, case 1 also has a 
special position in our case selection. Whereas the effort was assessed as moderate 
(0.33) from the client perspective, it was substantial in the remaining four cases. From 
the data in Table 3-4, it is apparent that perceptual differences between client and 
supplier also occur on the level of determinants. 
To analyze the relations between importance, substitutability and client dependence 
in our cases, we use the scatterplot logic (Miles and Huberman 1994). Figure 3-3 
includes our two determinants, 1-substitutability and importance, on the axis and 
perceived client dependence is denoted by size and color of the circle.  
 
Figure 3-3: Scatter Plot of Client Dependence and its Determinants 
Figure 3-3 shows that the expected logic, namely the multiplicative relationship 
between the dependence determinants (see section 3.4, framework), largely applies to 
our investigated cases: The majority of cases shows a higher perceived dependence, 
when importance and 1-substitutability increase. Deviations to this reasoning, can be 
found in case 4 (SP) and in case 5 (CP). In the latter, the client observes a high 
importance (0.83) and very limited substitutability (1.00). Surprisingly, self-perceived 
dependence is, however, lower rated (0.67). However, this rating can be explained by 
exceptional conditions, since the client is currently switching to an alternative supplier. 
Our recordings revealed that dependence was assessed as medium, reflecting the 
remaining dependence on this supplier. Inconsequently, the substitutability efforts 
were assessed as very high (1.00), while not equally reflecting here that a significant 
amount has already been incurred. Here, we would have expected a smaller remaining 
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value as well. Particular attention should be paid to this point in future studies, 
especially with regard to measurement items. An outlier is given with case 4 (SP) 
where the divergence could not be explained with interview data. A higher value of 
client dependence would have led to a better fit. 
3.5.3 Decomposing Client Dependence 
So far, we considered dependence as a composite construct of two determinants, 
importance and substitutability. However, the framework fails short when a more 
detailed analysis is needed. In particular, what are the salient underlying facets of the 
two determinants? This section will draw on our case study interviews as well as on 
the different general theories described in the beginning. 
3.5.3.1 Importance 
As mentioned before, scholars in dependence research argue that the ‘importance’ of 
a resource is a relevant determinant of dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). The 
predominant dimensions discussed in literature are the magnitude of exchange and its 
cruciality. Our findings confirm their relevancy in IS outsourcing relationships and 
suggest their occurrences on both levels, IS (ImpIS’,IS) and company (ImpIS,Client). 
Relative magnitude 
Grounded in RDT, relative magnitude corresponds to how large the share of this 
resource is of an organization’s total inputs or of a category of the total (Bourantas 
1989). The proportion of total purchasing volume is one way to express the relative 
magnitude accounted for by a supplier (Gulati and Sytch 2007). For example, on IS 
level, it is conceivable that the relative magnitude could be well assessed by 
comparing single vs. multi-sourcing options (e.g., Levina and Su 2008). Basically, if 
there is more than one supplier involved in the, e.g., IS development, and the 
purchasing volume is equally shared, the client’s dependence on one of the multiple 
suppliers decreases compared to the single sourcing model. In our cases there was 
mostly either only one supplier involved or the supplier acted as a prime contractor. 
Case 1, however, depicts an example where the importance of the supplier’s 
contribution was diminished with the cancellation of a general contractor agreement. 
The supplier’s relative magnitude was reduced in this way. 
“Our dependence on that supplier declined, when we cancelled the general contractor agreement 
and commissioned directly a former subcontractor of an important system component.” Case 1 (CP) 
 
62 3 Paper B: Positioning Clients in Dyadic Dependence Structures  
 
 
Relative value contribution 
Whilst relative magnitude is in most cases relatively easy to assess, it is not 
sufficient, at least conceptually, to determine the whole importance of an obtained 
resource. Recalling Emerson (1962), the relationship’s contribution to the focal 
company’s desired goals needs to be considered. Next to relative magnitude, Pfeffer 
and Salancik (1978) therefore introduced ‘criticality’ which reflects “the ability of the 
organization to continue functioning in the absence of the resource”. Bourantas (1989) 
broadened this idea, distinguishing a strategic criticality next to the more (functional) 
criticality, reflecting a resource’s contribution to achieve a competitive advantage. In 
marketing channel literature, the resource’s contribution to sales and profit are often 
used as a measure (Geyskens et al. 1996; Heide and John 1988; Kumar et al. 1995). In 
IS research, IS importance is more difficult to assess and different value categories 
have been discussed (Melville et al. 2004; Shang and Seddon 2002; Tallon et al. 
2000). These include cost reduction, improving quality and speed, enhancing overall 
firm effectiveness as well as reaching new markets with the use of IS. Equally relevant 
is finance and regulatory compliance, which can lead to cost avoidance. 
Besides magnitude of the IS, we need to incorporate the relative value contribution. 
This is based on the assumption that the importance (or overall value contribution) of 
an IS can be high, while accounting only for a relatively small purchasing magnitude 
or vice versa. That is, an IS relative value contribution can differ from its relative 
magnitude. For example, maintenance services of a sales system might be more crucial 
to the company’s success than similar services to a back-office system, even if the 
financial magnitude of exchange is equal (ImpIS,Client). Similarly, two suppliers can 
account for a comparable relative purchasing volume, but the components of one 
supplier can contribute above-average to the client, leading to a higher benefit-cost 
ratio (ImpIS’,IS). The importance of an IS or a component of the IS is thus a function of 
the relative magnitude and the relative value contribution (see e.g., El-Ansary and 
Stern 1972). 
“The more critical our system, the higher is our dependence on the supplier.[…] If a system is less 
critical, our dependence is low.” Case 3 (CP) 
“If we stopped working, there would be a high risk that a central application would crash, [leading 
to high financial damage]. In this regard, client’s dependence is high.” Case 5 (SP) 
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3.5.3.2 Substitutability 
In IS outsourcing, a supplier’s substitutability is synonymous with a multitude of 
factors. Analysis of the case study interviews and an on-going comparison with prior 
contributions in the switching cost (Jones et al. 2002; Whitten and Wakefield 2006) 
and dependence field led to the following factors. 
Supplier alternatives 
As RDT proposes, a client’s dependence on a supplier is interrelated to the number 
of supplier alternatives (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). A limited number of alternatives 
lowers the substitutability of the incumbent supplier and therefore increases the 
perceived dependence. The number of alternative sources has been identified as a 
crucial dimension of client dependence and has been used in several contributions 
(e.g., Ganesan 1994; Gulati and Sytch 2007). In IS outsourcing relationships, the 
existence of alternatives seems to influence the client’s dependence as well:  
“The reason for our low dependence… I think, there are enough suppliers on the market, who could 
deliver the same as our current supplier.” Case 1 (CP) 
“I think, at the moment we are fully dependent on our supplier. […] Second, there are not many 
companies on the market, who offer such a CRM application.” Case 4 (CP) 
Evaluation and selection efforts 
Even if there are known market alternatives, there are still further reasons that 
hamper a substitution of the exchange partner in IS outsourcing. In case of a large 
information system, for example, supplier switching usually requires a substantial 
amount of resources, know-how and time to conduct the phases from preselecting and 
evaluating alternatives to finally selecting an appropriate new supplier. To do so, the 
client needs, among other things, to be aware of the requirements of the incumbent IS 
and to compare it with existing supply alternatives. When the client has lost this 
critical know-how over time, selecting an alternative becomes a challenging task. 
Furthermore, the acquisition of lacking resources and expertise represent costs or at 
least opportunity costs, since the value of an alternate use of the resources is foregone. 
This facet also includes efforts to set up and review a new contract. Put together, 
evaluation and selection efforts represent transaction costs and are supposed to be an 
important facet. 
“The effort to evaluate the market alternatives was immense. People would not want to go through 
this again in the next years.” Case 3 (CP) 
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“Efforts to understand and specify the today’s system functionality should not be underestimated in 
case of a new bidding.” Case 1 (SP) 
Performance uncertainty of alternative suppliers 
A further barrier arises from the uncertainty associated with the performance level 
of alternative suppliers (Whitten and Wakefield 2006). In IS outsourcing, the 
supplier’s capability and performance level is an important success factor (Grover et 
al. 1996). However, clients might face the challenge that the performance and 
capability levels of an alternative supplier are unknown and hard to predict in advance. 
Even if a high degree of evaluation efforts can lower the gap between expectation and 
knowledge, we argue that the remaining uncertainty is a switching barrier. The 
following quotes emphasize its relevance: 
“There are others who could manage our system, but if they could do this in the same quality, I dare 
to question.” Case 1 (CP) 
“Basically we could transfer this service to supplier X. But would this really provide an advantage? 
It is not per definition proven, that the service of supplier X is really better than what we have 
today.” Case 2 (CP) 
Sunk costs 
Sunk costs encompass the client’s perception of non-recoverable time, money and 
effort invested in the outsourcing relationship (Jones et al. 2002; Whitten and 
Wakefield 2006). Sunk costs are seen as irrelevant according to classical economic 
and normative principles of economy (Whyte 1994). The reason is that historical sunk 
costs cannot be changed by future action and only future costs and benefits should be 
taken into account in the sense of a rational decision making model (Arkes and Blumer 
1985; Whyte 1994). However, sunk costs can lead to a bias in decision-making and 
explain why a decision-maker perseveres with e.g., an unproductive IS development 
project (Keil et al. 1995). In an environment of high asset specificity, a significant 
amount of transaction-specific sunk costs of a non-redeployable variety is present 
(Whyte 1994). Typical sunk costs in IS outsourcing relationships might be past costs 
for training employees for a specific IS (Vetter et al. 2010) or development costs, 
when the client is not granted the right to transfer the current IS to an alternative 
supplier for the maintenance phase. Our findings suggest that the amount of sunk costs 
negatively influences the substitutability of an incumbent supplier, adding to perceived 
dependence. 
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“So, then we have invested more money, more resources, and more know-how. You don’t change the 
supplier so easily, you know?” Case 4 (CP) 
“Of course, if we had possessed the software ownership, we could have talked about a scenario such 
as: We look for another supplier, which continues with the development. But in this case, the prior 
developments would have been in vain.” Case 5 (CP) 
Lost benefits 
The need to maintain a relationship can also arise from more positive motivations, 
resulting from the benefits received from the incumbent relationship. Especially if the 
replaceability of these benefits are limited, a so called benefit-based dependence arises 
(Scheer et al. 2010). These considerations trace back to SET (Thibaut and Kelley 
1959), which compares the outcomes of a current relationship to those available from 
alternatives. Outcomes or benefits include e.g., high service quality, discounts, or 
special support services, such as technical assistance and consulting (Anderson and 
Narus 1984). Benefits lost upon contract dissolution are seen as crucial components of 
the substitutability construct (Jones et al. 2002; Whitten and Wakefield 2006) and are 
hypothesized to positively influence perceived dependence. However, if the currently 
obtained outcomes are lower than those expected from alternate exchange partners, 
lost benefits are not present and do not bind the client to its current supplier. 
“With regard to the contract extension, the cooperation with our supplier is exemplary. They keep 
deadlines and their side of a bargain. We do not experience that with our other partners.” Case 1 
(CP) 
“This supplier offers us many more functionalities. We can also exploit synergy effects that another 
supplier could not provide us.” Case 3 (CP) 
Post-selection client side costs 
With the decision to switch to an alternate supplier, the client encounters further 
costs to stem the switching process. For example, the client usually needs to make 
personnel available to transfer requirements and to upscale the new supplier. Direct 
expenses and investments in human resources, such as training of employees, or even 
the hiring of additional IS expertise will increase this facet. Also worth mentioning are 
overhead costs on client side, which are needed to coordinate the whole switching 
process. Switching to a new supplier, might incur additional time and effort to learn 
and adapt to new policies, procedures and routines deployed by the new supplier 
(Jones et al. 2002; Whitten and Wakefield 2006). If the new supplier has a strong 
power position, these costs may be particularly significant for the client, since the 
supplier will try to dictate the procedures and routines prospectively used in the 
relationship. 
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“The time needed to switch to another supplier increases the dependence. This switching duration 
means we have to set up a project and efforts are needed to migrate from A to B. If there is much to 
migrate, inhibition thresholds are high.” Case 1(CP) 
“One should not underestimate the time needed for the bidding process and the final replacement. 
These efforts would create a decline in innovation, since - under constant resources - the 
maintenance of the current system would suffer.” Case 1 (CP) 
Set-up costs of alternate supplier 
Set-up costs include economic and relational investments in a new supplier to enable 
a fulfillment of its contract, namely to (further) develop and possibly operate the IS. In 
particular, as a prerequisite, requirements and business knowledge needs to be 
transferred to the supplier. To reach the latest work state, new set-up costs will arise on 
supplier side, depending on the degree of reusability, which the client usually has to 
bear. These costs also include learning costs, such as understanding interfaces to 
surrounding systems in the client’s system architecture. An indication of a long 
switching duration often expresses the magnitude of the supplier related set-up cost. In 
IS outsourcing, the time needed for supplier learning should not be underestimated. In 
case of maintenance of an existing system, the time needed to understand the 
functional and technical conditions might be immense.  
“This system requires a lot of specific functional know-how. It would be very difficult to put another 
supplier in the position to further develop our system.” Case 5 (CP) 
“As a client, when I would like to switch my supplier, the new one needs a training period, he is not 
so efficient in the first years.” Case 4 (SP) 
3.5.3.3 Spillover Effects 
So far, we have encountered nine different underlying facets of importance and 
substitutability which are summarized in Table 3-5. However, during data analysis 
another factor emerged – here referred to as spillover effects – which is assumed to 
influence perceived client dependence. Spillover effects are specific in the sense that 
they result from other exchange relationships present between the client and its 
supplier. They represent potential, undesirable consequences which a supplier might 
cause as a reaction to a terminated relationship by the client or to its plan to do so. 
Taking revenge or a backlash due to contract termination were also posited in 
marketing channel relationships by Weiss and Anderson (1992). Even though, the 
supplier might react negatively within the current relationship, for example, by 
delaying the switching process to the competing supplier, the scope for negative 
reactions increases with further exchange relationships; especially, if the supplier 
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possesses therein an untapped power potential. In that sense, dissatisfaction with the 
client’s contract termination can spill over to other exchange relationships. 
Table 3-5: Underlying Facets of the Client Dependence Construct 
Higher-
level Factor Influencing Factor Description 
ImpIS,Client, 
ImpIS’,IS 
1 Relative magnitude (+) Share of magnitude, e.g., purchasing volume, related to the IS/IS’. 
2 Relative value contribution 
(+) 
Degree of value contribution of the covered 
functionality (by the IS/IS’) in relation to relative 
magnitude. 
Substitut-
ability 
3 Supplier alternatives (+) Number of supplier alternatives for the IS/IS’ or a similar IS/IS’. 
4 Evaluation and selection 
efforts (-) 
Perception of time and effort needed for evaluating 
and selecting a new supplier. 
5 Performance uncertainty of 
alternative suppliers (-) 
Uncertainty or perception of risk surrounding the 
performance of alternative suppliers. 
6 Sunk costs (-) Perception of non-recoverable time, money and effort invested in the outsourcing relationship. 
7 Lost benefits (-) 
Perception of benefits resulting from the current 
relationship and which are lost upon contract 
termination. 
8 Post-selection client side 
costs (-) 
Perception of time, effort and financial outlays 
needed to conduct the switching process on client 
side. 
9 Set-up costs of alternate 
supplier (-) 
Perception of upcoming investments in the alternate 
supplier necessary to reach the previous work state 
(related to the IS/IS’). 
Dependence 10 Spillover effects (+) 
Perception of magnitude of negative reactions by the 
supplier in other exchange relationships caused by a 
(planned) termination of the focal relationship. 
Spillover effects have often been mentioned in the case study interviews. Examples 
include price increases in interconnected systems provided by the same supplier. They 
can also arise in non-IT related exchange relationships, e.g., when the supplier has 
gained a significant purchasing power of the client’s products. Revenues which are 
then in danger to be diminished might also hamper a termination of the focal exchange 
relationship. This factor might add to an explanation why clients, although able to 
substitute a current supplier, and unsatisfied, have to further maintain the exchange 
relationship. Therefore, we argue that the client’s perceived dependence is increased 
by the perception of negative spillover effects. 
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“The problem is, we have not only selected a core provider, we are also dependent on the 
interfaces… the supplier has the opportunity to do a prohibitive pricing, or to create barriers, that 
we have to say, [a replacement] does not make sense.” Case 3 (CP) 
“Supplier A is not just a supplier, he is also our customer. Supplier A has also a significant 
purchasing volume and in this particular year, they withdrew volume on purpose and gave it to our 
competitor.” Case 1 (CP) 
3.5.4 Assessment of Dependence Facets 
In the final wave on client side, we used the derived influencing facets to analyze 
client dependence in detail across the cases (see Figure 3-4). In accordance to our 
framework, overall importance (see Table 3-4) was disaggregated into the importance 
of the covered functionality by the IS for the company (ImpIS,Client) and the relative 
importance of the supplier’s delivered functionality for the whole IS (ImpIS’,IS).  
 
Figure 3-4: Subfacets of Client Dependence Determinants (Client Perspective) 
As Figure 3-4 shows, IS importance (ImpIS,Client) is very high across all cases. The 
investigated systems are core or front-end systems to the customer. As indicated 
earlier, the respective suppliers mostly account for the major part of the entire 
development of the system, which is reflected in high values of ImpIS’,IS. The subfacets, 
relative magnitude and value contribution, facilitate a detailed analysis here. In case 1, 
the supplier accounts for 30 percent of the total purchasing volume for the IS, a second 
supplier for 70 percent. However, the relative value contribution is favoring the second 
supplier, since disproportionate valuable components are delivered here. Thus, the 
relative value contribution of the considered supplier was rated below-average (<1). 
Consequently, the supplier’s importance for the system was rated 0.17 and thus below 
the 30 percent share of financial magnitude. Case 4 represents an example where the 
reverse appeared (0.7;>1). Note that we were only able to derive these values for the 
ImpIS’,IS hierarchy. While it is theoretically appealing that the two facets are equally 
relevant on the higher level, empirical values could not be collected due to two 
restrictions: 1) relative financial magnitude could not be determined reliably, 2) the 
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information basis for a more fine-grained assessment of the value contribution in 
comparison to other systems was missing. 
Turning to the substitutability facets, the ratings suggest that a lack of supplier 
alternatives is in three cases (cases 3, 4 and 5) a substantial barrier to switching. In the 
remaining cases, the procurement market is characterized by a sufficient number of 
alternatives. However, it has to be noted, that both, availability of alternatives and the 
associated performance uncertainty varies significantly across the cases. Sunk costs 
are perceived as high in almost all cases. Moreover, in some cases the client obtains 
benefits that could not be realized in alternative relationships, which increases the 
positive side of dependence. In all cases, the remaining three factors, evaluation and 
selection efforts, post-selection client side and supplier set-up costs were rated very 
high (on average 0.73, 0.87 and 0.80). A moderate rating was given on average for 
expected spillover effects, ranging from 0.00 in case 4 to 0.83 in case 2. However, in 
case 4 spillover effects were simply not relevant, because there was just one exchange 
relationship to this supplier. If this extreme case is ignored, the mean average increases 
to 0.58. 
At the end of the second data collection phase, interview partners on client side were 
asked if they considered the list of factors as relevant and complete to assess client 
dependence. The relevance was confirmed for each factor (>4 on a scale from 1 to 7). 
On average, the factors received a rating of 5.27. Moreover, our interview partners had 
the impression that the list was complete and able to reflect client dependence in IS 
outsourcing. 
3.6 Conclusion 
3.6.1 Summary of Key Findings 
Over the last years, the management of client-supplier relationships in an IS 
outsourcing setting has received increasing attention in research as well as in practice 
(Hirschheim et al. 2008; Kaiser and Buxmann 2012a; Oshri et al. 2011a; Rottman 
2008). As a crucial relationship aspect, the focus was here set on a detailed analysis of 
dependencies between clients and suppliers in IS outsourcing dyads.  
To contribute theoretically, we drew on dependence research and extended the still 
prevailing simplistic view on this concept in IS outsourcing research. Conceptually 
and empirically, we did not only assess the magnitude of client dependence, but 
incorporated the supplier side and its dependence as well. We used two central 
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constructs, relative and joint dependence, to adequately describe a dependence 
structure in a dyad. While collecting assessments from both sides, a significant 
perceptual incongruence was observed.  
To provide reasons for different client positions in the dependence map, a 
framework from prior research in reference disciplines was initially derived. 
Dependence was presented as a composite construct of the outsourced IS components’ 
importance and the substitutability of the supplier, currently developing or maintaining 
them. Moreover, several theories were integrated to describe the constituting elements. 
The transfer of these general theories and linking them with specialties of our domain 
were facilitated by our dyadic case study approach. As a result, 10 underlying facets 
were retrieved that our interviewees considered as adequate to assess client 
dependence in our study context. As an unanticipated aspect ‘spillover effects’ 
emerged which extended the previous two categories. Dissatisfaction with a client’s 
decision to terminate a relationship can spill over to other relationships between the 
partners and lead to an exploitation of an untapped power potential. Since the 
dependence facets were identified in an exploratory manner, involving several expert 
interviews and supported by literature, a high degree of generalizability is expected. A 
first ‘proof-of-concept’ was presented with their quantification in our cases which 
further underlined their usefulness and explanatory power. 
Our research also provides managerial implications: The conceptualization of client 
dependence offers companies involved in IS outsourcing insights into how to influence 
their dependence position in current and future exchange relationships. Furthermore, 
the dyadic perspective presented has various implications for both sides. To keep an 
eye on partner’s dependence and on the own dependence can prove valuable in the 
long-run. Perceptual incongruences can trigger a critical investigation of the self-
perception and can help to reveal untapped potentials to increase outsourcing success. 
The dependence map used herein was assessed as a powerful visualization tool by the 
practitioners involved in our study. 
3.6.2 Discussion, Limitations and Future Research 
We hope that the proposed conceptualizations bring us closer to rigorous, empirical 
analysis of dependence and power in IS outsourcing relationships. Nevertheless, the 
findings are subject to limitations. Although we tried to get access to different cases, 
also including those with low dependence, our cases showed mostly medium-to-high 
levels. Further studies are therefore needed to investigate the full range of possible 
3.6 Conclusion 71 
 
dependence combinations. The exact composition, i.e., the weighting coefficients for 
the presented determinants and their facets, is still to be determined for the wide range 
of IS outsourcing relationships.  
Although full dyadic data is much harder to access, it is exceptionally valuable in 
the context of dependence. Since matched pair surveys are also rare in other research 
disciplines (Gulati and Sytch 2007; Kumar et al. 1995), especially when it comes to 
investigations of perceptual differences, such studies have the potential to contribute 
back to dependence research in reference disciplines. Some interesting questions are 
e.g.: Are there systematic patterns of over-/underestimation? And also, what are 
consequences of a great mismatch of perceived dependencies on the use of power and 
relationship quality? With our introduction of the two constructs, relative and joint 
dependence, we hope to have inspired future studies to incorporate them in other 
research models in our domain, e.g., to study their impacts on relationship quality and 
business performance. Although this study focused on the conceptualization of client 
dependence within dyadic outsourcing relationships, a few hints can be given for 
future research at this point. Among the most mentioned ‘negative’ consequences 
resulting from powerful IT suppliers were price increases, decrease of service quality 
(especially responsiveness of supplier’s personnel) and loss of innovative potential for 
clients. A few interviewees confirmed that symmetric dependence relationships are 
more beneficial for both parties. However, interviewees perceived differences in the 
degree to which IT suppliers exploited power potentials. Further research could, for 
instance, investigate whether a power potential directly translates into the use of power 
and what possibly hinders IT suppliers from making extensive use of power.  
Besides profiting from a higher explanatory power for theoretical models in the IS 
domain, dependence research in IS could potentially inform reference disciplines 
about unnoticed relationships or peculiarities in our context. With regard to this piece 
of research, the ‘spillover effects’ can be exemplarily mentioned here, which seemed 
to influence perceived dependencies. Since it is most likely that outside the IS domain 
also embedded, multiple relationships between same exchange partners exist, our 
findings suggest to pay more attention to potential spillovers in general. Furthermore, 
we would argue that the IS domain’s inherent distinction from other domains in terms 
of market structures and exchange of digital instead of physical goods, generally turns 
it into an interesting and different field of inter-organizational dependence research.  
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While this paper focused on the firm level to investigate inter-firm dependence, 
future research could also adopt an embedded view, applying social theories (e.g., 
social exchange theory, social capital theory) on the individual level and theorizing 
how these impact in turn inter-firm dependencies. Since also medium-to-high values of 
supplier dependence were partially observed, a detailed conceptualization of the 
supplier side could further add to our understanding of dependencies. 
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4 Paper C: A Two-Sided Perspective on Supplier 
Dependence in IS Outsourcing Dyads5 
4.1 Introduction 
Dependence, or the extent to which it is necessary to maintain an exchange 
relationship to achieve desired goals (Frazier 1983), is seen as a central attribute of 
relationships between organizations in various disciplines (Casciaro and Piskorski 
2005; Emerson 1962; Gulati and Sytch 2007). Likewise, prior IS literature has 
acknowledged that dependence pertains to the ‘behavioral dimension’ (Currie and 
Willcocks 1998; Kern and Willcocks 2000) or to the ‘attributes’ (Goles et al. 2005) 
pervading the working atmosphere of an outsourcing relationship.  
However, when compared to research in other fields, such as marketing channels or 
industrial relationships, very few efforts have been made to bring forward these 
concepts in IS research. Apart from studies that simply mention the term 
‘dependence,’ mainly to refer to it as a risk for the client, literature remains largely 
silent about its dyadic nature. In traditional dependence research, it is common practice 
to incorporate both organizations’ dependencies in order to identify the one with the 
greater power base in a relationship (Casciaro and Piskorski 2005; Emerson 1962; 
Gulati and Sytch 2007). A difference in a dependence structure represents a threat for 
the weaker party’s business performance (e.g., Gulati and Sytch 2007; Lacity et al. 
2009). For example, a more powerful supplier might deliver lower service quality to 
the detriment of the client, but also IT suppliers might suffer when a powerful client 
bullies them and puts pressure on prices. 
While, for example, Heiskanen et al. (2008), Lonsdale (2001) and Willcocks and 
Currie (1997) analyze different issues related to client dependence, especially, the 
                                              
5  This is the accepted author’s version of the following article: Kaiser, J., Widjaja, T., and Buxmann, 
P. 2013. “A Two-Sided Perspective on Supplier Dependence in IS Outsourcing Dyads,” in 46th 
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, IEEE Computer Society, pp. 4709–4718. 
The publisher-authenticated version is available online at: doi:10.1109/HICSS.2013.66, © 2013 
IEEE. 
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supplier side of a dependence structure is generally barely emphasized and rarely 
understood in IS outsourcing relationships. This is a shortcoming, since today’s global 
outsourcing market does not only show large-players such as IBM, Accenture or SAP, 
which will most likely have very low dependency on any single client. On the 
business-to-business market, small-and mid-size firms rather coexist with global-
players. IT suppliers usually vary in organizational maturity, in offered IT solutions 
(e.g., IS development, operations, software-as-a-service), as well as in served client 
portfolios and markets. For example, some suppliers act on niche markets facing 
oligopolistic demand structures or on markets with high competition, all of which 
influence a supplier’s dependence and power position with regard to a particular client. 
Given that prior research on the supplier side is rare, capturing supplier dependence is 
a crucial building block towards a better understanding of dyadic dependencies in IS 
outsourcing. 
To sum up, this paper focuses on the supplier side of bilateral dependencies and 
contributes in two ways: (1) by applying dependence research to fully describe a 
dependence structure between IT suppliers and their clients, (2) by providing a 
conceptualization of supplier dependence specific to IS outsourcing relationships. 
Thus, our results will complement existing literature and allow a full dyadic 
dependence approach on IS outsourcing relationships. Thereby, next to a client 
perspective, a supplier perspective is adopted – identified as a view point generally 
less examined by previous literature reviews (Dibbern et al. 2004). 
4.2 Related Literature 
4.2.1 Dependence in Exchange Relationships 
In other research disciplines, like relationship marketing and supply management, it 
is common to consider client dependence along with supplier dependence (Gulati and 
Sytch 2007; Kumar et al. 1995). Many researchers have built on Emerson’s dyadic 
dependence conceptualization (Emerson 1962), suggesting that dependence and power 
are strongly interlinked: “The power of A over B is equal to, and based upon, the 
dependence of B upon A” (p. 33). Investigations of the dyadic nature of dependence 
led to two constructs, namely joint dependence, or the sum of two organizations’ 
dependencies on each other, and relative dependence, i.e., the difference in the 
dependencies as described above (Casciaro and Piskorski 2005; Gulati and Sytch 
2007). 
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Researchers have used both constructs to measure the impact on, for example, 
relationship quality and the partners’ performances in an exchange relationship. High 
joint dependence usually shows positive outcomes due to a mutual desire to maintain 
the relationship and, for example, higher levels of joint action, commitment and trust 
(e.g., Gulati and Sytch 2007; Kumar et al. 1995). In contrast, dependence asymmetry 
has been proven to lead to decreasing trust and commitment as well as increasing 
conflict (Kumar et al. 1995). These constructs were also embedded in larger causal 
models to investigate their interplay with further antecedents of relationship quality 
and business performance (Palmatier et al. 2007). 
4.2.2 Dependence in IS Outsourcing Relationships 
IS outsourcing is herein understood as a “business practice in which a company 
contracts all or part of its information systems operations to one or more outside 
information service suppliers” (Hu et al. 1997, p. 288). Turning to dependencies in IS 
outsourcing relationships, prior research has here shown that dependence can be linked 
to the field of ‘relational governance,’ i.e., the softer practices associated with 
managing client-supplier relationships, as a determinant of client’s outsourcing success 
(Lacity et al. 2009). Combined with findings from reference disciplines, dependence 
can be seen as a ‘contextual’ variable and thus, as antecedent of relational governance 
facets, like trust, commitment and conflict (Goles et al. 2005; Gulati and Sytch 2007; 
Palmatier et al. 2007). While contextual factors are crucial for understanding exchange 
relationships, they have been largely disregarded in outsourcing research (Blumenberg 
et al. 2009). 
Throughout an outsourcing relationship, dependencies are likely to influence the 
efforts put into the relationship, stipulating power-play and influencing relationship 
outcomes. For example, in an experimental setting, Swinarski et al. found a positive 
relationship between a client’s power, i.e., a supplier’s dependence on the client, on its 
motivation to comply with contractual obligations, its willingness to cooperate and to 
invest additional resources in the relationship (Swinarski et al. 2004). A similar study 
investigated the impact of an outsourcing deal’s importance to a supplier on 
relationship quality and outsourcing success (Blumenberg et al. 2009). Additionally, a 
few case studies provided insight into the dynamics of dependence (Heiskanen et al. 
2008; Lonsdale 2001; Willcocks and Currie 1997; Willcocks and Kern 1998), 
indicating that the dependence structure might often shift to an imbalance over time in 
favor of the supplier.  
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Thus, prior research approaches let us assume that dependencies are highly relevant 
throughout the whole lifecycle of an IS outsourcing relationship. However, especially, 
the supplier side remains elusive. Understanding a supplier’s dependence is valuable 
for both parties in order to draw adequate conclusions from a specific dependence 
position, with regard to relative and joint dependence, in a dyad. For a client, supplier 
dependence represents an opportunity to ensure supplier bonding and to optimize the 
relationship in its favor (assuming that its own dependence is lower). Conversely, a 
high dependence on a client represents a risk for the IT supplier and can cause 
financial or strategic damage. To clarify supplier dependence in our field, we will 
build on the profound dependence literature and traditional theories as being referred 
to in the following. 
4.2.3  Theories 
Apart from Emerson’s generic conceptualization (Emerson 1962), several classical 
theories can be used to explain a party’s dependence in a bilateral relationship; mainly, 
resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), transaction cost economics 
(Williamson 1981) and social exchange theory (Thibaut and Kelley 1959). 
Dependence is a key element in resource dependence theory (RDT) (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978). Herein, firms are described as open systems which have to transact 
with their environment in order to obtain resources necessary for survival. Dependence 
arises when an organization cannot possess all required resources itself. Furthermore, 
dependence on another organization is influenced by the importance of the obtained 
resource and the degree to which that resource is controlled by relatively few 
organizations (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). While the traditional way is to apply RDT 
on the client side, it can also be turned around, since clients also possess valuable 
resources for suppliers, such as compensation for delivered services (see e.g., 
Blumenberg et al. 2009). 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) deal with the comparison of production and 
transaction costs to achieve economic efficiency (Coase 1937; Williamson 1981). 
Transaction costs are defined by Williamson (1981, p. 552 f.) as “comparative costs of 
planning, adapting, and monitoring task completion under alternative governance 
structures.” The theory describes the conditions of a transaction that lead to an optimal 
governance structure between market (external), hierarchy (internal) and hybrid. One 
major factor which influences the efficient governance form is the level of specific 
assets. Heide and John (1988) introduced transaction-specific investments as “those 
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human and physical assets (tangible and intangible) required to support exchange and 
which are specialized to the exchange relationship” (p. 21). Because of their 
specificity, these assets are non-redeployable in other exchange relationships and are 
assumed to create dependence for the investing party (Heide and John 1988). 
Social exchange theory (SET), originally developed to investigate interpersonal 
relations (Thibaut and Kelley 1959), has also been used in the marketing literature to 
study dyadic relationships between organizations (Anderson and Narus 1984). A 
central construct in SET are outcomes obtained from a relationship, reflecting the 
difference between rewards received and costs incurred. To evaluate these outcomes, 
two further constructs have been posited, namely the comparison level (CL) and the 
comparison level for alternatives (CLalt). Whereas CL represents the expected 
outcomes from that kind of relationship based on experience, CLalt reflects the average 
outcomes that are available from the best alternative relationship (Thibaut and Kelley 
1959). If a firm obtains outcomes from an exchange relationship that exceed those 
available from alternatives, its dependence on the current partner increases (Anderson 
and Narus 1984; Thibaut and Kelley 1959), even though, dependence arises here from 
more positive conditions (Scheer et al. 2010). 
Besides these three theories, another related perspective is the switching costs 
perspective (e.g., Bourantas 1989; Gulati and Sytch 2007). The term ‘switching costs’ 
(SC) is often used to describe the costs incurred by a substitution of a supplier 
(Bourantas 1989; Caniëls and Gelderman 2005; Heide and John 1988). Today’s 
literature defines and operationalizes “switching costs in terms of economic (i.e., 
monetary) expenditures and intangible (i.e., psychological or relational) costs 
associated with changing an exchange relationship” (Whitten and Wakefield 2006, p. 
266). Switching costs thus also address barriers to switching that create dependence on 
a current exchange partner. 
4.3 Research Approach 
With the aim to study supplier dependence in IS outsourcing dyads, we investigated 
outsourcing relationships between different IT units within a client organization, 
operating in the passenger transportation sector, and five different IT suppliers. Note 
that a closer look at the client side of dependencies is given in Kaiser et al. (2012). The 
study was set up to follow a multiple-case design to derive in-depth, exploratory and 
generalizable findings (Miles and Huberman 1994; Yin 2003). Table 4-1 gives a 
descriptive overview of the investigated cases. Literal and theoretical replication logics 
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were applied for the selection of the five outsourcing relationships (Yin 2003). To 
have similar basic conditions, all five IT suppliers are strongly involved in 
development and/or maintenance phases of one of the client’s information systems 
(literal replication). For theoretical replication and to increase variance, relationships 
were selected to include different combinations of dyadic dependencies (low vs. high, 
symmetry vs. asymmetry). This initial evaluation was based on estimates of two 
client’s representatives. 
Table 4-1: Overview of Cases 
  Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 
Supplier 
Description
(approx. 
values) 
global presence, 
400,000 
employees, 
revenue 
100 billion 
USD 
presence across 
Europe, 1,300 
employees, 
revenue 150 
million EUR 
global presence, 
10,000 
employees, 
revenue 2.5 
billion EUR 
international 
presence, 500 
employees, 
revenue 200 
million EUR 
in-house 
provider, global 
presence, 3,000 
employees, 
revenue 600 
million EUR 
Contract 
Period, 
Type and 
Volume 
2009–2015, 
usage-related, 
20 million EUR 
2009–2011, 
framework 
contract, 2.9 
million EUR 
2005–2020, 
framework 
contract, 400 
million EUR 
2008–2020, 
fixed price 
volume, n. a. 
2011–2015, 
fixed price,  
> 10 million 
EUR 
IS 
Lifecycle 
Phase 
maintenance end of 
development 
development/ 
maintenance 
development maintenance, 
supplier 
transition 
We did not only conduct interviews with IT suppliers, but also included the 
respective clients’ opinions and evaluations to derive a more complete and adequate 
picture of supplier dependence. In total, 19 interviewees participated in our study. 
Whenever possible, we followed a multi-informant approach, i.e., we interviewed 
persons with different responsibilities and on different hierarchy levels (see Table 4-2).  
Table 4-2: Overview of Interviewees Across Cases  
 Supplier side  Client side 
Case C1 C2 C3 C4 C5   C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 
Project Manager - 1 - 1 1 Division Manager - - - 1 - 
Team Member - - - - - Team Member 1 1 1 - 1 
Account Mgr. 1 1 1 - 1 Team/Project Manager 2 1 - 1 1 
 Contract Manager - - 1 - 1 
Subtotal 1 2 1 1 2 Subtotal 3 2 2 2 3 
In total: 19 interviewees in 16 interviews 
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All interviews were based on a pre-tested interview guideline and a short 
questionnaire to triangulate data collection (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2003). Also, an 
estimate of dependencies in the respective relationship as well as determinants and 
influencing factors of supplier dependence were investigated. To enhance the 
generalizability of findings, this particular discussion was not limited to the chosen 
relationship, rather, interviewees drew on their experience gathered in other exchange 
relationships with different partners. 
Altogether, the interviews lasted about 20 hours and produced 382 pages of 
transcribed text. The subsequent coding process was followed using guidelines 
(Corbin and Strauss 2008; Miles and Huberman 1994) and supported with a qualitative 
data analysis (QDA) software. Different streams of literature and theories (see section 
4.2.3) were used to facilitate this process of concept development (Eisenhardt 1989). 
During analysis, the main challenge was to avoid an overlapping (mutual 
exclusiveness) of the identified determinants and facets, while, at the same time, 
striving to reach a high degree of completeness.  
Worth mentioning is that we focused on the clients’ and suppliers’ perceptions of 
supplier dependence rather than on actual dependence. The latter is hard to assess, 
since necessary data to establish a fully objective measure is rarely available. We 
consider perceived values as an adequate proxy, since perceptions govern a decision 
maker’s behavior and are widely used in other disciplines (Kumar et al. 1995; 
Noorderhaven et al. 1998). 
4.4 Case Study Findings 
4.4.1 Suppliers’ Dependence and Power Positions 
To determine each supplier’s dependence and power position within the respective 
outsourcing relationship, we queried the supplier’s perceived dependencies, i.e., its 
own dependence and the perceived client dependence. Figure 4-1 shows the resulting 
dependence map (e.g., Caniëls and Gelderman 2005) from supplier perspective (SP). 
The abscissa depicts the suppliers’ perceived client dependencies, ranging from low 
([0-0.33[), over medium ([0.33-0.66[) to high ([0.66-1]). Accordingly, perceived own 
dependence is shown along the ordinate. Table 4-3 shows the corresponding numbers. 
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Client and supplier dependence was measured by taking the average score on three 
reflective measured items respectively.6 
 
Figure 4-1: Dependence Map (SP) 
In accordance with traditional dependence research, the map can be analyzed in at 
least three ways: by the degree of supplier dependence, relative dependence and joint 
dependence. First, the extent of supplier dependence varies across the five cases. In 
our sample, case 1 reaches a low dependence position with 0.22. Cases 2 and 5 show 
medium levels, 0.39 and 0.61, and in cases 3 and 4 a high dependence of 0.83 is given.  
From supplier perspective, a dependence symmetry is only perceived in case 3, i.e., 
relative dependence here is equal to zero. In cases 1, 2, and 5 the respective suppliers 
perceive a supplier dominance. The power advantage ranges from 0.22, in cases 2 and 
5, to 0.44 in case 1, on a scale from -1 (maximum supplier dependence) to +1 
(maximum client dependence). Case 4 is the only case, where the supplier perceives a 
structure favoring the client in the relationship (-0.33). With regard to joint 
                                              
6  Based on Frazier’s and Emerson’s conceptualization, a party’s dependence is the “need to maintain 
the relationship in order to achieve desired goals” (Frazier 1983, p. 158). 
Table 4-3: Assessments of Dependencies (SP) 
 
Perceived Client 
Dependence (1) 
Perceived Own 
Dependence (2) 
Relative 
Dependence (1)-(2) 
Joint Dependence 
(1)+(2) 
Case 1 0.67 0.22 0.44 0.89 
Case 2 0.61 0.39 0.22 1.00 
Case 3 0.83 0.83 0.00 1.66 
Case 4 0.50 0.83 -0.33 1.33 
Case 5 0.83 0.61 0.22 1.44 
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dependence, we encounter medium to high levels, ranging from 0.89 (case 1) to 1.66 
in case 3. These high values also result from the medium to high perceived client 
dependencies. 
In summary, with the help of the two constructs suggested by traditional dependence 
research, relative and joint dependence, we are able to adequately position a supplier 
vis-à-vis its client and fully describe a dyadic dependence structure. However, these 
constructs cannot explain how specific positions of suppliers arise or how they can be 
actively influenced. For this purpose, a conceptualization of supplier dependence, 
addressing determinants and influencing factors, is developed in the following. 
4.4.2 Conceptualization of Supplier Dependence 
In related research disciplines, Emerson’s power-dependence-theory is widely used 
to conceptualize dependence (e.g., El-Ansary and Stern 1972; Geyskens et al. 1996). 
Herein, a party’s dependence is determined by, (1) its motivational investment in goals 
mediated by the client and (2) the degree to which alternatives exist to achieve these 
goals. Motivational investment involves the value of the outcomes mediated by the 
other party (Geyskens et al. 1996), which is similar to ‘resource importance’ in RDT 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). For the second category, Emerson adds that the costs 
associated with alternatives have to be taken into account (Emerson 1962). Or, in other 
words, dependence is influenced by the “difficulty involved in replacing the 
incumbent exchange partner” (Heide and John 1988). 
In general, our explorative study confirmed the applicability of Emerson’s broad 
conceptualization to our field and showed that supplier dependence in IS outsourcing 
relationships is determined by (1) the importance of the outsourcing relationship in 
achieving a supplier’s goals, and (2) the substitutability of the current client with an 
alternative outsourcing company. Conceptually, a multiplicative relationship between 
the two determinants exists, reflecting that dependence is not present when either 
importance or substitutability is close to zero (Bourantas 1989; Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978). 
In the following, we will report on the important underlying facets of the two 
determinants in IS outsourcing relationships. This section will draw on our case study 
interviews as well as on the different general theories described in section 4.2.3. 
Furthermore, the description of the identified supplier dependence facets are 
substantiated with statements from client (CP) and supplier perspective (SP). 
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4.4.2.1 Importance of the Outsourcing Deal 
Our data analysis suggests two factors determining a supplier’s perceived 
importance of a relationship: relative financial magnitude and strategic impact of the 
outsourcing relationship. 
Relative financial magnitude 
Given that key goals of suppliers are sales and profit, they are relatively dependent 
on outsourcing relationships that account for a significant fraction of their turnover and 
profit. This measurement has already been widely used in studies of channels (e.g., El-
Ansary and Stern 1972; Geyskens et al. 1996) and industrial relationships (e.g., 
Noorderhaven et al. 1998). Relative financial magnitude is also seen as a central 
component of an organization’s dependence in RDT (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). 
Apart from current levels of total sales or profit, anticipated future sales and profits 
pertaining to this deal as a percentage of total sales and profits also influence a 
relationship’s importance (Blumenberg et al. 2009; Noorderhaven et al. 1998). In our 
IS outsourcing cases, relative financial magnitude was also closely linked to 
importance and thus further strengthens earlier predictions (Blumenberg et al. 2009), 
hypothesizing a positive relationship between them.  
“As a supplier, I am dependent on a customer, because I would like to make profit.” Case 2 (CP) 
“Additionally, the future business we will have with this customer is important. Well, yes, I think 
financial dependence is very high here.” Case 4 (SP) 
“In the past, we made a lot of turnover with this project, dependence was much higher in the past.” 
Case 5 ( SP) 
Strategic impact  
While the sales and profit approach is widely used in other research disciplines, it is 
not sufficient to determine the whole importance of a relationship in our domain. A 
second crucial facet we encountered in our cases addresses the ‘strategic’ importance 
of a deal. Some suppliers ascribe a high importance to an exchange relationship, even 
if the current and future relative financial magnitude herein are low. This is in 
accordance with RDT which introduces a second facet - ‘criticality’ - alongside the 
relative magnitude of a resource (Bourantas 1989; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). In such 
cases, suppliers usually expect the current relationship to have a significant influence 
on their medium- to long-term business development. Frequently, IT suppliers try to 
access important industry or domain knowledge within an exchange relationship, 
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which presents another kind of compensation. Essentially, strategic intents associated 
with a relationship can be twofold: On the one hand, the expectation of lucrative 
follow-up jobs in other units within the client company stimulates the importance of 
the current deal. Figuratively speaking, ‘having a foot in the door’ is here a motivating 
factor and almost all interviewees hoped that the current client department endorses 
them to other IT projects and tenders of the client company. 
On the other hand, strategic intents can also move beyond the client’s company and 
reflect the expectation to generate further business in a market as a consequence of the 
current deal. Here, the access to a not yet tapped market sector, an increase of 
reputation or the interest in receiving crucial references contribute to relationship 
importance (see also Blumenberg et al. 2009). 
While deals are usually envisioned to be successful, the opposite can take place as 
well. A negative outcome may discourage other potential clients and can result in a 
severe damage for the supplier’s reputation and business development. Altogether, the 
strategic impact encompassing the gain or loss of future deals as a result of the current 
relationship proffers a facet of crucial importance. 
4.4.2.2 Substitutability  
Substitutability reflects the costs and efforts needed to achieve financial and 
strategic goals in alternative exchange relationships. 
Client alternatives 
As RDT (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) and Emerson’s power-dependence theory 
(Emerson 1962) propose, an organization’s dependence on an exchange partner is 
interrelated to the number of alternatives. A limited number of alternatives lowers the 
current client’s substitutability and increases perceived dependence. Case analyses 
suggest that in IS outsourcing relationships the existence of alternatives equally 
influences a supplier’s dependence. Suppliers facing monopolistic or oligopolistic 
market structures might have greater efforts to identify alternate exchange partners. 
“It also has a strategic reason. This client has a high reputation in this particular market. And of 
course, if we successfully complete this project and the client is satisfied, other clients will get 
interested in our product. And yes, thus, there is a kind of dependence.” Case 4 (SP) 
“We need this client. They are important for us to convince other customers.[..] I’d say we are 
dependent.” Case 3 (SP) 
“So far they [supplier] had the interest to place this product on the market, they were dependent on 
us. Once they decided to leave this market, there was no dependence anymore.” Case 5 (CP) 
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Furthermore, if suppliers act on saturated markets the perception of potential 
alternatives is likely to decrease. In contrast, suppliers with diversified client 
portfolios, i.e., serving different markets might perceive a higher number of client 
alternatives.  
“The supplier planned to sell this product to other clients. But when it became clear that this 
solution cannot be sold to others, their dependence on us increased.” Case 5 (CP) 
“There are others who build their software only for certain clients. We do projects and our projects 
are not dependent on any client.[…] The market is big.” Case 2 (SP)  
“This client is one we would never want to lose, never. We could survive without them, yes. But 
there are not many customers like them in the market.” Case 3 (SP) 
Degree of amortization 
Non-recoverable investments in terms of time, efforts and money in outsourcing 
relationships are sunk costs which have a binding effect on the current exchange 
partner (Jones et al. 2002; Whitten and Wakefield 2006). Sunk costs are seen as 
irrelevant according to classical economic and normative principles of economy 
(Whyte 1994). The reason is that historical sunk costs cannot be reversed and only 
future costs and benefits should be taken into account for the purpose of a rational 
decision making model (Arkes and Blumer 1985; Whyte 1994). However, in practice, 
decision-makers find it usually hard to ignore past costs (Arkes and Blumer 1985; 
Whyte 1994). The degree of amortization of investments was found to be highly 
relevant for a supplier. Interviewees explained that in IS development projects, IT 
suppliers often go into advance payment and are first paid after reaching certain 
milestones. In phases, in which they have not reached an amortization of their 
investments, termination of the relationship is considered to be particularly painful. 
Thus, the lower the degree of amortization the higher is the perceived need for the 
supplier to maintain this business relation and the higher should be its perceived 
dependence. 
“In the beginning, we had a negative financial impact. In these phases, our dependence on that 
client was very high. You don’t like to leave a relationship with an unprofitable contract. That 
would have been a disaster.” Case 1 (SP) 
“Dependence is high, when the financial damage caused by a contract termination is high. 
Sometimes we outlay in advance and payment milestones are much later. An exit of the project in 
such phases would have an extremely serious impact on our business.” Case 4 (SP) 
“In the beginning, the supplier was relatively dependent on us. They offered a fixed-price contract, 
but they underestimated their internal efforts. Dependence declined or was very low, when the 
project was refinanced with maintenance payments.” Case 1 (CP) 
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Acquisition and set-up costs 
Grounded in TCE, the costs of a supplier to acquire an alternate customer hamper 
the substitutability of the incumbent client. When awarding IS outsourcing contracts, 
bidding processes are a widely used method to select the ‘best fit’ IT supplier among 
competitors. For participating suppliers, bids can be a costly and time-consuming 
affair, in particular when the competition among suppliers is strong. Once an alternate 
client has been won, efforts for contract negotiation and initial project set-up create 
further costs which delay and hamper the achievement of the financial and strategic 
goals. Frequently, the staff needs train-up phases before becoming productive. Set-up 
costs further increase when new employees with specialized know-how or expertise 
have to be hired in. 
Depending on the contractual agreements, the costs incurred in these phases might 
be partially covered by payments from the ‘new’ client. For example, costs for 
tailoring a software solution might be charged back. Overall, additional efforts, costs 
and time borne by the supplier to achieve again the lost financial or strategic goals 
decrease the substitutability of the current client. 
“From one day to another we would not be able to staff the project members to a totally different 
project. There would be train-up phases and yes, we would have to generate new business.” Case 2 
(SP) 
“Substitutability of a client is much easier when your systems are customizable [which induces 
lower set-up efforts].” Case 5 (SP)  
“When the client decided to switch to another supplier a few years ago, we tried to get new deals. 
But we had great problems. [..] We had to identify a larger number of smaller clients, there are not 
many as big as this client. You need higher contract volumes. All this meant more costs, for contract 
negotiations and to handle the number of clients. We did not manage to substitute the lost volume.” 
Case 5 (SP) 
Lost benefits 
A further binding instrument are benefits received from the incumbent relationship. 
Especially, if the replaceability of these benefits is limited, a so called benefit-based 
dependence arises (Scheer et al. 2010). These considerations trace back to SET 
(Thibaut and Kelley 1959) which compares the outcomes of a current relationship to 
those available from alternatives. 
A client’s attractiveness can originate from different sources. Benefits include the 
access to important technical or market information (Noorderhaven et al. 1998) or a 
client’s support to build up rare, but valuable capabilities or know-how. Furthermore, 
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suppliers might prefer clients that are very innovative and ‘push them forward.’ Good 
inter-personal relationships and a client staff’s quality were also mentioned as 
potential benefits on team-level. 
Thus, perceived benefits are multi-faceted, but we argue that they can act as a 
binding mechanism. Namely, when the perceived net-benefits are higher than the 
second-best client alternative. However, if the currently obtained benefits are lower 
than those expected from alternate exchange partners, lost benefits are not present and 
do not bind the supplier to the incumbent client. 
“I would say there is a high emotional dependence. In our team there are many people who showed 
high levels of commitment to this client over the last number of years. They are really happy with 
their job here – and I think they could relatively easy find a job somewhere else.” Case 1 (CP)  
“Their dependence on us is reflected by their innovation boost we give them.” Case 3 (CP) 
Termination costs 
In accordance with the logic of TCE, a termination of a business relation can induce 
follow-up costs detrimental to the supplier. While there might be efforts and costs 
related to handle the termination of the focal outsourcing contract, additional costs and 
efforts can be incurred for terminating the relationships to other contractual partners so 
far involved in the service delivery.  
For example, those employees that have hitherto delivered the service to the 
customer and cannot be staffed to other projects, e.g.: due to special-purpose know-
how and expertise, will either result in on-going idle costs or costs of layoffs. 
Interviewees also mentioned that employees themselves might terminate their 
employment contract when a particular client or a site are lost. Especially, the loss of 
valued employees can be harmful, e.g.: when they possess good technical and 
functional knowledge, which is hard to replace. 
 Furthermore, there can be running costs for unused physical assets (e.g., servers), 
license fees, or contractual penalties in case of premature termination. In the same 
way, IT suppliers that have further commissioned other IT suppliers, e.g., offshore 
centers, can face additional costs when ongoing contracts have to be cancelled. 
Appropriate contractual safeguards help to pass such costs on to the client or to other 
contractual partners. However, anticipated termination efforts and costs, which the 
supplier has to bear, decreases the substitutability of the incumbent client. 
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“At a later point, dependence is higher. You have hired a lot of developers and perhaps offshore IT 
suppliers. [..]A reversal can be very hard.” Case 4 (SP) 
“I think, our dependence is not so high since we are used to project business and that we have to 
deploy our employees quickly to other projects. […] But this depends much on the number of 
projects we have and the number of employees in the given project. It is harder to staff a large 
number anywhere else.” Case 5 (SP) 
“When the client terminates a contract … maybe we have know-how we cannot use anymore … 
sometimes you lose project members who are specialized to a certain market or customer. They 
switch to the client or to other suppliers in the field.” Case 4 (SP) 
4.4.2.3 Spillover Effects 
During data analysis another factor emerged – here referred to as ‘spillover effects.’ 
This factor is assumed to influence perceived supplier dependence but did not fit very 
well in the two traditional dependence categories. Spillover effects are specific in the 
sense that they result from other exchange relationships existing between the two 
exchange partners. In IS outsourcing, it is not uncommon that IT suppliers develop, 
operate or maintain more than one information system per client. Spillover effects then 
reflect potential, undesirable consequences, which a client might employ as a reaction 
to a terminated relationship by the supplier or to its plan to do so. 
When considering the extreme case in which a supplier is basically able and willing 
to terminate a contract with the client, because it does neither contribute to the 
financial nor to the strategic business goals and the involved resources could be better 
used in alternate relationships: Anticipated negative consequences in other outsourcing 
relationships with this client – especially, if the client possesses therein an untapped 
power potential – can lead to a continuation of this disadvantageous business relation. 
Expected reactions of a client include, e.g.: tougher price negotiations, withholding of 
information, delaying of contract renewals or even termination of other contractual 
relationships by the client.  
Case study analysis suggests the following relationship: The higher the perceived 
magnitude of spillover effects, the higher is the need to maintain the relationship and 
thus the dependence on this client. 
“If you have one system with a client and this is not profitable, you won’t expire the contract. But 
mostly, you have more than one system with a client. For example, we could not terminate the 
contract X, because the client would complain. It is not very common, but a good account manager 
adopts a total perspective as well. Then, maybe you better give in [in this relationship] to safeguard 
your other investments [with this client].” Case 5 (SP) 
“If we stopped our service tomorrow, we would face negative consequences in other relationships 
with this client.” Case 2 (SP) 
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4.4.3 Cross-case Analysis 
To facilitate a cross-case analysis, we used a predictor-outcome matrix (Miles and 
Huberman 1994) (see Table 4-4). Apart from a short description of the eight factors, 
Table 4-4 shows in which cases the factors were mentioned respectively (denoted by 
an x). Here, we used both perspectives, that is, clients (CP) were asked as well to name 
determinants of supplier dependence. Whenever possible, we used the interview data 
to evaluate the factors’ extent (low L, medium M, high H). In some cases, a factor was 
mentioned as a sub-determinant of supplier dependence, but not evaluated in the 
contractual relationship at hand (see e.g., factor 5 in case 5, CP). To provide a clear 
overview, please note that multiple mentions on client or supplier side (in different 
interviews) were only counted once. 
The cross-case analysis shows that the importance facets, relative financial 
magnitude and strategic impact, were the most mentioned factors to justify a specific 
dependence level. Next in line are the aspects of substitutability, client alternatives, 
degree of amortization and spillover effects. In our case selection, acquisition and set-
up costs, lost benefits and termination costs were less commonly mentioned. In 
particular, it is striking, that these factors are barely mentioned as relevant factors 
influencing a supplier’s dependence from client perspective. One reason for that could 
be that clients have less insight in these sub-determinants of supplier dependence. The 
high values of strategic impact across all cases can be explained by the client’s good 
reputation in the specific market.  
Whilst more data would be needed to reliably evaluate the goodness of the 
determinants to explain a certain level of supplier dependence, the collected case data 
should not be disregarded. Figure 4-1 showed the different levels of supplier 
dependence. Overall, we see a good fit between these values and the factors’ 
evaluations. In case 1, overall dependence was assessed as low, which is also reflected 
in low levels of relative financial magnitude, a sufficient number of client alternatives 
and a high degree of amortization. Strategic importance, lost benefits and termination 
costs were rated medium to high, resulting in a low, but not absolutely insignificant 
dependence of 0.22. Similar, the deal in case 2 accounts for a small financial 
magnitude but the strategic impact is high. Alternatives are rather sufficient, merely 
acquisition and set-up costs are assessed as medium. This largely fits to the 
dependence estimated as moderate. 
4.4 Case Study Findings  89 
 
Table 4-4: Predictor-Outcome Matrix Across Cases 
Higher-
level 
factor 
Influencing 
factor Description Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 
 SP CP SP CP SP CP SP CP SP CP 
Imp. 
1 Relative 
financial 
magnitude (+) 
Share of financial output, i.e., turnover or 
profit, accounted for by this deal today and 
in the future. 
x x x x x x x x x x 
L L L M M M H H (H)L/M L 
2 Strategic 
impact (+) 
Importance of this deal to achieve IT 
supplier’s strategic goals. 
x x x x x x x - x x 
H H H H H H H - (H) L (H) L 
Subst. 
3 Client 
alternatives (+) 
Number of client alternatives to achieve 
these financial and strategic goals. 
- x x - x x x x x x 
- H H - L M M L L L 
4 Degree of 
amortization 
(+) 
Perceived degree to which the non-
recoverable time, money and effort invested 
in the outsourcing relationship have been 
amortized. 
x x - x - - x x - - 
(L)H (L)H - - - - L L - - 
5 Acquisition 
and set-up costs 
(-) 
Perceived time, cost and effort needed to 
acquire alternatives and reach again an 
efficient level to compensate for affected 
goals. 
- - x - - - x - x x 
- - M - - - H - H - 
6 Lost benefits  
(-) 
Perception of benefits resulting from the 
current relationship and which are lost upon 
termination. 
x - x - x x - - - - 
H - - - H H - - - - 
7 Termination 
costs (-) 
Perception of additional time, effort and 
financial outlays needed for handling 
termination of the focal and related contracts 
(e.g., with IT suppliers and staff). 
x - - - - - x - x - 
M - - - - - - - L - 
Supplier 
Dep. 
8 Spillover 
effects (+) 
Perceived magnitude of negative reactions 
by the client in other exchange relationships 
caused by a (planned) termination of the 
focal relationship. 
- - x - x x x - x x 
- - H - H M L - - M 
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Case 5 is particular in our selection, since the client is currently switching to an 
alternate supplier and the current contract will expire in the near future. The deal’s 
contribution to the supplier’s financial and strategic goals has changed from high to 
medium/low. The IT supplier has had time to react to the lost revenues, but faces few 
alternatives and high acquisition and set-up efforts. Perceived supplier dependence has 
dropped from very high to a medium remaining dependence, reflecting that revenue 
has already been either lost or safeguarded by countermeasures. 
Case 3 and 4, which received high values of supplier dependence, also show 
medium-to-high levels in the sub-determinants. In case 3, the relationship’s 
contribution to revenue and profit is medium, but strategic importance is high. The 
supplier has very few alternate clients to substitute the incumbent exchange partner. In 
addition, in case 3 there is more than one exchange relationship and potential spillover 
effects with a strong magnitude are perceived. Case 4 is similar, in addition, a low 
degree of amortization acts here as a further binding mechanism. 
4.5 Conclusion 
4.5.1  Discussion of Findings and Implications 
The conceptualization of supplier dependence provides insights for both sides, client 
and supplier, on how to explain and influence the supplier side of dyadic dependencies 
in an IS outsourcing relationship. The findings have several theoretical and practical 
implications. 
As a theoretical contribution, we grounded our work on dependence and power 
research from reference disciplines (e.g., Emerson 1962; Gulati and Sytch 2007; 
Kumar et al. 1995) and incorporated supplier dependence next to client dependence to 
fully describe a dyadic dependence structure. Suppliers evaluated their own 
dependence and perceived clients’ dependence. In this way, we were able to identify 
the party with the higher power potential – at least from the suppliers’ viewpoint. It 
has to be noted that potential and actual degree of power use might differ (e.g., Gulati 
and Sytch 2007), i.e., parties might not fully exercise a power advantage. Different 
reasons are conceivable. Since perceptions largely affect behavior and attitudes, one 
reason might be that perceptual differences exist and ‘incorrect’ evaluations of the own 
and/or the partner’s dependence are made.  
Since in business-to-business marketing literature operationalization of dependence 
varies widely (e.g., Kumar et al. 1995; Scheer et al. 2010), the second aim was to 
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receive a reliable picture of supplier dependence in our field. Several theories and a 
dyadic case study were used to decompose the two broad and generic determinants, 
i.e., importance and substitutability, of dependence. Our approach enabled us to set 
crucial accentuations in the conceptualization of supplier dependence: First, we 
included the strategic importance right next to the financial importance of a contractual 
relationship. Furthermore, companies involved in IS outsourcing often face challenges 
in the clear specification of services and during the estimation of costs, which is 
reflected in the substitutability facets, degree of amortization and termination costs. 
Spillover effects were added as a third determinant, reflecting that a client might use 
its power in other exchange relationships as a reaction of a supplier’s (planned) 
termination of the focal relationship. Since the various facets of dependence were 
identified in an exploratory manner, involving several expert interviews and supported 
by literature, a high degree of generalizability is expected. 
Furthermore, our research provides managerial implications: Since a partner with a 
larger power base is always a risk, both parties should monitor not only their own but 
also their partner’s dependence. However, case study interviews suggest that managing 
dependence is not easy, especially due to its dynamic nature and the variety of sources 
of influence. Interviews revealed that a dependence structure favoring a client can 
result in negative outcomes for a supplier. Too tight markets, low diversification and 
the risk that an IT solution cannot be sold to other clients represent serious concerns of 
IT suppliers. When the client terminates an important contract, lost revenues and 
profits might be hard to substitute and can even threaten the company’s long-term 
survival. However, a high own dependence needs not always to be disadvantageous, at 
least when the client’s dependence is equally high. Then, a mutually high joint, but 
balanced dependence relationship might result, facilitating the evolvement of a 
strategic partnership. 
Overall, a higher supplier dependence can act as binding mechanism, bringing the 
client in a favorable position to benefit from better relationship outcomes and higher 
supplier commitment and loyalty (Blumenberg et al. 2009; Gulati and Sytch 2007). In 
parts, suppliers frankly reported that a high importance or dependence on a client leads 
to more motivation, easier access to resources from concurrent projects and a higher 
senior management’s commitment within their company. 
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4.5.2 Limitations and Further Research 
The proposed conceptualizations of supplier dependence enriches the stream of IS 
outsourcing relationship research. In particular, we adopted two central constructs, 
relative and joint dependence, from reference disciplines to fully describe dependence 
structures in our domain. While we relied on multiple cases and applied a multi-
informant approach, there still is the need for future research to discuss, argue and 
confirm our findings for the variety of IS outsourcing relationships. A limitation might 
be that, despite five distinct IT suppliers, only one client organization was involved in 
our study. In parts, we managed to weaken this limitation by incorporating different IT 
units (thus, different people and projects) within this organization. Whilst collecting 
dyadic data is difficult, especially when it comes to such a sensitive topic like 
‘dependencies,’ future research providing additional case studies in other industries 
would still be very valuable. To derive an exact composition of the supplier 
dependence construct, i.e., the weightings of the presented determinants and their 
facets, is seen as an interesting subject for a cross-sectional survey. Overall, we hope 
that this research stimulates further investigations into the dyadic nature of 
dependence. To move beyond a dyadic view and to investigate dependencies on a 
network level is further seen as a promising avenue for future research. 
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5 Paper D: Unfolding Dyadic Dependencies in IS 
Outsourcing Relationships – Development of 
Two Multidimensional Constructs7 
5.1 Introduction 
Dependence has been identified as a crucial aspect of exchange relationships in 
various contexts and disciplines (e.g., Bode et al. 2011; Casciaro and Piskorski 2005; 
Gulati and Sytch 2007). IS outsourcing relationships can also be understood as sets of 
interdependent organizations, involved in developing and operating information 
systems. Since the early days of outsourcing, a high dependence on IT suppliers has 
been identified as a major business risk for client firms (e.g., Gonzalez et al. 2005; 
Lacity et al. 2009). However, the converse fact – that IT suppliers might also run the 
risk of a critical dependence on their clients, for example, through voluminous, long-
term contracts with those clients – has been largely disregarded (Kaiser et al. 2013a). 
Although dependence research in many disciplines is already advanced and has 
produced interesting results by studying phenomena such as the impact of dyadic 
dependencies (i.e., the dependencies of both parties) on exchange relationship 
performance, the nature and consequences of dependence are under-researched in the 
IS outsourcing field. 
The few publications that treat dependence in our domain are predominantly case-
based but substantiate its critical role. The publications relate e.g., to the risk of 
dependence imbalance favoring the supplier (Willcocks and Kern 1998), the impact of 
the supplier’s perceived importance of outsourcing deals on the relationship quality 
(Blumenberg et al. 2009), barriers and power plays that arise during supplier switching 
and transitions (Chua et al. 2012; Whitten and Wakefield 2006), and multi-sourcing as 
a means to reduce client dependence on each individual supplier (Levina and Su 
                                              
7  This is the accepted author’s version of the following article: Kaiser, J., Widjaja, T., and Buxmann, 
P. 2013. “Unfolding Dyadic Dependencies in IS Outsourcing Relationships – Development of Two 
Multidimensional Constructs,” in International Conference on Information Systems, Milan, Italy. 
The definitive publisher-authenticated version is available online at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/. 
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2008). A shortcoming of these studies is that they usually do not adopt the dyadic 
approach, which simultaneously considers the client’s and the supplier’s dependence. 
Yet such an approach could answer important questions, such as: is it always 
advantageous to decrease dependence on a partner or can relationships characterized 
by strong joint dependence have beneficial consequences due to both parties’ mutual 
interest in the relationship? To enable our discipline to unfold the full potential of 
dependence research, a thorough conceptualization and operationalization of client and 
supplier dependence can be considered as necessary pre-conditions. Our paper tries to 
fill this research gap by identifying and validating key facets of dependence. 
Our overall research agenda aims to 1) extend the existing literature on outsourcing 
relationships with a conceptualization of organizational dependence grounded on 
theoretical considerations and empirical investigations, 2) provide validated 
measurement instruments useful for future research, and 3) identify for practitioners 
key aspects of their own and their partner’s dependence that should be useful for 
monitoring and influencing the overall dependence structure. In this research-in-
progress paper, we follow established guidelines (MacKenzie et al. 2011) and rely on a 
multi-method approach to develop two multidimensional ‘dependence’ constructs that 
capture client as well as supplier dependence. 
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows: First, we provide the theoretical 
background for our work and describe related work on exchange and IS outsourcing 
relationships. We then describe our process of conceptualization and scale 
development. Finally, we discuss expected theoretical, methodological, and practical 
contributions of our work along with promising avenues for future research. 
5.2 Theoretical Background and Related Literature 
5.2.1 Related Work on Dependence in Exchange Relationships 
In contrast to the IS outsourcing domain, there is a long tradition of research on 
dependencies in related research fields, such as supply chain management and 
relationship marketing. Also recently, various articles have investigated the role of 
dependence in exchange relationships (Bode et al. 2011; Gulati and Sytch 2007; 
Palmatier et al. 2007; Scheer et al. 2010). According to Frazier (1983, p. 158), 
dependence is the need to maintain a relationship to achieve desired goals. While its 
crucial role is beyond doubt, researchers have proposed different operationalizations to 
capture dependence, producing contradictory findings and often leaving the researcher 
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confused about which is best to use in a specific context. Proposed measures include 
the role performance approach (Frazier 1983), a replaceability scale (Heide and John 
1988), the concentration and importance of a relationship as reflected in the sales and 
profit approach (El-Ansary and Stern 1972), global dependence measures (Noordewier 
et al. 1990) and several variations on these. Emerson (1962) also offered a pioneering 
conceptualization in which each party’s dependence is determined by both the 
importance of the relationship for achieving desired goals and the extent to which 
there are alternatives for achieving these goals. 
5.2.2 Related Work on Dependence in IS Outsourcing Relationships 
Prior IS outsourcing literature has linked dependence to the field of ‘relational 
governance,’ i.e., the softer practices associated with managing client-supplier 
relationships, as a determinant of clients’ outsourcing success (Lacity et al. 2009). 
Combining this with findings from reference disciplines, dependence can be seen as a 
‘contextual’ variable and thus as an antecedent of relational governance facets like 
trust or conflict (e.g., Goles et al. 2005; Palmatier et al. 2007). Although various 
studies point to the relevance of dependence in IS outsourcing relationships (Aubert et 
al. 2005; Chua et al. 2012; Lee and Kim 1999; Levina and Su 2008; Willcocks and 
Kern 1998), little research to date has been directed towards its conceptualization, 
taking into account findings from reference disciplines, and studying dependence on 
both sides of an outsourcing dyad. Table 5-1 lists a selection of related concepts and 
operationalizations in the IS outsourcing domain. 
Table 5-1: Related Concepts and Operationalizations 
Source Concept Operationalization 
Lee and 
Kim 1999 
Mutual 
dependency 
In our relationship, our service provider 1. is responsible for lots 
portions of our system development and 2. supports and manages most 
core information technologies we need. 
Goo et al. 
2007  
Extent of 
substitution 
The average annual contract amount with your IS vendor as a 
percentage of total IS. 
Sia et al. 
2008  Ease of exit 
1. If our outsourcing relationship was discontinued we would have 
difficulty finding a replacement for the outsourcing vendor (R). 2. 
Changing our outsourcing vendor will significantly affect our future 
operating performance (R). 3. We are heavily dependent on this 
outsourcing vendor (R).  
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Table 5-1 (continued)  
Swinarski 
et al. 
2008  
Client power 
(=supplier 
dependence) 
1. If your company decided to stop supplying application services to 
SouthBank, you could easily replace their profit contribution with 
application service supplied to other customers (R). 2. If the 
relationship with SouthBank were terminated, it would not hurt our 
operations (R). 3. Finding new buyers for the application services 
currently supplied to SouthBank would not have a negative impact on 
our costs (R). 4. It would be relatively easy for us to find other buyers 
for the application services currently supplied to SouthBank (R). 
Lee et al. 
2008  
Client’s 
mutual 
dependency 
1. It would be difficult for us to replace the service provider with 
others. 2. My company would suffer greatly if we lost our relationship 
with the service provider. 3. The support of the service provider is 
crucial to our ability to manage ISs. 4. We are relying on the service 
provider’s expertise for managing ISs. 5. The relationship with the 
service provider is important to our business. 
Goo et al. 
2009  
Mutual 
dependence 
Both parties in the relationship 1. share the risks that can occur in the 
process of business, 2. have collective responsibility of benefits and 
risks, and 3. effectively carry out services that the other is dependent 
on. 
Bahli and 
Rivard 
2013  
Bargaining 
power 
1. There is not a sufficient number of reputable external IT vendors 
who can potentially provide IT facilities and services to us for this 
outsourced operation. 2. There is not a sufficient number of 
trustworthy external IT vendors who can potentially provide IT 
facilities and services to us for this outsourced operation. 3. If we 
decided to terminate the current contract with the IT vendor, there 
would be no other external service providers who could provide us 
with the same level of IT facilities and services for this outsourced 
operation. 
Bahli and 
Rivard 
2013 
Holdup 
problem 
1. If our relationship was discontinued with our IT vendor, we would 
have difficulty making up for our IT operation. 2. This IT vendor is 
crucial to our future performance. 3. It would be difficult for us to 
replace this IT vendor. 4. We are dependent on this IT vendor (and four 
more items). 
Reviewing the related concepts, considerable differences in their operationalizations 
are evident. While we acknowledge the existing research efforts in our field (and of 
course, dependence was not the central focus in those studies), we are not aware of a 
‘dependence’ construct that has undergone a thorough scale development process. 
Many prior operationalizations of related concepts raise critical questions with regard 
to content validity, its exhaustiveness as well as the transferability of items developed 
in other disciplines. 
5.3 Conceptualization and Scale Development 
To address the lack of prior scale development for client and supplier dependence in 
our domain, our research aims at developing two scales that allow for domain 
particularities. To date, we have conducted a comprehensive literature review, 19 
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interviews, 2×2 Q-sort experiments, extensive questionnaire pre-tests with 10 experts, 
and a two-sided pre-study with 44 responses from 367 companies. Following 
multidimensional construct development guidelines (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 
2001; MacKenzie et al. 2011; Polites et al. 2012), Figure 5-1 shows our process, 
comprising five essential stages. 
 
Figure 5-1: Conceptualization and Scale Development Process 
5.3.1 Stage 1 Conceptualization of Client and Supplier Dependence 
Our conceptualization of client and supplier dependence began with a literature 
review in IS and related disciplines. Since this review revealed a lack of profound 
dependence conceptualizations in our domain as well as different approaches used in 
reference disciplines, we conducted an explorative multiple case study with a dyadic 
approach.8 Building on company documentation and 19 expert interviews on the client 
and supplier sides (totaling 20 hours and 382 pages of transcribed text), we aimed to 
provide an understanding of dependence in the IS outsourcing context and to identify 
key aspects of the construct’s domain (MacKenzie et al. 2011). 
Both theoretical considerations (Emerson 1962) and our interviews suggest that 
when client dependence is attributed to a client organization, it must be done so with 
regard to a specific client-supplier exchange relationship. In our context, an exchange 
relationship covers development and/or supply of an information system, for which the 
supplier is compensated. Reference to a specific relationship is important since several 
                                              
8  An earlier version of our conceptualization efforts (Stage 1) appeared in Kaiser et al. (2012, 
2013a). Here, conceptualization has been refined and elaborated to satisfy requirements for 
multidimensional construct development (MacKenzie et al. 2011). The process stages 2-4 are 
completely new to the present research-in-progress paper. 
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exchange relationships can coexist between the same client and supplier (for example, 
other IS outsourcing relationships). Note that supplier dependence can be specified 
analogously. 
Two dimensions emerged from our case study analysis, confirming the general 
applicability of Emerson’s twofold conceptualization in our field. Dependence is 
determined by (1) importance of the resource obtained and (2) its source’s 
substitutability (Bourantas 1989; Emerson 1962; Jacobs 1974). Conceptually, a 
multiplicative relationship between the two determinants was proposed, as dependence 
is absent when either importance or substitutability is close to zero (Bourantas 1989; 
Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). More specifically, client dependence in our domain 
comprises (1) the importance of the delivered information system (component) (IS) for 
the client company and (2) the substitutability of the incumbent supplier. Supplier 
dependence comprises (1) the importance of the outsourcing relationship for achieving 
the supplier’s goals and (2) the substitutability of the client with an alternative 
outsourcing company. 
Grounded on case study interviews, related literature (e.g., on IT business value, 
(Melville et al. 2004; Tallon et al. 2000), and theories, such as resource dependence 
theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), transaction cost economics (e.g., Williamson 
1981), social exchange theory (Thibaut and Kelley 1959), and switching cost 
perspective (e.g., Whitten and Wakefield 2006), the salient facets of the two 
dimensions shown in Tables 5-2 and 5-3 were identified.9 Here we strived for 
exhaustiveness and mutual exclusivity of the facets. 
Table 5-2: Facets of the Client Dependence Construct 
Dimension Facet Description 
Importance 
1 Relative magnitude (+) Share of magnitude, e.g., purchasing volume, related to the IS. 
2 Revenue enhancements (+) Business value generated by IS in form of revenue enhancements in, e.g., supported business processes. 
3 Cost savings (+) Business value generated by IS in form of cost savings. 
4 Regulatory requirements (+) Contribution of IS to fulfilling official and legal requirements. 
5 Strategic advantages (+) Contribution of IS to achieving strategic advantages. 
   
                                              
9  Due to space constraints of the conference proceedings, not every facet can be described here in 
detail. Details can be found in Kaiser et al. (2012, 2013a). 
5.3 Conceptualization and Scale Development 99 
 
Table 5-2 (continued)  
Substitut-
ability 
6 Supplier alternatives (+) No. of supplier alternatives for the IS. 
7 Evaluation and selection 
efforts (-) 
Time and effort needed for evaluating and selecting a 
new supplier. 
8 Performance uncertainty of 
alternative suppliers (-) 
Uncertainty or perception of risk surrounding the 
performance of alternative suppliers. 
9 Sunk costs (-) Non-recoverable time, money, and effort invested in the outsourcing relationship. 
10 Lost benefits (-) Benefits from the current relationship that would be lost upon contract termination. 
11 Post-selection client-side  
costs (-) 
Time, effort, and financial outlays that would be 
needed to conduct the switching process on client 
side. 
12 Setup costs for alternative 
supplier (-) 
Investments in the alternative supplier that would be 
necessary to reach the previous work state (related to 
the IS). 
Spillover effects (+) 
Expected negative reactions in other exchange 
relationships with this supplier caused by a (planned) 
termination of the focal relationship. 
 
Table 5-3: Facets of the Supplier Dependence Construct 
Dimension Facet Description 
Importance 
1 Relative revenue (+) Share of current turnover accounted for by this relationship. 
2 Relative profit (+) Share of profit achieved with this relationship (expresses margin). 
3 Fut. financial magnitude (+) Relative magnitude of future revenues expected with this relationship. 
4 Strategic impact (+) Importance of this relationship to achieve supplier’s strategic goals. 
Substitut-
ability 
5 Client alternatives (+) No. of client alternates for achieving these financial and strategic goals. 
6 Sunk costs (-) Investments made in this relationship that could not be applied to other relationships. 
7 Acquisition and setup costs 
(-) 
Time, cost, and effort that would be needed to 
acquire alternate clients and again reach an efficient 
level to compensate for affected goals. 
8 Lost benefits (-) Benefits from the current relationship that would be lost upon contract termination. 
9 Termination costs (-) 
Additional time, effort and financial outlays needed 
for handling termination of focal and related 
contracts (e.g., with IT suppliers/staff). 
Spillover effects (+) 
Expected negative reactions in other exchange 
relationships with this client caused by a (planned) 
termination of the focal relationship. 
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During data analysis, another unanticipated dimension emerged that is assumed to 
influence perceived dependence in the focal relationship: we call this spillover effects. 
Spillover effects are specific in the sense that they result from other exchange 
relationships between the client and supplier. They represent potential, undesirable 
consequences that a partner might cause in reaction to a (planned) termination of the 
focal relationship. Even though, for example, a supplier might react negatively within 
the focal relationship by delaying the process of switching to a competing supplier, the 
scope for negative reactions increases with additional exchange relationships, 
especially if the partner possesses untapped power potentials in this regard. 
5.3.2 Stage 2 Generation and Validity Assessment of Items 
5.3.2.1 Generating Items 
To capture all essential aspects of the dependence constructs’ domains, we 
generated items that directly reflect the focal constructs, their dimensions, and the 
underlying facets (MacKenzie et al. 2011). Here we relied on prior literature and 
statements from expert interviews. The process produced a total of 59 items, as shown 
in Table 5-4: 
Table 5-4: Initial Set of Items 
Client Dependence (CDep, 5 items) Supplier Dependence (SDep, 5 items) 
Importance (CImp) 5 items + 5 items for facets Importance (SImp) 
5 items + 4 items for 
facets 
Substitutability 
(CSubst) 
4 items + 7 items for 
facets 
Substitutability 
(SSubst) 
4 items + 5 items for 
facets 
Spillover (CSpill) 5 items Spillover (SSpill) 5 items 
5.3.2.2 Validity of Items 
Q-sorting is a widely recognized technique used in IS research to ensure content, 
convergent, and discriminant validity, by asking domain experts to group items 
according to their similarity (Petter et al. 2007; Straub et al. 2004). We applied a 2×2 
Q-Sort with 12 judges (4 practitioners, 8 researchers) in each round, following 
procedures set forth by Moore and Benbasat (1991). To avoid bias, judges were not 
engaged as coders or interviewees in the first stages of our research process. We 
divided the 12 judges equally into two expert groups, one for client dependence and 
the other for supplier dependence. To avoid confounding judges with our different 
aggregation levels, we conducted each round in two steps. The first step was dedicated 
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to dimensions and the second step explored the validity of facets. In the first round 
(step 1), the judges were asked, without being told what the underlying constructs 
were, to categorize items into groups and to label them (e.g., Moore and Benbasat 
1991). Our proposal of three underlying major dimensions (importance, 
substitutability, spillover effects) was confirmed (in 83% of the cases), although, of 
course, judges described the categories in their own words. In step 2, the judges were 
asked to sort the facet items into two categories, importance and substitutability. As a 
check, we included two very similar but ‘false’ items, which were successfully 
discovered (in 83% of the cases). In each round, judges had the option to sort out items 
that were ambiguous or not clearly assignable to one of the provided categories. 
Table 5-5: Statistics for Q-Sort Rounds 
Client Supplier 
 Item Placement Ratio 
Avg. 
Raw 
Agree-
ment 
Avg. 
Cohen’s 
Kappa 
Item Placement Ratio Avg. Raw 
Agree-
ment 
Avg. 
Cohen’s 
Kappa CImp CSubst CSpill Avg. SImp SSubst SSpill Avg. 
R 1.1 
Dim. 0.93 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.92 0.87 0.83 0.88 1.00 0.90 0.84 0.77 
R 1.2 
Facets 0.90 0.98 - 0.93 0.88 0.80 0.97 0.70 - 0.81 0.76 0.60 
R 2.1 
Dim. 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.93 0.97 0.92 1.00 0.96 0.94 0.91 
R 2.2 
Facets 0.93 0.98 - 0.94 0.88 0.80 0.97 0.90 - 0.93 0.86 0.75 
 
To assess construct validity, we used Moore and Benbasat’s item placement ratio, 
which reflects the overall frequency of judges placing items within the intended 
theoretical constructs. Both raw agreement and Cohen’s Kappa were used to assess 
inter-rater reliability. For the client expert group, the items on the dimension level 
received an average item placement ratio of 0.95, average raw agreement of 0.92, and 
average Cohen’s Kappa of 0.87 (see Table 5-5). Sorting of facets resulted in an 
average placement ratio of 0.93, average raw agreement of 0.88 and average Cohen’s 
Kappa of 0.8. Although the results were acceptable after the first round, we further 
scrutinized the items – in this case two – that were not sorted into the intended 
categories more than once and consequently reworded them. This improved the figures 
in the second sorting round. Items for supplier dependence were analogously assessed 
and reworded. 
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5.3.3 Stage 3 Model Specification 
Based on our conceptualizations, we modeled client and supplier dependence as 
composite latent constructs comprised of three dimensions: importance, 
substitutability, and spillover effects. Importance and substitutability present 
themselves as composite constructs of several facets. To decide how to model the 
relationship between identified facets and their dimensions, we applied Jarvis et al.’s 
(2003) decision rules, which all call for formative measurement (direction of causality 
is from items to dimensions; indicators need not to be interchangeable; not necessary 
for indicators to covary with each other; nomological net for the indicators may differ). 
Jarvis et al.’s rules also indicate that the dimensions are in turn formative indicators of 
the second-order focal constructs. Therefore, we treat our (second-order) focal 
constructs, client and supplier dependence, as functions of their (first-order) 
dimensions (see, e.g., Polites et al. 2012). To avoid identification problems in models 
with formative indicators, it is recommended that at least two global reflective 
indicators of the latent constructs be included (Diamantopoulos 2011; MacKenzie et 
al. 2011). With the inclusion of (reflective) indicators (see Table 5-4), the resulting 
model in Figure 5-2 shows a complete MIMIC (multiple indicators, multiple causes) 
structure. 
 
Figure 5-2: MIMIC Structure of Client and Supplier Dependence Constructs 
5.3.4 Stage 4 Pre-study and Scale Refinement 
Personalized invitations for our pre-study were sent via an online social business 
network to 367 randomly selected IT professionals in client and supplier firms of 
different sizes. Participation was encouraged by offering a results report and a raffle 
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for a tablet device. Reminder emails were sent two–three weeks later to all non-
respondents who had initially indicated interest. A total of 44 completed 
questionnaires were received, 20 from the client side and 24 from the supplier side, 
yielding a response rate of 12%. The majority of client participants were supplier 
managers (45%) and project managers (40%), whereas the suppliers were mainly (key) 
account managers (38%) and project managers (25%). 
The purpose of our pre-study was to (1) ensure the questionnaire’s 
comprehensibility, (2) conduct preliminary reliability and validity assessments, and (3) 
shorten scales where appropriate.10 We included an open question allowing 
respondents to comment on content, wording, and questionnaire length. We assessed 
reliability with traditional techniques discussed in the literature: we checked for the 
unidimensionality of our constructs’ reflective indicators using exploratory factor 
analyses (EFA); we assessed internal consistency through Cronbach’s alpha (alpha) 
and corrected item-total correlations (CITC), and we tested for formative indicator 
redundancy using the variance inflation factor (VIF). Furthermore, average variance 
extracted (AVE) and Fornell and Larcker’s criterion of discriminant validity was 
assessed (Fornell and Larcker 1981). We tried to identify candidates for elimination 
from reflective item pools by analyzing inter-item correlations, CITC, ‘Cronbach’s 
alpha if item deleted’ statistics, and standard deviation scores (e.g., Sun 2012). 
5.3.4.1 Assessment and Purification of Client Dependence Scale 
We confirmed unidimensionality for the client dependence scale’s sets of reflective 
indicators with an EFA (principal axis factoring, promax rotation, extraction based on 
factors with eigenvalues greater than 1). The reliability test results exceeded 
commonly suggested thresholds (alpha 0.7; minimal CITC 0.5): CDep (0.834; 0.609), 
CSubst (0.931; 0.811) and CSpill (0.900; 0.696). Only the results for importance 
(CImp) have not yet been sufficient: Cronbach’s alpha at 0.668 was slightly below the 
threshold of 0.7. Hence, we tried to improve the items by rewording to avoid small 
standard deviations and skewness in the items’ distributions (e.g., the ceiling effect). 
Although a larger sample is needed to provide final evidence for reflectively 
measured constructs’ validity, two criterions were used to early reveal potential threats 
to validity. Convergent validity was initially assessed by calculating AVE11. Except for 
                                              
10 The revised sets of items can be found in Tables A-2 and A-3 in the appendix. 
11 SmartPLS was used for calculation (Ringle et al. 2005). 
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CImp (0.448), AVE values of remaining constructs exceeded the critical value of 0.5 
(Fornell and Larcker 1981): CDep (0.753), CSubst (0.834) and CSpill (0.761). 
Furthermore, the square roots of AVE were greater than the respective correlations 
with other constructs, suggesting discriminant validity according to Fornell and 
Larcker’s criterion (see appendix, Table A-4). 
Assessing the formatively measured items, we found that the VIFs for the 
importance dimension ranged from 1.386 to 2.843, all below the cutoff level of 10 
(Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001) and the more conservative level of 3 
(Diamantopoulos and Siguaw 2006). At this stage, therefore, there is no indication to 
remove or change any of the importance facets. However, multicollinearity might arise 
in our substitutability dimension, as the VIF value for setup costs for alternative 
supplier (item #12) exceeded the cutoff level of 10. An in-depth analysis revealed a 
high inter-item correlation for evaluations of the two client-side cost facets, post-
selection client side costs (item #11) and setup costs for alternative supplier (item 
#12). So although they are conceptually distinguishable, it seems unlikely that these 
two facets are independent in their magnitude. To ensure content validity, we decided 
to merge these facets and draw them on a higher abstraction level. The final instrument 
will include one item for the client’s total costs and will no longer distinguish between 
direct and indirect costs. We pre-tested this approach by merging (arithmetic mean) 
the items’ responses in our pre-study sample, with resulting VIF values all below 3. 
5.3.4.2 Assessment and Purification of Supplier Dependence Scale 
The supplier dependence scale was assessed analogously, identifying candidates for 
elimination and, where deemed appropriate, changing the questionnaire. Reduced 
reflective indicator sets for SDep (0.903; 0.674), SImp (0.852; 0.686), SSubst (0.853; 
0.648), and SSpill (0.85; 0.591) met the unidimensionality and reliability criteria. 
Furthermore, strong indications for convergent validity were found: AVE of all 
dimensions clearly exceeded the threshold of 0.5: SDep (0.781), SImp (0.799); SSubst 
(0.695); SSpill (0.680). In addition, a preliminary discriminant validity analysis was 
also here conducted (Fornell and Larcker 1981). For all constructs, square roots of 
AVE were greater than the respective correlations with other employed constructs (see 
appendix, Table A-4). Thus, tentative results of this pre-study equally suggest 
convergent and discriminant validity of the supplier dependence scale. 
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Again, we checked the formative indicators of our substitutability and importance 
dimensions. The VIF values for the formative indicators for importance ranged from 
1.233 to 1.515, with no indication of multicollinearity. Formative indicators for 
substitutability received VIF values from 1.042 to 4.019, slightly exceeding the 
conservative threshold of 3 but still well below the cutoff value of 10. While this result 
could be considered satisfactory, we critically analyzed the items and modified them 
slightly to potentially yield even better results in our main survey. 
5.4 Conclusion 
5.4.1 Main Survey as Final Stage of Scale Development 
While our pre-study was a valuable research step, we will gather a new, larger-sized 
sample to obtain conclusive empirical proof for the validity and reliability of the 
developed scales. Final tests will be performed through an online survey directed to IT 
professionals in client and IT supplier firms. Thus, two separate studies will be 
launched; the ‘client study’ will have client organizations as the primary source, while 
the ‘supplier study’ will be sent to supplier firms in the first instance. Reliability and 
validity tests will be repeated for the new sample; in particular, direction, magnitude, 
and significance of indicators will be analyzed. The main study will address 
nomological validity by showing that our measures of focal constructs can be related 
to other constructs in the expected way (MacKenzie et al. 2011). Furthermore, 
evaluation of overall model fit (e.g., assessing goodness of fit, model comparisons and 
model parsimony) is expected to be a central analysis step. The final analysis will also 
include control variables, such as contract duration, firm size, and type of outsourcing 
(IS development, maintenance and/or operations). 
5.4.2 Expected Contributions, Limitations, and Future Research 
Management of client-supplier relationships has recently received increasing 
attention in IS outsourcing research and practice (e.g., Hirschheim et al. 2008; Kaiser 
and Buxmann 2012a; Oshri et al. 2011a). We have focused on a crucial aspect of these 
dyadic relationships, the dependencies between clients and suppliers. To refine the 
rather simplistic prevailing view of these dependencies in our field, we applied a 
plurality of methods to identify, structure, and evaluate their constitutive elements. 
While reflective and formative measures have different strengths and weaknesses, 
such as parsimony versus richness and generality versus precision (Barki et al. 2007), 
misspecification should in any case be avoided (Jarvis et al. 2003). Two dependence 
dimensions, importance and substitutability, emerged, for which a multiplicative 
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relationship has been theoretically discussed in literature (Bourantas 1989; Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978). Moreover, and interestingly, spillover effects emerged as an 
unexpected dimension. In 70% of our cases on the client side, the client-supplier 
relationship under consideration was one of several exchange relationships between 
that client and supplier. Of these clients, 42.9% feared an exploitation of untapped 
power potentials in their other relationships with the supplier. Even on the supplier 
side, 56.2% indicated moderate to high levels of potential spillovers (66.7% were 
nested relationships). If spillover effects are confirmed as a substantial dimension in 
our main survey, this may serve as an important contribution to general dependence 
research and can inform related disciplines. 
While our proposed client and supplier dependence scales can be used to assess 
individual firm-level dependencies, they can also be combined to address 
dependencies on the relationship-level. Two constructs primarily evolved in reference 
disciplines: relative dependence (i.e., the difference of the individual dependencies) 
and joint dependence (i.e., the sum of the dependencies) (Casciaro and Piskorski 2005; 
Gulati and Sytch 2007). The developed client and supplier dependence scales, used 
either individually or in combination, should be useful for a variety of established and 
emerging IS themes. For example, they might inform and extend inter-organizational 
IS studies on relationships and outsourcing success (Gulati and Sytch 2007), 
innovation generation (Jean et al. 2012) and on influence strategies, adoption, and 
compliance (Hart and Saunders 1998; Payan and McFarland 2005). Future research 
might transfer our dyadic dependence conceptualization to complex exchange 
networks or study intercultural differences. Our findings also have practical relevance, 
offering client and supplier firms insights into how to influence dependence positions. 
The facets we have identified provide a basis for fully assessing and monitoring their 
own and their partner’s dependence. 
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6 Paper E: Relative and Joint Dependence in IS 
Outsourcing Relationships – A Model of 
Effects on Relational Facets and Exchange 
Performance12 
6.1 Introduction 
Information systems (IS) outsourcing has become a common practice in many client 
companies. As a result, client organizations must increasingly rely on collaboration 
with IT suppliers to achieve their business goals. This development has generated a 
large amount of research interest over the last few decades. Since the early days of 
outsourcing, client firms have been warned to avoid dependence on suppliers, as it 
would pose a major business risk (Gonzalez et al. 2005; Lacity et al. 2009). However, 
the converse fact – that IT suppliers might also run the risk of a critical dependence on 
their clients, for example, through voluminous, long-term contracts with those clients – 
has largely been disregarded (Kaiser et al. 2012; Kaiser et al. 2013a). Furthermore, 
apart from considering dependence as a (client-side) risk, little attention has been paid 
to the consequences of the parties’ dependencies in outsourcing relationships. This 
article is therefore motivated by the question: What is the impact of dependence on 
outsourcing relationships and their exchange performance?  
Clear motivation for this research question arises from prior, very fundamental, 
reflections on this topic in other disciplines concerning, e.g., social relations, 
marketing channels, and inter-organizational relationships. Traditional dependence 
literature suggests adopting a dyadic perspective, assessing both client and supplier 
dependence in a dyad in order to draw adequate conclusions (Emerson 1962). One 
reason behind this is that the desired power advantage of one party arises from a 
dependence asymmetry, i.e., a difference between the two parties’ dependencies 
                                              
12 This is the accepted author’s version of the following article: Kaiser, J., Widjaja, T., and Buxmann, 
P. 2013. “Relative and Joint Dependence in IS Outsourcing Relationships – A Model of Effects on 
Relational Facets and Exchange Performance,” in Advances in Global Sourcing. Models, 
Governance, and Relationships, I. Oshri, J. Kotlarsky, and L. P. Willcocks (eds.), LNBIP 163, pp. 
18–34. This version is provided with kind permission from Springer Science and Business Media. 
The publisher-authenticated version is available at: doi:10.1007/978-3-642-40951-6_2. 
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(Emerson 1962). The opportunity to exercise a power advantage in an unbalanced 
dependence structure represents a threat to the weaker party’s business performance 
(e.g., Gulati and Sytch 2007). For example, a supplier in a more powerful position 
might provide a lower quality of service, to the client’s detriment. Conversely, supplier 
performance losses might occur if a more powerful client bullies its supplier and exerts 
pressure on pricing. In addition to relative dependence, a dyadic perspective enables 
the examination of joint dependence, which is the sum of two organizations’ 
dependencies on each other (e.g., Casciaro and Piskorski 2005). In a high joint-
dependence structure where each partner is highly dependent on the other, both face 
high exit barriers and each partner can seriously damage the other. However, this 
combination can also provide the basis for a relationship of mutual trust and 
commitment (Kumar et al. 1995). As such, the degree of joint dependence provides a 
further critical characteristic of dyadic relationships. 
Against this theoretical background, several questions arise: To what extent is it 
reasonable for a more powerful party to exploit its position of power? How can power-
balanced relationships influence relationship outcomes? Can relationships 
characterized by a high joint dependence have beneficial consequences due to both 
parties’ mutual interest in the relationship? 
This conceptual paper considers relative and joint dependence as two central 
constructs that can facilitate a differentiated examination of these questions. We offer 
a causal research model describing anticipated effects of relative and joint dependence 
on the relationship quality and performance outcomes for both, the client and the 
supplier. Overall, our work aims to contribute to IS outsourcing research in several 
ways: (1) by advancing the conceptualization of dyadic dependencies in our field, (2) 
by revealing their role in outsourcing relationship performance, and (3) by equally 
integrating both client and supplier perspectives and interests into our model. In doing 
so, we transfer previous results from other research disciplines to our research field 
and aim to extend the current state of dependence research. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a 
theoretical background for our research topic. Following that, we present our research 
model and hypotheses. We then address methodological issues and present the 
procedures and results of our initial pretests. Finally, we close the paper with a 
discussion of the expected findings from our main survey. 
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6.2 Related Literature 
6.2.1 Dependence in Related Disciplines 
In contrast to the IS outsourcing domain, dyadic dependencies have received greater 
attention in related research fields such as supply chain management and relationship 
marketing (Bode et al. 2011; Gulati and Sytch 2007; Palmatier et al. 2007; Scheer et 
al. 2010). 
Many contributions in reference disciplines have been inspired by the seminal work 
of Emerson, who illustrated that the concepts of dependence and power are strongly 
interlinked: “the power of A over B is equal to, and based upon, the dependence of B 
upon A” (Emerson 1962, p. 33). Many publications have built on Emerson’s 
conceptualization of dependence, in which each party’s dependence is determined by 
both the importance of the relationship for achieving desired goals and the extent to 
which there are alternatives for achieving these goals. Studies based on this 
conceptualization usually adopt a pluralist perspective in which parties involved 
pursue different objectives and power consists of a party’s ability to influence the 
other’s behaviors (Jasperson et al. 2002). 
Dependencies between parties, either individually or in combination, i.e., as relative 
or joint dependence, have been related to various concepts such as, inter-
organizational relationships and exchange performance (Gulati and Sytch 2007; 
Hibbard et al. 2001), mergers and acquisitions (Casciaro and Piskorski 2005), 
innovation generation (Jean et al. 2012), and influence strategies, adoption, and 
compliance (Hart and Saunders 1998; Payan and McFarland 2005). 
6.2.2 Dependence in IS Outsourcing Relationships 
Turning to IS outsourcing, which we understand as a “business practice in which a 
company contracts all or part of its information systems operations to one or more 
outside information service suppliers” (Hu et al. 1997, p. 288), the picture is rather 
incomplete. Prior IS outsourcing research has linked dependence to the field of 
‘relational governance,’ i.e., the softer practices associated with managing client-
supplier relationships, as a determinant of clients’ outsourcing success (Lacity et al. 
2009). Combining this with findings from reference disciplines, dependence can be 
viewed as a ‘contextual’ variable and thus as an antecedent of facets of relational 
governance such as trust or conflict (Goles et al. 2005; Palmatier et al. 2007). 
Surprisingly, apart from studies that mention the term ‘dependence,’ mostly to refer to 
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it as a risk for the client (e.g., Aubert et al. 2005; Gonzalez et al. 2005), current 
literature is largely silent about its dyadic nature and its specific effects on outsourcing 
relationships. 
The few publications that treat dependence in our domain are predominantly case-
study based but substantiate its critical role. The publications relate, e.g., to the risk of 
dependence imbalance favoring the supplier (Currie and Willcocks 1998; Willcocks 
and Kern 1998), the impact of the supplier’s perceived importance of outsourcing 
deals on the relationship quality (Blumenberg et al. 2009), barriers and power plays 
that arise during supplier switching and transitions (Chua et al. 2012; Whitten and 
Wakefield 2006), and multi-sourcing as a means to reduce client dependence on 
individual suppliers (Levina and Su 2008; Tan and Sia 2006). 
In an experimental setting, Swinarski et al. (2004) found a positive relationship 
between a client’s power, i.e., a supplier’s dependence on the client, and its motivation 
to comply with contractual obligations as well as its willingness to cooperate and to 
invest additional resources in the relationship. Sia et al. (2008) consider ‘ease of exit,’ 
a construct conceptually related to dependence, to be a fundamental dimension of 
flexibility in outsourcing endeavors. Lee et al.’s empirical study explores the 
moderating role of mutual dependence on trust and knowledge sharing between two 
outsourcing parties (Lee et al. 2008). 
Combining dyadic dependencies and relationship quality in a survey-based 
approach, Lee and Kim’s study (Lee and Kim 1999; Lee and Kim 2005) posited a 
positive relationship between mutual dependence and the quality of outsourcing 
relationships. However, inconsistent with findings in other disciplines (e.g., Gulati and 
Sytch 2007; Kumar et al. 1995), they found a negative relationship and argued that this 
was due to particularities in the Korean market. Comparing their measures with those 
used in relationship marketing and other fields, it appears that their findings might also 
have been affected by 1) a strong focus on client dependence without reference to the 
supplier side and 2) a lack of differentiation between a balance and an imbalance of 
dependencies. In contrast, a more recent survey (Goo et al. 2009) was able to provide 
evidence for the positive effect of mutual dependence on at least trust and commitment 
between parties in the IS outsourcing context. 
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Our literature analysis revealed that the great majority of the IS outsourcing 
literature mentions ‘dependence’ in passing, without studying its dyadic nature or its 
interrelations with other constructs. This is underscored by findings from an extensive 
literature review in outsourcing relationships (Lacity et al. 2010) that identified only 
one article (Lee and Kim 1999) dealing with ‘mutual dependency’ as a relationship 
characteristic. As discussed above, the prevalent unilateral view of dependence in IS 
outsourcing research conflicts with the view found in traditional dependence research. 
To advance research in our field, a simultaneous incorporation of both relative and 
joint dependence is needed, as well as a thorough analysis of their impact on 
outsourcing relationships. 
6.3 Research Model and Hypotheses 
In this section, we propose a research model that allows us to analyze the effects of 
dyadic dependencies on exchange performance in IS outsourcing relationships (see 
Figure 6-1). In the model, we assume that both the client and the supplier have a 
certain degree of dependence (ranging from low to high) on their exchange partner. As 
motivated in the introduction to this paper, our model distinguishes between relative 
and joint dependence based on the individual client and supplier dependencies. We 
refer to relative dependence (i.e., the difference between the client and supplier 
dependence) as a party’s dependence advantage. Thus, either the client or the supplier 
in a dyad can possess a dependence advantage, when its dependence is less than its 
partner’s. Joint dependence is the sum of the two dependencies. 
 
Figure 6-1: Research Model (from the Perspective of the Power-dominant Party) 
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The causal research model developed in this paper draws on and extends Kumar et 
al.’s model for marketing channels (Kumar et al. 1995) and Gulati and Sytch’s model 
for the automotive industry (Gulati and Sytch 2007). The causal ordering of the 
constructs is based on recent results in the field of relationship marketing (Gulati and 
Sytch 2007; Palmatier et al. 2007). We will summarize the main anticipated effects 
before illustrating them in more detail in the following section. 
We posit that high joint dependence leads to higher relationship quality in several 
ways, namely, by increasing inter-organizational trust, commitment, coordination 
effectiveness and information sharing and by decreasing conflicts between the parties 
(H1). In contrast to this positive effect, an imbalance in the second component of 
interdependence, relative dependence, is hypothesized to produce a negative impact on 
the relational facets. First, we assume that the greater a party’s power potential is, i.e., 
the dependence advantage of one party, the greater the extent of power used by this 
dominant party will be (H2). Second, however, as the dependence advantage or the 
exercise of power increases, the relational spirit of the relationship will decrease (H3 
and H4). 
While the use of a power advantage is posited to increase the performance received 
by the more powerful party (H5), it decreases the outcomes for the weaker party, 
which is pressured and exploited as a consequence (H6). Last, but not least, an 
increase in the quality of the relationship (increased trust, commitment, etc.) usually 
increases the exchange performance for both parties and, as a consequence, both client 
and supplier satisfaction with the exchange performance (H7 and H8). 
The proposed research model captures the questions posed in this paper’s 
introduction. Assuming a dominant party in a relationship and empirical evidence for 
the posited relationships, an important trade-off arises. Is it reasonable to exercise a 
power advantage when power use has a simultaneous negative impact on the 
relationship quality, which might diminish the dominant party’s outcomes? Also of 
interest is the effect of joint dependence on the exchange performance as well as the 
impact of fully balanced relationships (i.e., relationships where the parties’ relative 
dependence is zero). The next section elaborates our proposed hypotheses. 
6.3.1 Joint Dependence and Relational Facets 
A high joint-dependence structure is one in which both partners are highly dependent 
on the other. In contrast to a highly asymmetric relationship, both parties in such a 
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relationship face high exit barriers and each can cause serious damage to the other. 
This lays the ground for a successful business relationship, since its success is critical 
to and desired by both parties (Gulati and Sytch 2007). These circumstances promote 
the development of relational facets such as trust, commitment, and information 
sharing (Gulati and Sytch 2007; Kumar et al. 1995). 
Our research model consists of five different constructs that are a) deemed to be 
relevant relational characteristics of IS outsourcing relationships (Goles et al. 2005; 
Kern and Willcocks 2000; Lee and Kim 1999), and b) posited as the result of joint 
dependence (Gulati and Sytch 2007; Kumar et al. 1995). In the following, we will 
explain each relational facet in detail and describe the associated research hypothesis. 
6.3.1.1 Trust and Commitment 
Trust and commitment are seen as critical pillars of strong relationships that have the 
ability to promote the performance of the exchange (Morgan and Hunt 1994; Palmatier 
et al. 2007). Since their mechanisms in business relationships are very similar, we 
address them jointly in this section. Inter-organizational trust includes the expectations 
that the partner organization can be relied upon to fulfill its obligations, to behave 
predictably, and to act and negotiate fairly even when the possibility of opportunism 
exists (Zaheer et al. 1998). Definitions of commitment in marketing channels as well 
as in IS outsourcing relationships usually incorporate three facets: affective 
commitment (i.e., a desire to continue a relationship because of positive affect toward 
the partner), willingness to invest (i.e., a willingness to become more deeply involved 
in the relationship through investment of capital and effort), and relationship stability 
(i.e., an expectation that both parties intend to remain in the relationship) (Goo et al. 
2009; Kumar et al. 1995). 
Researchers have argued that trust and commitment are less widespread in 
relationships with low joint dependence (Gulati and Sytch 2007; Kumar et al. 1995; 
Uzzi 1997). This is because in such relationships, both parties have a very low 
dependence on their current exchange partner. Such loosely-coupled relationships are 
often characterized by short-term contracts and a mutual flexibility to leave the 
relationship (e.g., Dwyer et al. 1987; Kumar et al. 1995). However, recalling that in a 
high-joint dependence structure, both parties have much at stake for both parties and 
exit barriers are very high, the parties in such a situation are more likely to both be 
committed to the relationship, with a strong motivation to satisfy the exchange 
partner’s requirements and desires, which fosters the sentiment of trust (Dwyer et al. 
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1987; Geyskens et al. 1996; Kumar et al. 1995). Furthermore, in a high joint-
dependence setting, both parties have an incentive to devote more effort to the 
relationship, and opportunistic behavior or negative tactics should be less prevalent 
because each partner can be greatly damaged by the other (Kumar et al. 1995). We 
therefore posit the following hypotheses: 
H1a: Joint dependence is positively related to the level of trust between client and 
supplier in an IS outsourcing relationship. 
H1b: Joint dependence is positively related to the level of commitment between client 
and supplier in an IS outsourcing relationship. 
6.3.1.2 Conflict 
Similarly to other inter-organizational relationships, there are usually many 
potentials for conflict in IS outsourcing arrangements due, for example, to goal 
divergence, technology complexity, incompatibilities and the dynamics of the business 
environment (Goles et al. 2005; Goo et al. 2009; Lee and Kim 1999). Actual conflict 
involves an overall level of disagreement between the exchange partners, often termed 
‘manifest’ conflict (Palmatier et al. 2006). Manifest and dysfunctional conflict can be 
very destructive for a business relationship, and thus, it is advised that such conflict be 
resolved harmoniously and turned into agreement and consensus (Goo et al. 2009). 
Drawing on previous work (Dwyer et al. 1987; Gundlach and Cadotte 1994; Kumar 
et al. 1995), we hypothesize that joint dependence has a diminishing effect on the level 
of conflict. To substantiate this causal relationship, we can apply bilateral deterrence 
theory (Lawler et al. 1988; Lawler and Bacharach 1987). According to this theory, an 
actor’s desire to engage in or instigate conflict is a function of the actor’s fear of 
retaliation and expectation of attack. As joint dependence increases (holding the 
dependence asymmetry constant), both parties have an increased fear of a severe 
retaliation. Further, since each party fears retaliation and knows the partner does so as 
well, the actual expectation of being attacked is low and the suppression of conflicts is 
high (Kumar et al. 1995). Thus, joint dependencies usually increase the motivation of 
both parties to resolve conflicts cooperatively and quickly (Dwyer et al. 1987; 
Gundlach and Cadotte 1994; Kumar et al. 1995). 
H1c: Joint dependence is negatively related to the level of conflict between client and 
supplier in an IS outsourcing relationship. 
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6.3.1.3 Coordination Effectiveness 
Coordination effectiveness has been discussed as another mediator of joint 
dependence’s influence on performance (Gulati and Sytch 2007; Jap 1999). 
Coordination effectiveness indicates the degree to which the client and supplier 
effectively work together to fulfill collective tasks in an outsourcing relationship (Fang 
et al. 2008b; Van de Ven et al. 1976). Coordination effectiveness can be realized by 
enabling synergistic ways to do business together, by effectively coordinating the work 
to create and utilize unique business opportunities and by engaging in projects tailored 
to both companies’ needs (Fang et al. 2008b; Jap 1999). 
The need and motivation to achieve coordination effectiveness are mainly driven by 
joint dependence, since both parties recognize that success depends in part on their 
partner (Jap 1999). Joint dependence complicates a simplistic exit strategy, forcing 
firms to work out problems and giving direct feedback, which fosters learning and 
innovation (Uzzi 1997). Coordination effectiveness is further facilitated by an 
increased convergence of interests and goals between the firms, which is more likely 
in a high joint-dependence structure (Jap 1999; Kumar et al. 1995). 
H1d: Joint dependence is positively related to the level of coordination effectiveness 
between client and supplier in an IS outsourcing relationship. 
6.3.1.4 Information Sharing 
Information sharing refers to the extent to which both parties effectively communicate 
and exchange critical information about important tasks and the environment along 
with supplementary information to support the business planning of each (Anderson 
and Narus 1984; Fang et al. 2008b; Lee and Kim 1999). It is essential for the 
development of the relationship that information sharing is bilateral and that it goes 
beyond the daily information exchanges of routine processes (Goles et al. 2005; Heide 
and John 1992). 
Mutual dependence and heightened attention to the exchange partner are important 
antecedents to open communication and the exchange of critical information. 
Recalling that much is at stake for both parties, withholding important information 
poses a risk for both. Thus, joint dependence creates an environment that is conducive 
to developing long-term cooperative ties, encouraging the exchange of unique fine-
grained information, and promoting economic opportunities for the relationship 
(Gulati and Sytch 2007; Uzzi 1997). 
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H1e: Joint dependence is positively related to the level of information sharing between 
client and supplier in an IS outsourcing relationship. 
6.3.2 Relative Dependence, Use of Dependence Advantage, and Relational Facets 
In contrast to joint dependence, dependence asymmetry has been argued to have a 
negative impact on relational facets (Hibbard et al. 2001; Kumar et al. 1995; Palmatier 
et al. 2007). Diverging interests, opportunistic behavior, and coercive use of power are 
more likely to occur in asymmetric relationships and are adverse to the development of 
relationship quality. 
When a party is more dependent on its exchange partner than vice versa, the partner 
has a dependence advantage and is in a position of relative power (Emerson 1962). 
Generally, a power advantage offers a situation where the more powerful organization 
can exploit the other party to structure the exchange relationship in its own favor 
(Cook 1977). Guided by prior contributions from other domains (Gaski and Nevin 
1985; Kim et al. 2005; Provan et al. 1980), we distinguish between a potential power 
advantage and its actual use. In other words, the possession of a power advantage 
should not be equated with its use. Although it seems theoretically plausible that, all 
else being equal, a greater power potential will lead to enhanced exploitation (Gaski 
and Nevin 1985), there might be further moderators that regulate its exercise. For 
instance, contractual safeguards (e.g., detailed price clauses or service level 
agreements (Barthélemy and Quélin 2006)) in the weaker party’s interest might hinder 
the stronger party from making unlimited use of its power advantage (Wuyts and 
Geyskens 2005). Similarly, the fear of damaging one’s own market reputation might 
result in a restraint of power (Wang 2008). 
H2: The greater the relative dependence in an outsourcing relationship, the greater 
the stronger party’s actual use of power will be. 
Differentiating between potential and actual use of a power advantage has several 
implications for our research model. While some authors argue that relative 
dependence has a negative impact on relationship quality (Kumar et al. 1995), others 
argue that the actual use of power is of greater interest or at least has a greater effect 
(Gaski and Nevin 1985). The question is whether the mere presence of a power 
advantage matters, or whether it is rather the exercise of a power advantage that 
produces behaviors that are damaging to the relationship quality. Theoretically, both 
effects are possible and can coexist. Thus, we hypothesize that there is direct negative 
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effect of increased dependence asymmetry on relationship quality. The concomitant 
mechanism is an indirect effect, where the dependence asymmetry is mediated by the 
stronger party’s actual use of power.  
A remaining question is: How exactly does dependence asymmetry (or exercise of a 
power advantage) damage the relational facets?13 With an increasing dependence 
asymmetry, the more powerful firm can use its power in a self-serving and coercive 
manner to obtain compliance from the more dependent party (Hart and Saunders 1997; 
Kumar et al. 1995). Dependence asymmetry (or exercise of a power advantage) 
produces a vicious effect on trust and commitment (Kumar et al. 1995): The more 
powerful firm is less dependent on the weaker firm’s trust and commitment, since it 
can use coercion to achieve its goals. Additionally, the more powerful firm has less 
need to be committed to the relationship or to trust its partner, since its own 
dependence is relatively low. Furthermore, it is unlikely that trust and commitment are 
developed unilaterally (Anderson and Weitz 1992), resulting in an asymmetric 
dependence relationship characterized by relatively low levels of overall trust and 
commitment. According to this logic, it also seems reasonable that dependence 
asymmetry and self-serving and exploitative exercises of power diminish coordination 
effectiveness and the extent of information sharing. The more dependent party is less 
motivated to identify with the dominant party and to invest more than is necessary in 
the relationship. Equally, an increasing dependence asymmetry increases the level of 
conflict by promoting hostility, destructive actions, and aggression within the 
relationship (Hibbard et al. 2001; Kumar et al. 1995). According to bilateral deterrence 
theory, the dominant party fears less and weaker retaliation, so its motivation to avoid 
conflicts decreases. Additionally, the theory states that the weaker party, expecting 
more attacks from its partner, is less likely to quietly accept this danger, but to oppose 
it instead (Kumar et al. 1995; Lawler et al. 1988; Lawler and Bacharach 1987). Thus, 
under dependence asymmetry and exploitative power use, the level of conflict in the 
relationship will be relatively high. In summary, our argumentation leads to the 
following hypotheses: 
H3: Relative dependence in an outsourcing relationship is negatively related to 
relationship quality in terms of a) trust, b) commitment, c) diminished conflict, d) 
coordination effectiveness, and e) information sharing. 
                                              
13  Since we have already introduced the relational facets in detail when describing H1a-e, we will 
keep the following discussion brief. 
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H4: The dominant party’s use of a dependence advantage is negatively related to 
relationship quality in terms of a) trust, b) commitment, c) diminished conflict, d) 
coordination effectiveness, and e) information sharing. 
6.3.3 Impact on Exchange Performance 
Relative dependence, or use of power, and joint dependence result in two rival 
mechanisms affecting the outsourcing relationship’s performance. To illustrate these, 
we look at how value is created and appropriated in business relationships (Jap 1999; 
Jap 2001; Wagner et al. 2010), using a ‘pie model.’ First, joint dependence can be 
argued to be a driver of value creation, i.e., increasing the size of the ‘pie’ that can be 
shared by both partners, through increased relationship quality (Gulati and Sytch 2007; 
Jap 1999). The second mechanism, value appropriation, concerns how the pie or the 
value created in the relationship is shared between the parties. In the following, we 
argue that relative dependence, i.e., a dependence asymmetry, influences this 
mechanism to a great extent, and we will elaborate on the corresponding theoretical 
hypotheses. 
Starting with relative dependence, we can state that the greater the dependence 
asymmetry, the greater the potential is for the stronger party to structure the 
relationship in its own favor and to capture greater value in the relationship at the 
expense of the weaker party (‘ensuring a bigger share of the pie’) (Blau 1964; Cook 
1977; Gulati and Sytch 2007). In the case of a more powerful client, the supplier might 
be pressed to provide a high quality service but at a low price. Similarly, client 
organizations can be exploited by powerful suppliers and be subjected to dictation of 
pricing or to low service quality. In contrast, in a balanced dependence structure, the 
parties interact at eye-to-eye level, and unequal value appropriation should be less 
severe. This does not mean that the use of power is totally nonexistent in these 
relationships, but rather that theoretically, a dominant party should not emerge 
(Emerson 1962). Thus, we posit the following hypotheses for client and supplier 
satisfaction in an outsourcing setting: 
H5: The dominant party’s (client’s or supplier’s) use of a dependence advantage is 
positively related to its own satisfaction with the exchange performance. 
H6: The dominant party’s (client’s or supplier’s) use of a dependence advantage is 
negatively related to its partner’s satisfaction with the exchange performance. 
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By enhancing the relationship quality, joint dependence increases a relationship’s 
value-generating potential and thus promotes both partners’ exchange performances 
(‘increasing the overall pie size’) (Gulati and Sytch 2007). The reason lies in the 
strengthened relational facets, which lead to a beneficial relationship climate. In the IS 
outsourcing context, trust, information, and knowledge sharing have frequently been 
found to lead to better outcomes for client organizations (Lacity et al. 2010). For 
example, Poppo and Zenger (2002) found support for the positive effect of relational 
governance on a client’s satisfaction with the exchange relationship in terms of overall 
cost, output quality, and the supplier’s responsiveness. Research in other fields has 
viewed this topic from a broader perspective. For instance, Jap (1999) showed that 
coordination efforts enhance profit performance and competitive advantages for both 
parties in a buyer-supplier dyad. For the automotive industry, Gulati and Sytch (2007) 
argued that greater trust, a higher level of information exchange, and dyadic 
cooperation and coordination lead to superior results for manufacturers and suppliers. 
Long-lasting, dysfunctional conflicts have been argued to decrease the satisfaction of 
exchange partners (Anderson and Narus 1990). Uzzi’s research on inter-firm networks 
showed that, compared to loosely coupled, arm’s-length ties, ‘embedded’ exchange 
relationships can result in economic advantages for both parties by fostering trust, 
information transfer, and joint problem-solving arrangements (Uzzi 1997). Thus, we 
posit: 
H7: The higher the relationship quality in terms of a) trust b) commitment, c) 
diminished conflict d) coordination efforts, and e) information sharing, the higher a 
client’s satisfaction with relationship exchange performance. 
H8: The higher the relationship quality in terms of a) trust, b) commitment, c) 
diminished conflict, d) coordination efforts, and e) information sharing, the higher a 
supplier’s satisfaction with relationship exchange performance. 
6.4 Methodology and Research Process 
To provide empirical evidence for our research model, we plan to conduct a survey 
involving experts in client and IT supplier firms of different sizes. To date, we have 
conducted a comprehensive literature review, 19 interviews in case studies, extensive 
questionnaire and scale pre-tests with 16 experts, and a two-sided pre-study with 43 
participants. Our overall research process follows a three-step approach, as depicted in 
Figure 6-2. 
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6.4.1 Conceptualization and Development of Measures 
Two different versions of the questionnaire have been prepared, one addressing the 
client side and one the supplier side in an outsourcing relationship. Measures were 
developed based on a review of the literature and interviews with 19 practitioners. We 
then pre-tested the questionnaires and further refined them using comments collected 
from IT experts and scholars during the pre-tests.  
We measured client dependence by asking participants to assess the client’s 
dependence on a particular supplier in a specific IS outsourcing relationship. The 
measure for client dependence was based on several interviews with IT experts (Kaiser 
et al. 2012; Kaiser et al. 2013a) and prior studies in marketing channels (Frazier 1983; 
Hibbard et al. 2001; Kumar et al. 1998). The measure of supplier dependence was 
developed similarly. 
To reflect relative and joint dependence, we plan to follow approaches suggested by 
prior articles in dependence research (Casciaro and Piskorski 2005; Gulati and Sytch 
2007; Kumar et al. 1995). For a client’s dependence advantage, the difference between 
supplier and client dependence (DS-DC) is calculated. This variable is then recoded to 
equal (DS-DC) if (DS > DC) and zero otherwise. Similarly, a supplier’s dependence 
advantage is coded to (DC-DS) if (DC > DS) and zero otherwise. Assuming a sufficient 
sample size, our research model might then be analyzed for different cases, either a) 
when the client possesses a dependence advantage or b) when the supplier possesses a 
dependence advantage or c) on an aggregated level, including a partner’s dependence 
advantage as depicted in Figure 6-1. For joint dependence, we sum the client and 
supplier dependence scores. 
 
Figure 6-2: Research Process 
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To measure the actual use of a dependence advantage by the dominant party, we 
used four newly developed items. Wording of the items was based on literature in the 
field (Cook 1977; Emerson 1962) and was closely tied to the construct ‘restraint of 
power use’ introduced by Heide and Miner (Heide and Miner 1992). 
Measures for our relational variables were adopted from the following sources: trust 
(Fang et al. 2008a), commitment (Goo et al. 2009; Kumar et al. 1995), conflict (Kumar 
et al. 1992), information sharing (Goles et al. 2005; Lee and Kim 1999; Wüllenweber 
et al. 2008), and coordination effectiveness (Fang et al. 2008b; Jap 1999). 
Measures for client satisfaction with exchange performance were based on (Kumar 
et al. 1992; Poppo and Zenger 2002; Zaheer et al. 1998). Measures for supplier 
satisfaction with exchange performance were adopted from the extant literature 
(Corsten and Kumar 2005; Kumar et al. 1992; Palmatier et al. 2006; Palmatier et al. 
2007). All constructs were assessed on a seven-point Likert scale. 
6.4.2 Assessment and Refinement of Measurement Model 
To pre-validate our measures, we conducted a pre-study and obtained data from 
respondents in our target group. Personalized invitations were sent via an online social 
business network to 367 randomly selected IT professionals in client and supplier 
firms of different sizes. Participation was encouraged by offering a results report and a 
raffle for a tablet device. Reminder emails were sent two to three weeks later to all 
non-respondents who had initially indicated interest. A total of 43 completed 
questionnaires were received, 19 from the client side and 24 from the supplier side, 
yielding a response rate of 12%. The majority of the client participants were supplier 
managers (45%) and project managers (40%), whereas the suppliers were mainly (key) 
account managers (38%) and project managers (25%). 
The purpose of our pre-study was to (1) ensure the questionnaire’s 
comprehensibility, (2) shorten scales where appropriate, and (3) conduct preliminary 
reliability assessments. With regard to the first objective, we included an open 
question allowing respondents to comment on content, wording, and questionnaire 
length, and we adjusted the questionnaire accordingly.  
We tried to identify candidates for elimination from reflective item pools by 
analyzing inter-item correlations, CITC, ‘Cronbach’s alpha if item deleted’ statistics, 
and standard deviation scores (e.g., Sun 2012). When we had the impression, based on 
the statistics, that item formulations could be improved, we modified them slightly. 
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Item means and variances were inspected (DeVellis 2003, pp. 93-94). We assessed 
reliability with traditional techniques discussed in the literature. We confirmed 
unidimensionality for all our reflectively measured constructs with exploratory factor 
analysis (principal axis factoring, promax rotation, extraction based on factors with 
eigenvalues greater than 1). The reliability test results exceeded commonly suggested 
thresholds (Cronbach’s alpha 0.7; minimal corrected item-total correlation 0.5): client 
dependence (0.842; 0.599), supplier dependence (0.923; 0.720), power use (0.891; 
0.732), commitment (0.880; 0.526), trust (0.896; 0.777), conflict (0.926; 0.796), 
coordination effectiveness (0.895; 0.701), information sharing (0.867; 0.604), client 
satisfaction (0.856; 0.670), and supplier satisfaction (0.854; 0.646). 
6.4.3 Main Survey 
While our pre-study was a valuable research step, we will gather a new larger 
sample to provide conclusive, empirical validation of our research model. The main 
survey will use cross-sectional data and will be directed to client and IT supplier firms 
of different organizational sizes. Two separate studies will be launched; the ‘client 
study’ will have client organizations as the primary source, while the ‘supplier study’ 
will be sent to supplier firms in the first instance. We aspire to a total sample size of 
approximately 400 respondents. 
We plan to test our hypotheses with structural equation modeling (SEM), a second-
generation statistical method (Bagozzi and Yi 2012). More precisely, we plan to use 
covariance-based SEM, since it provides certain advantages over partial least squares 
(PLS) regression, for example, estimating models incorporating error terms 
(Diamantopoulos 2011). The final analysis will also include control variables such as 
contract duration, firm size, and type of outsourcing (IS development, maintenance, 
and/or operations). 
6.5 Discussion and Expected Contributions 
Our research project aims to contribute to IS outsourcing relationship and 
dependence research. With our transfer of dyadic dependencies to a ‘new’ application 
domain, the IS outsourcing field, our research model addresses expected effects of 
relative and joint dependence on the quality of outsourcing relationships (in terms of 
trust, commitment, and so forth) and exchange performance. One unusual 
characteristic of this study is that we do not merely focus on client outcomes; we also 
incorporate suppliers’ satisfaction with exchange performance. This approach will 
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allow particular interpretations to benefit both parties. With this dyadic approach and 
the inclusion of power use, we also try to contribute back to the dependence research 
in reference disciplines (Gulati and Sytch 2007; Kumar et al. 1995). In particular, this 
study answers calls in the research literature to study in detail the role of 
interdependence as an inter-organizational relationship aspect in value appropriation 
and creation (Gulati and Sytch 2007; Wagner et al. 2010). To summarize, our research 
project aims to extend prior related models in reference disciplines by (1) 
distinguishing between the potential and the exercise of a power advantage, (2) 
exploring in detail the concomitant effects of dependence asymmetry and joint 
dependence on relationship quality and exchange performance, and (3) incorporating 
both parties’ outcome evaluations. 
A central question that our research focuses on is: To what extent is it beneficial to 
exercise a power advantage that has been achieved? Power usage at the expense of the 
weaker party has been argued to damage the relationship quality and thus to 
significantly endanger the value-creating potential of the exchange relationship. So it 
might happen that a more powerful party gets the bigger piece of the pie, but the pie 
itself has been dramatically diminished. In the worst case, the dominant party could 
even be confronted with a net loss (Gulati and Sytch 2007). Another important 
question is: what prevents powerful IT suppliers and clients from making extensive 
use of their power? 
Our research model has also practical implications. Assuming that client and 
supplier dependencies can vary across relationships, different combinations of relative 
and joint dependence can emerge. Which strategy should companies involved in IS 
outsourcing pursue with regard to dependencies? Is it always advantageous to decrease 
one’s own dependence, or can it also be beneficial to increase the partner’s 
dependence, thereby boosting the joint dependence in the relationship? Knowing the 
positive and negative aspects of power use should provide practitioners with valuable 
insights. For that purpose, a detailed analysis of dependence asymmetry (or power 
usage) on relational variables should complete the picture. 
Our main study will also enable us to analyze in more detail the characteristics of 
the IS outsourcing market. The study has the potential to provide insight into 
dependence structures that are ‘common’ to different kinds of outsourcing, e.g., IS 
development and operations, and to analyze the impact of relationship duration on the 
development of interdependence. 
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7 Dependence Asymmetry, Power Use, and Joint 
Dependence in IS Outsourcing Arrangements 
– A Structural Equation Model  
To test the previously developed model (chapter 6), data about IS outsourcing 
relationships were collected through an online survey. In this chapter, the methodology 
used is first discussed in detail in section 7.1. The chapter continues with an evaluation 
of the measurement model in section 7.2.1, followed by a presentation of common 
dependence structures found in the observed outsourcing relationships in section 7.2.2 
and a discussion of the partial least square analysis that was used to validate the 
structural model and test the hypotheses in section 7.2.3. The chapter closes with a 
discussion of the findings and implications in section 7.3 and of limitations and 
directions for future research in section 7.4. 
7.1 Methodology 
7.1.1 Data Collection 
To investigate the causal model, data were collected from IS outsourcing 
relationships covering a range of IS outsourcing activities, such as development, 
maintenance, and operations. A total of 1,235 IT professionals were invited to respond 
to an online survey with regard to an outsourcing relationship they were personally 
involved in. Candidates from different client and supplier firms were randomly 
selected via a large online social business network. Selection was not restricted with 
respect to firm size or specific industries in the case of client firms (supplier firms all 
belong to the IT and software industry). Nevertheless, all participants had to pass a 
screening process and fulfill the following inclusion criteria: 1) they had to be 
employed at a company, excluding one-person enterprises, at the time of the survey; 2) 
they had to occupy a position relevant to the study’s topic, with a sufficient 
involvement in an outsourcing relationship and adequate knowledge to respond to the 
study’s questions; and 3) they had to have been in that specific position within the 
company for at least one year. 
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Requests for participation, including a short study description, were sent via the 
social network. Participation was encouraged by offering a results report and a raffle 
for a tablet device. Reminder emails were sent about two weeks later to all non-
respondents who had initially indicated interest. A total of 100 completed 
questionnaires were finally received (50 on the client side and 50 on the supplier side), 
yielding a response rate of 8.1%.14 
7.1.2 Sample Characteristics 
The final data set of participants yielded the descriptive details shown in Table 7-1. 
Each outsourcing relationship was evaluated from either a client or a supplier 
perspective. First, the table shows the distribution of client and supplier firm sizes. For 
each relationship, respondents indicated the number of employees in their own 
company as well as in their partner firm (partner firm size is depicted in parentheses). 
In 36% of the outsourcing relationships investigated, client firms had 500 or fewer 
employees (statements from clients and suppliers equally considered). About 56% of 
the relationships involved supplier firms with 500 or fewer employees. In the case of 
client side responses, the number of IT employees was also gathered. Approximately 
36% of the client companies had IT departments with 50 employees or less. Table 7.1 
also lists the industries covered as well as the respondents’ job titles. The majority of 
the client participants were project managers (40%) and supplier managers (22%), 
whereas the supplier-side participants were mainly project managers (44%) and (key) 
account managers (32%). On average, the survey respondents had 12 years of 
outsourcing experience. 
To assess nonresponse bias in the sample, the first 25% and the last 25% of the 
responses were compared based on the response time in days (Armstrong and Overton 
1977). This procedure assumes that late respondents tend to be similar to non-
respondents in their characteristics. Utilizing t-tests, no significant differences with 
regard to the research model variables were found. Thus, nonresponse bias does not 
appear to be an issue. 
 
 
                                              
14  This sample was collected as one part of a large-scale survey. The analysis here is based on data 
from 100 IS outsourcing relationships that were collected in the first phases of continuous data 
collection efforts. 
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Table 7-1: Sample Characteristics 
Client Company Data Supplier Company Data 
Client Company Size Frequency 
(Partner 
Frequency) 
Supplier Company Size Frequency 
(Partner 
Frequency) 
≤100 6% (14%) ≤ 50 20% (24%) 
101–200 6% (12%) 51–100 20% (10%) 
201–500 20% (14%) 101–200 10% (4%) 
501–1,000 8% (8%) 201–500 14% (10%) 
1,001–5,000 24% (18%) 501–1,000 4% (4%) 
5,001–10,000 6% (10%) 1,001–5,000 18% (8%) > 10,000 28% (24%) > 5,000 14 % (36%) 
n/a 2% (0%) n/a 0% (4%) 
Client Company IT Employees Frequency   
≤ 10 26%   
11–50 10%   
51–200 14%   
201–500 12%   
501–1,000 12%   >1,000 12%   
n/a 14%   
Industry Sector Frequency Industry Sector Frequency 
Manufacturing  22% IT Consulting 18% 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 12% System Integration 6% 
Transportation and Storage 12% Individual Software Development 12% 
Information and Communication 12% Standard Software 6% 
Financial and Insurance Activities 22% Hosting Services 8% 
Public Administration, Education 
and Human Health 
14% IT Services 28% 
Other 6% Other 22% 
Client Respondents’ Job 
Positions Frequency 
Supplier Respondents’ Job 
Positions Frequency 
IT Department Manager (e.g., 
CIO) 
16% IT Department Manager 2% 
Supplier Manager 22% (Key) Account Manager 32% 
IT Project Manager 40% IT Project Manager 44% 
IT Operations Manager 12% IT Operations Manager 6% 
IT Demand Manager 8% IT Demand Manager / Consultant 8% 
Other 2% Other 8% 
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Because a single method was used to collect the data, a series of tests was conducted 
to analyze common method bias (CMB) in the dataset. A popular statistical approach 
that addresses CMB in partial least squares was developed by Liang et al. (2007). 
However, though it has frequently been applied in the last few years, a recent analysis 
concluded that this approach neither detects nor controls for common method variance 
(Chin et al. 2012). Consequently, it was decided to use two other approaches discussed 
in the literature: Harman’s single factor test (Podsakoff et al. 2003) and the PLS 
marker variable approach recently introduced by Rönkkö and Ylitalo (2011).  
Harman’s single factor test using exploratory factor analysis was used to check 
whether the majority of the variance can be explained by a single factor (Podsakoff et 
al. 2003). The test was performed with principal axis factoring and by restricting the 
factors to extract to one. The results showed that a single factor accounted only for 
35% of the variance, which is below the critical value of 50%.  
In addition, the study followed the steps recommended by Rönkkö and Ylitalo 
(2011) to perform a marker variable approach in PLS models. In step 1, two marker 
items which were not part of the research model were used from the empirical dataset 
(e.g., ‘my needs and desires are taken into account in planning the company’s benefit 
program’). Ideal marker variables are theoretically unrelated to the study variables or 
at least show low correlations with the indicators of the study variables, but they must 
be subject to the same measurement effects (Bagozzi 2011; Lindell and Whitney 2001; 
Rönkkö and Ylitalo 2011). To conduct an initial diagnosis of the degree of common 
method variance in the data, the mean correlation between the marker items and the 
study items was calculated (Rönkkö and Ylitalo 2011). Ideally, these two groups 
should be related to each other only because they are affected by a common method 
factor. Correlations between marker items and study items ranged between -0.232 and 
0.192, and most of these were positive. Since these values are within the 99% 
confidence interval of Pearson’s correlation coefficient for a sample size of 100, there 
is no indication that any marker item has a stronger association with a study item than 
the correlation raised by the same method variance. This resulted in a mean correlation 
of 0.02 between marker items and study items, which is already below the suggested 
threshold of 0.05 (Rönkkö and Ylitalo 2011). Nevertheless, to be conservative, the 
analysis was continued by including the marker variable with regression paths to all 
the endogenous constructs in the structural model. A comparison of the baseline model 
(without marker variable) and the CMB model (with marker variable) showed no signs 
of serious common method bias in the dataset (see Table 7-4, p. 133). First, the marker 
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variable shows no significant effect on the endogenous variables. In addition, all 
parameter estimates which are significant in the baseline model show no significant 
difference between the two models (∆≤0.015), and none of these change to a lower 
significance class in the CMB model. Thus, both approaches indicate that it is unlikely 
that a common method bias distorts the results, and therefore both increase the 
confidence that valid effects have been found. 
7.1.3 Measures 
As discussed in section 6.4.2, measures were developed based on a comprehensive 
literature review and interviews with 19 practitioners. An extensive survey-based pre-
study was then conducted to perform preliminary reliability and validity assessments. 
The final set of items appears in Table A-5 in the appendix. 
All constructs follow a reflective measurement perspective (Jarvis et al. 2003). The 
questionnaire included the client and supplier dependence variables, the relational 
facets (commitment, trust, conflict, coordination effectiveness, and information 
sharing), use of a dependence advantage (or power use, PUSE for short), and the 
client’s and supplier’s satisfaction with the exchange performance. Measures for 
relative and joint dependence, as introduced in section 1.3.2, were calculated based on 
the individual client and supplier dependencies, following prior research from 
reference disciplines (Casciaro and Piskorski 2005; Gulati and Sytch 2007; Kumar et 
al. 1995). For joint dependence, the means of client dependence (five items) and 
supplier dependence (five items) were added together. To assess the degree of relative 
dependence, the absolute difference between the average client dependence and the 
average supplier dependence was calculated. A further binary variable was added to 
indicate whether the client (0) or the supplier (1) was the dominant party in the 
relationship. Variables for the dominant party’s satisfaction and the weaker party’s 
satisfaction were also created. For each data row, the construct dominant party 
satisfaction received either the values of client satisfaction (when the client was found 
to be the dominant party) or the values of supplier satisfaction (when the supplier was 
in a more powerful position). The construct of weaker party satisfaction was similarly 
created. 
The questionnaire also included single-item measures of several extraneous 
elements that have been discussed as impacting exchange partners’ satisfaction. First, 
the duration of the relationship has frequently been controlled for in studies of 
exchange performances (Gulati and Sytch 2007; Palmatier et al. 2007; Poppo et al. 
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2008). Relationship duration is measured as the longevity of the outsourcing 
relationship (for the particular information system) in years. The study further 
controlled for a characteristic of the information system involved – the degree of IS 
specificity. This variable might affect not only interdependence but also the need for 
relational variables like information sharing and trust (Gulati and Sytch 2007). It was 
measured as the degree to which the IS had been adapted to the client firm’s 
characteristics (Alvarez-Suescun 2010; Saarinen and Vepsäläinen 1994). Additionally, 
the questionnaire included two characteristics of the relationship’s contract – contract 
size and contract extensiveness – frequently found to positively impact outsourcing 
outcomes (Lacity et al. 2010). Contract size was measured as the total contract volume 
in Euro (Lacity et al. 2010). To control for contract extensiveness, respondents were 
instructed to assess the level of detail with which the contract describes the roles and 
responsibilities of each party (based on Lusch and Brown 1996; Wuyts and Geyskens 
2005). The effects of these control variables on both exchange partners’ satisfaction 
and on the model’s mediating variables were examined. 
7.1.4 Data Analysis 
The research model presented in chapter 6 was operationalized as a structural 
equation model, using PLS as implemented in SmartPLS version 2.0 M3 (Ringle et al. 
2005). PLS-SEM is a variance-based approach that maximizes the explained variance 
of the dependent variables by estimating partial model relationships in an iterative 
series of ordinary least squares regressions (Hair et al. 2012). The PLS technique is 
appropriate and well suited for this study, because it has modest requirements 
regarding sample size in contrast to its covariance-based counterpart (CB-SEM, 
Reinartz et al. 2009). 
With n=100, the obtained sample meets the rule of thumb for robust PLS 
estimations that requires a minimum sample size of ten times the maximum number of 
paths aiming at any variable (Barclay et al. 1995; Hair et al. 2012). A PLS 
bootstrapping technique with individual sign changes and 500 resamples consisting of 
the same number of cases as the original sample was used to determine the statistical 
significance of the parameter estimates (Hair et al. 2012). 
Although PLS, in contrast to CB-SEM, does not impose any assumptions regarding 
the distribution of the indicators and has been shown by prior research to be robust in 
situations where data are non-normal (e.g., Reinartz et al. 2009), guidelines for PLS 
use nevertheless suggest that data distribution should be checked for extreme values of 
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non-normality (Hair et al. 2012; Ringle et al. 2012). West et al. (1995) proposed an 
absolute skew value of >2 and kurtosis value >7 as a reference of substantial 
departure from normality. Overall, only a small to moderate skew or kurtosis (up to 
skew 1.3 and kurtosis 5.5) was found. Thus, this moderate deviation from a normality 
distribution is not very likely to be a problem in the PLS analysis. 
7.2 Results 
7.2.1 Validation of the Measurement Model 
Several tests ensured the reliability and validity of the reflective multi-item 
measures. For all constructs, Cronbach’s alpha clearly exceeded the recommended 
minimum of 0.7 (Nunnally 1978, see Table A-5, appendix). Additionally, with values 
greater than or equal to 0.869, composite reliability (CR) for all constructs was very 
high and exceeded the threshold value of 0.6 (Bagozzi and Yi 1988). These results 
suggest a strong internal consistency and reliability of the included measures.  
The convergent validity of the constructs was additionally assessed by calculating 
AVE. Table A-5 (see appendix) shows that AVE values range from 0.553 
(commitment) to 0.878 (power use) and thus exceed the critical value of 0.5 (Fornell 
Table 7-2: Descriptive Statistics, Correlations, and Square Roots of AVEs 
Variables 
1 
RDEP 
2 
JDEP 
3 
PUSE 
4 
TRU 
5 
COM 
6 
CON 
7 
COEF 
8 
INFS 
9 
DSAT 
10 
WSAT 
11 
RELD 
12 
CSIZ 
13 
CEXT 
14 
ISSP 
1 RDEP n/a              
2 JDEP -0.179 n/a             
3 PUSE 0.008 -0.040 0.937            
4 TRU -0.128 0.042 -0.462 0.921           
5 COM 0.000 0.211 -0.380 0.722 0.743          
6 CON -0.023 0.161 0.462 -0.727 -0.613 0.912         
7 COEF -0.150 0.186 -0.373 0.767 0.698 -0.667 0.875        
8 INFS -0.235 0.178 -0.315 0.681 0.648 -0.614 0.773 0.831       
9 DSAT -0.086 0.079 -0.328 0.639 0.654 -0.617 0.649 0.518 0.898      
10 WSAT -0.140 0.118 -0.460 0.726 0.692 -0.719 0.769 0.658 0.622 0.891     
11 RELD 0.045 0.131 0.010 -0.012 -0.080 0.074 0.128 0.015 0.068 -0.056 n/a    
12 CSIZ 0.041 -0.058 0.050 0.061 0.077 -0.049 0.040 0.038 0.033 0.038 0.089 n/a   
13 CEXT -0.095 -0.133 0.023 0.287 0.339 -0.323 0.410 0.412 0.224 0.384 -0.060 -0.121 n/a  
14 ISSP -0.090 0.194 0.035 -0.074 -0.078 0.108 -0.012 0.006 -0.220 -0.044 0.190 -0.077 -0.010 n/a 
Notes: Diagonal elements are square roots of AVEs and off-diagonal elements present correlations 
RDEP = Relative Dependence; JDEP = Joint Dependence; PUSE = Power Use; TRU = Trust; COM = Commitment; CON = Conflict; 
COEF = Coordination Effectiveness; INFS = Information Sharing; DSAT = Dominant Party Satisfaction; WSAT = Weaker Party 
Satisfaction; RELD = Relationship Duration; CSIZ = Contract Size; CEXT = Contract Extensiveness; ISSP = IS Specificity 
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and Larcker 1981). Furthermore, all factor loadings on posited latent variables were 
significant at the p<0.001 level, greater than 0.5 (Bagozzi and Yi 1988), and, except 
for COM3 (0.564), even greater than 0.6 (Chin 1998a). Altogether, these results 
suggest the convergent validity of the employed constructs. 
As evidence of discriminant validity, loadings of indicators on intended constructs 
were always higher than loadings on any other construct (Chin 1998b). In addition, all 
constructs fulfilled Fornell and Larcker’s criterion. As Table 7-2 shows, the diagonal 
elements representing the square roots of AVE of the indicators within a construct 
were always higher than that construct’s correlation with any other construct (off-
diagonal elements, Fornell and Larcker 1981). 
7.2.2 Descriptive Analysis of Interdependence 
The data collected within this study provide the opportunity to identify dependence 
structures ‘typical’ to IS outsourcing relationships and thus to scrutinize and discuss 
the picture that is conveyed by the body of prior IS outsourcing research. Therefore, 
several descriptive analyses were performed. Across all relationships, we notice that 
the mean of client dependence (4.390) is higher than the mean of supplier dependence 
(3.786; see Table 7-3). This suggests that on average the client party is slightly more 
dependent on its supplier than vice versa. However, the strong focus of prior IS 
outsourcing research on client dependence does not appear to be strongly justified, 
given that 39% of supplier firms also show moderate to high levels of dependence (>4 
on a scale from 1 to 7). 
Table 7-3: Interdependence Characteristics      
Construct N Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Client Dependence (1–7) 100 4.390 4.400 1.118 1.8 7 
Supplier Dependence (1–7) 100 3.786 3.600 1.380 1 7 
Relative Dependence (0–6) 100 1.352 1.200 1.052 0 5 
Joint Dependence (2–14) 100 8.176 8.000 1.930 4 14 
Further analyses can be conducted using the binary variable created to classify the 
dominant party in the outsourcing relationship. Out of 100 outsourcing relationships, 
34 (34%) showed a client dominance (client dependence < supplier dependence), 62 
(62%) showed a supplier dominance (client dependence > supplier dependence), and 
in 4 relationships (4%), the dependencies were perfectly symmetric (client dependence 
= supplier dependence). To control for a possible bias, responses made by client and 
supplier respondents were compared. An approximate ratio of one-third to two-thirds 
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(client vs. supplier dominance) was found on both sides, pointing to similar 
assessments made by client and supplier companies regarding dependence structures in 
the outsourcing market. The findings indicate that in the majority of cases, suppliers 
are in a more powerful position in IS outsourcing relationships. But again, it must be 
noted that in 34% of the relationships investigated, the client is the dominant party. 
Concerning the size of dependence advantages, degrees of relative dependence 
ranged from 0 to 5. The majority of relationships (74%) showed a dominant party with 
a relatively low advantage (0 < 𝑅𝐷𝐸𝑃 ≤ 2). In 19% of the relationships, there was a 
moderate dependence advantage (2 < 𝑅𝐷𝐸𝑃 < 4). In only 3% of the relationships did 
the dominant party achieve a high dependence advantage of greater than or equal to 4. 
Regarding joint dependence, 13% of the relationships showed a low joint 
dependence (2 ≤  𝐽𝐷𝐸𝑃 ≤ 6). A moderate joint dependence (6 <  𝐽𝐷𝐸𝑃 ≤ 10) was 
reported in 71% of the relationships. High joint dependence (𝐽𝐷𝐸𝑃 > 10) was found 
in 16% of the outsourcing relationships. 
7.2.3 Validation of the Structural Model 
The next step involves validating the structural model by assessing path coefficients, 
R-squared (R²) values, and effect sizes in PLS. A summary of the test results is shown 
in Table 7-4. 
Table 7-4: Structural Model Results   
Relationships 
Research Model 
(w/o Marker 
Variable) 
CMB Model 
(with Marker 
Variable) 
Impact of Relative Dependence on Relational Facets   
Relative Dependence → Power Use 0.012 n.s. 0.001 n.s. 
Relative Dependence → Commitment 0.087 n.s. 0.096 n.s. 
Relative Dependence → Trust -0.094 n.s. -0.082 n.s. 
Relative Dependence → Information Sharing -0.162 * -0.157 * 
Relative Dependence → Coordination Effectiveness -0.081 n.s. -0.069 n.s. 
Relative Dependence → Conflict  -0.031 n.s. -0.023 n.s. 
Impact of Joint Dependence on Relational Facets   
Joint Dependence → Commitment 0.303 *** 0.310 **** 
Joint Dependence → Trust 0.068 n.s. 0.077 n.s. 
Joint Dependence → Information Sharing 0.206 ** 0.209 ** 
Joint Dependence → Coordination Effectiveness 0.218 *** 0.227 *** 
Joint Dependence → Conflict 0.110 n.s. 0.116 n.s. 
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Table 7-4 (continued)   
Impact of Dep. Advantage Used (PUSE) on Relational Facets  
Power Use → Commitment -0.382 **** -0.374 **** 
Power Use → Trust -0.470 **** -0.460 **** 
Power Use → Information Sharing -0.322 **** -0.318 **** 
Power Use → Coordination Effectiveness -0.379 **** -0.370 **** 
Power Use → Conflict 0.478 **** 0.485 **** 
Impact of Dep. Advantage Used (PUSE) on Parties’ Satisfaction  
Power Use → Dominant Party Satisfaction 0.044 n.s. 0.046 n.s. 
Power Use → Weaker Party Satisfaction -0.122 ** -0.120 ** 
Impact of Relational Facets on Dominant Party Satisfaction  
Commitment → Dominant Party Satisfaction 0.340 *** 0.342 *** 
Trust → Dominant Party Satisfaction 0.096 n.s. 0.088 n.s. 
Information Sharing → Dominant Party Satisfaction -0.078 n.s. -0.078 n.s. 
Coordination Effectiveness → Dominant Party Satisfaction 0.270 * 0.266 * 
Conflict → Dominant Party Satisfaction -0.244 ** -0.252 ** 
Impact of Relational Facets on Weaker Party Satisfaction 
Commitment → Weaker Party Satisfaction 0.148 * 0.149 * 
Trust → Weaker Party Satisfaction 0.078 n.s. 0.073 n.s. 
Information Sharing → Weaker Party Satisfaction -0.001 n.s. -0.000 n.s. 
Coordination Effectiveness → Weaker Party Satisfaction 0.384 **** 0.382 **** 
Conflict → Weaker Party Satisfaction -0.228 ** -0.234 *** 
Control Variables (only significant paths reported here)   
Relationship Duration → Coordination Effectiveness 0.136 * 0.128 * 
Relationship Duration → Dominant Party Satisfaction 0.115 * 0.114 * 
Contract Extensiveness → Trust 0.313 *** 0.298 *** 
Contract Extensiveness→ Information Sharing 0.447 **** 0.441 **** 
Contract Extensiveness → Coordination Effectiveness 0.462 **** 0.448 **** 
Contract Extensiveness → Commitment 0.410 **** 0.399 **** 
Contract Extensiveness → Conflict -0.333 **** -0.343 **** 
Contract Size (lg) → Commitment 0.162 * 0.160 * 
IS Specificity → Dominant Party Satisfaction -0.185 ** -0.182 ** 
Effects of Marker Variable    
Marker → Power Use  -0.107 n.s. 
Marker → Commitment  0.067 n.s. 
Marker → Trust  0.092 n.s. 
Marker → Information Sharing  0.037 n.s. 
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Table 7-4 (continued)   
Marker → Coordination Effectiveness  0.082 n.s. 
Marker → Conflict  0.064 n.s. 
Marker → Dominant Party Satisfaction  0.031 n.s. 
Marker → Weaker Party Satisfaction  0.021 n.s. 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; **** p<0.001; n.s. not significant; two-tailed tests 
R² (R² adj.): PUSE 0.005; TRU 0.334 (0.283); INFS 0.365 (0.317); COM 0.374 (0.326); CON 0.360 (0.311); COEF 0.406 
(0.361); DSAT 0.584 (0.537); WSAT 0.710 (0.677) 
As expected, joint dependence had a positive impact on trust, commitment, 
coordination effectiveness, and information sharing in the relationship. In particular, 
its effects on commitment, coordination effectiveness, and information sharing (β = 
0.303, p<0.01; β = 0.218, p<0.01; β = 0.206, p<0.05) were statistically significant, 
supporting hypotheses H1b, H1d, and H1e respectively. However, the hypothesized 
relationships between joint dependence and trust (H1a) and conflict (H1c) were not 
supported. 
Effects of relative dependence on relational facets were in most cases not 
significantly different from zero (H3a–H3d). An exception is the slightly significant 
negative effect on information sharing between the parties (β = -0.162, p<0.1), in 
support of H3e. Hypothesis H2, predicting a positive relationship between the levels of 
dependence advantage and its use, could not be supported. While a positive 
relationship between the two variables was postulated, no effect significantly different 
from zero was found. The next section will discuss this finding and provide potential 
reasons. All hypotheses concerning the negative impact of a party’s actual use of 
power on the relationship quality were supported, and relatively large effects were 
found (H4a–e). Increased exploitation decreases trust (β = -0.470, p<0.001), 
commitment (β = -0.382, p<0.001), coordination effectiveness (β = -0.379, p<0.001), 
and information sharing (β = -0.322, p<0.001) while increasing conflict (β = 0.478, 
p<0.001). 
Consistent with the expectations, commitment and coordination effectiveness had a 
positive and significant impact on the dominant party’s satisfaction with the exchange 
performance (β = 0.340, p<0.01; β = 0.270, p<0.1). Thus, hypotheses H7b and H7d 
were supported. Hypothesis H7c, predicting a negative relationship between conflict 
and dominant party satisfaction, was also supported (β = -0.244, p<0.05). However, 
trust and information sharing showed no significant positive effect on the dominant 
party’s satisfaction, rejecting hypotheses H7a and H7e. 
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The findings are similar for the weaker party’s satisfaction with the exchange 
performance. Statistically significant positive impacts of commitment and 
coordination effectiveness (β = 0.148, p<0.1; β = 0.384, p<0.001) were found, 
supporting hypotheses H8b and H8d. As predicted by hypothesis H8c, level of conflict 
had a significant negative impact on the weaker party’s satisfaction (β = -0.228, 
p<0.05). However, hypotheses H8a and H8e, involving trust and information sharing, 
were not supported.  
Further tests explored whether true mediating relationships exist in the case of the 
relational facets. According to Baron and Kenny (1986), the first step in testing for 
mediation requires establishing a significant relationship between the independent and 
dependent variable when excluding mediators. Model tests showed significant positive 
relationships between joint dependence and dominant party satisfaction  
(β = 0.146, p<0.1), as well as between joint dependence and weaker party satisfaction 
(β = 0.175, p<0.05). The next steps require confirming that 1) the independent variable 
is a significant predictor of the mediator and 2) the mediator is a significant predictor 
of the dependent variable. The relational mediators, commitment and coordination 
effectiveness, fulfilled these two conditions. Additionally, the previously significant 
paths between joint dependence and satisfaction scores were greatly reduced and 
became insignificant after each of the two relational mediators was included, 
suggesting full mediation. This is underlined by Sobel’s test (Sobel 1982), which is 
able to determine whether the reduction in the effect of the independent variable on the 
dependent variable is significant after including a mediator variable, and therefore 
whether the mediation effect is statistically significant. Mediating effects of 
commitment and coordination effects between joint dependence and satisfaction scores 
were all found to be significant at p≤0.01 (one-tailed). Taken together, the findings 
suggest that the impact of joint dependence on satisfaction is fully mediated by the two 
relational facets commitment and coordination effectiveness. 
Continuing with hypothesis testing, the posited direct effect of power use on the 
dominant party’s satisfaction was slightly positive but insignificant (β = 0.044, n.s.), 
rejecting H5. However, as expected, a direct negative effect of power use on the 
weaker party’s satisfaction was found (β = -0.122, p<0.05), supporting H6. Again, we 
analyze this direct effect in its interplay with the postulated negative ‘side effect’ of 
power use on the relational facets. Based on Baron and Kenny (1986), the mediators 
coordination effectiveness, commitment and conflict come into question since these 
are 1) significantly affected by power use and 2) themselves significant predictors of 
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the dependent variable, weaker party satisfaction. In all three cases, the absolute path 
value between power use and weaker party satisfaction was reduced but remained 
significant in the corresponding mediation model (β = -0.220, p<0.001; β = -0.273, 
p<0.001; β = -0.216, p<0.01), in comparison to a regression model without a mediator 
variable (β = -0.474, p<0.001). Sobel’s test indicates that the reduction in the path 
coefficient is significant in each case at p<0.001 (one-tailed). Thus, the partial 
mediation effects of commitment, coordination effectiveness, and conflict are found to 
be significant. 
Among the control variables investigated, coordination effectiveness appeared to 
increase with relationship duration (β = 0.136, p<0.1). Relationship duration further 
increased dominant party satisfaction (β = 0.115, p<0.1). Contract size had a positive 
effect on the parties’ commitment to the outsourcing relationship (β = 0.162, p<0.1). 
Furthermore, detailed contract drafting had strong effects on all relational mediators. 
While conflicts appeared to decrease with increasing contract extensiveness  
(β = -0.333, p<0.001), there was an increase in trust (β = 0.313, p<0.01), commitment 
(β = 0.410, p<0.001), information sharing (β = 0.447, p<0.001), and coordination 
effectiveness (β = 0.462, p<0.001). Furthermore, degree of IS specificity was found to 
decrease satisfaction of the dominant party (β = -0.185, p<0.01). 
With R² values ranging from 0.334 to 0.406 (see Table 7-4), variances of relational 
mediators are moderately explained by the model (Chin 1998b). However, since the 
aim was not to fully explain these relational facets, this result can be considered 
satisfactory. Relative dependence accounted for only 0.5% of the variance of power 
use, which is not surprising given the insignificant path between the two constructs. 
The squared multiple correlations for the outcomes variables ‘weaker party’s 
satisfaction’ (R² = 0.584) and ‘dominant party’s satisfaction’ (R² = 0.710) point to the 
model’s strong explanatory power. 
An additional analysis of the effect sizes (𝑓2) of exogenous variables on endogenous 
variables revealed that all those with a significant influence also showed at least weak 
effects greater than 0.02 (Chin 1998b; Chin 2010). The effect sizes of joint 
dependence on relational facets (information sharing, coordination effectiveness, and 
commitment) ranged between 0.057 and 0.126. The highest 𝑓2 values were reached by 
power use, with its moderate to large effects on the relational mediators (ranging from 
0.162 for information sharing to 0.355 for conflict). A critical look at path coefficients 
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(β-values) further revealed that for a large portion of the supported hypotheses, 
substantial influences of at least 0.2 could be found (Chin 1998a). 
7.3 Discussion and Implications 
When a closer look at interdependence is taken, the study findings demonstrate that 
this critical facet of exchange arrangements impacts performance in IS outsourcing 
relationships to a substantial degree. Following prior research (Gulati and Sytch 2007; 
Kumar et al. 1995; Palmatier et al. 2007), interdependence was considered as 
encompassing two variables: joint dependence and relative dependence. The latter 
indicates a dependence asymmetry that provides a power advantage to the dominant 
party. To additionally account for a difference between a mere power (or dependence) 
advantage and its actual use, the latent variable ‘party’s use of dependence advantage’ 
(power use, for short) was included in the research model. While dependence 
asymmetry and an actor’s power use are mainly associated with value appropriation in 
relationships, joint dependence was introduced as increasing the relationship’s value-
generating potential. Using a sample of diverse IS outsourcing relationships, the role 
of interdependence as well as the concurrent value-related mechanisms were carefully 
examined. 
First, we found evidence for the value-enhancing character of joint dependence. The 
study findings indicate that, in particular, three key relational facets – commitment, 
coordination effectiveness, and information sharing – increase under high levels of 
joint dependence. Commitment and coordination effectiveness, in turn, were found to 
lead to higher degrees of satisfaction with exchange performance for both the 
dominant party and the weaker party. These findings underscore and extend the results 
of Gulati and Sytch (2007), who found that relational facets – joint action and quality 
of information exchange – acted as significant mediators of joint dependence on 
manufacturer (that is, client) satisfaction in the automotive supply industry. While 
their study solely focused on performance outcomes for the client party of a dyad, this 
study confirmed that joint dependence – through the three relational mediators – has a 
significant impact on both dominant and weaker party satisfaction.  
In this regard, it should be noted that no support could be provided for the expected 
mediating role of trust and information sharing. Although joint dependence showed a 
positive significant effect on information sharing, neither relational facet had a 
significant impact on the parties’ satisfaction scores. While Kumar et al.’s findings 
suggested a positive impact of joint dependence on the level of trust (Kumar et al. 
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1995), Gulati and Sytch (2007) also failed to repeat this result for the automotive 
industry. Likewise, Palmatier et al. (2007) found no support for joint dependence 
being significantly related to (customer) trust in seller-distributor relationships. The 
results presented here also leave doubt about a significant influence of joint 
dependence on the level of trust in IS outsourcing relationships.  
The interplay of joint dependence with conflict merits further discussion. We were 
not able to support hypothesis H1c, which predicted that in a high joint dependence 
setting parties experience fewer conflicts (Kumar et al. 1995). In line with bilateral 
deterrence theory (Lawler et al. 1988; Lawler and Bacharach 1987), both parties in a 
high joint dependence setting should have an increased fear of severe retaliation and 
be motivated to resolve conflicts cooperatively and quickly (Dwyer et al. 1987; 
Gundlach and Cadotte 1994; Kumar et al. 1995). However, we found a positive but not 
significant influence. This unexpected finding might be simply due to measurement 
differences across studies. Another possible explanation is that the environment of IS 
outsourcing relationships differs from the business relationships in other studies. 
Typical IS outsourcing endeavors are characterized, for example, by technology 
complexity and dynamic requirements (e.g., Goo et al. 2009), and projects of highly 
jointly dependent parties probably even more so. These characteristics might hinder 
the firms from resolving problems quickly, leading to an impression of many 
unresolved and longer-lasting conflicts. Since we were not able to provide sufficient 
empirical support, future IS research is encouraged to repeat and advance 
investigations in this regard, and to even consider alternative theoretical models of 
conflict development, such as conflict spiral theory (Lawler et al. 1988).  
Turning to the role of power potentials and their active exploitation, different effects 
could be found in this study. The discussion of model development (section 6.3.2) 
debated whether it is the mere presence of a dependence advantage, or rather the 
exercise of such a potential, that produces behaviors that are damaging to the 
relationship quality. The results clearly suggest that mere dependence advantages are 
not significantly related to relational facets, or are at least related to a lower degree, as 
in the case of information sharing (𝛽𝑅𝐷𝐸𝑃→ 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑆 = -0.162 vs. 𝛽𝑃𝑈𝑆𝐸→ 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑆 = -0.322). In 
contrast, the exercise of power advantages showed strong negatives effects on all 
relational facets considered, interfering with the value-enhancing effects of joint 
dependence. These findings suggest that (potential) dependence asymmetries as such 
are of less concern for relationships, because the damaging effects on relational facets 
seem to occur mainly under the actual use of a power advantage. This is good news for 
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dominant parties since this would entail that attaining a position of power does not 
necessarily substantially damage the relationship’s quality. For the weaker party, 
however, these results are not completely reassuring, since dependence asymmetries 
still provide the basis for power advantages, which can easily switch from being 
unexercised to being exercised. While the results allow us to draw such conclusions, 
further research is urged to substantiate them. 
Two relationships in particular remain puzzling. The first is the relationship between 
the levels of power potential and power use. The view that greater power potentials 
will lead to enhanced exploitation (Gaski and Nevin 1985) could not be supported. 
This suggests that the relationship between the variables is more complex and that 
additional variables which need to be controlled for must be included. As discussed in 
section 6.3.2, there might be further moderators that regulate the exercise of a power 
advantage, such as contractual safeguards (Wuyts and Geyskens 2005) or a party’s 
fear of damaging its own market reputation (Wang 2008). Furthermore, it may be 
worth the effort to account for characteristics of the dominant firm, such as its size, 
and to check whether there are even fundamental differences between the ways that 
clients and suppliers handle power potentials. For example, Gulati and Sytch (2007) 
argued that small automotive suppliers tend to rarely use eventual dependence 
advantages against large manufacturer firms. Future research might also investigate a 
possible non-linear relationship between the two variables. 
The second relationship that produced mixed results concerns the proposed value-
appropriation mechanism. Besides an indirect negative effect through relational 
mediators, the theoretical model suggested a (direct) positive effect of an exercised 
power advantage on the dominant party’s outcomes (so-called ‘inconsistent 
mediation,’ where the direct path was argued to be opposite in sign (+) than the 
indirect path (-); Davis 1985). Postulation of a positive effect was based on the idea 
that the dominant party is able to structure the exchange to its own benefit. 
Consequently, a negative relationship between power use and the weaker party’s 
satisfaction was posited as the complement effect of value-appropriation. While we 
found support for the negative influence of power exercise on the weaker party’s 
outcomes, the simultaneous positive outcome for the dominant party was not in 
evidence. An insignificant direct path from power usage to dominant party satisfaction 
was found in the sample when controlling for the relational mediators. The results 
suggest not only that the weaker party suffers from high power usage by the dominant 
party (a significant direct and indirect effect was found), but also that the dominant 
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party is frequently unable to realize benefits from power use. As an independent t-test 
underlines, in the case of low power usage (<3.5) the average dominant party’s 
satisfaction level is 5.351, whereas under high power usage (≥3.5) the mean decreases 
to 4.720. The difference in means between the two groups is statistically significant 
(t(98)=3.148, p<0.01; given equality of variances according to Levene’s test). A 
possible interpretation might be that dominant parties fare better when they refrain 
from exploiting (at least high) power positions. However, before clear 
recommendations for practice can be derived, further in-depth research is needed on 
the role of power use. 
Another recommendation can be made for parties who have a high asymmetric 
dependence on their partner and are confronted with or afraid of exploitation. If it 
seems impossible to satisfactorily decrease their own dependence, an alternative might 
be to attempt to increase the partner’s dependence (Emerson 1962; Kumar et al. 1995). 
In this way, a more balanced but highly joint dependence structure would be reached, 
allowing the weaker party to profit from the relationship’s value-enhancing structure.  
As another outcome, this study revealed interdependence constellations that appear 
to be characteristic for IS outsourcing relationships. It was confirmed that clients 
frequently face very powerful suppliers. However, in about one-third of the 
outsourcing arrangements, the client was the dominant party. Such an overview of 
market characteristics should not only be helpful for companies involved in 
outsourcing, market researchers, and consulting firms, but also informs research about 
client-supplier constellations which frequently occur but have been less studied, such 
as relationships dominated by clients. 
In summary, many posited causal relations were supported with the data obtained, 
and some findings even raised new follow-up questions that open up valuable avenues 
for future research. First, the model offers high explanatory power for parties’ 
satisfaction with exchange performance, which is a central outcome variable in IS 
outsourcing arrangements. Since prior IS outsourcing research has largely emphasized 
the client side and its outcomes, this study equally serves the interest of both parties. 
Second, relative and joint dependence were transferred to the IS outsourcing domain 
and proved to be antecedents of relational facets. Third, the construct ‘use of a 
dependence advantage’ was developed to separate the effects of potential and 
exercised power by the dominant party. The construct is an advancement of the 
construct ‘restraint of power’ offered by Heide and Miner (1992). With the inclusion 
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of this variable, the reference models developed by Kumar et al. (1995) and Gulati and 
Sytch (2007) were advanced. Using the distinction afforded by the variable, some 
inconsistent and contradictory findings in prior research might be reconciled in the 
future. Finally, this study substantiated the value-generation mechanism of joint 
dependence as well as interference with that mechanism arising from power use, and 
provided partial support for the concept of value appropriation. Given that we have 
entered a rather uncharted territory in IS research, the recommendations for practice 
have to be considered carefully, and further research is needed to confirm, argue, and 
discuss the study’s findings. 
7.4 Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
In addition to major directions for future research, the study’s limitations should be 
noted. One limitation arises from the use of the key-informant technique instead of 
simultaneously considering responses from different people involved in an outsourcing 
relationship. In addition, future research that overcomes the logistical and financial 
challenges of collecting full dyadic data (so that an outsourcing relationship is 
concurrently assessed by both the client and the supplier) would certainly yield 
valuable insights. For example, such data could be used to investigate whether there 
are significant perceptual incongruences between the parties regarding the dependence 
structure (see the discussion in section 3.5.1). 
Another limitation is the sample size, which constrained the options during data 
analysis. Future plans include extending the sample to capture approximately 400 IS 
outsourcing relationships to pursue several objectives. The research model will be 
analyzed for different cases (see section 6.4.1): 1) when the client possesses a 
dependence advantage, 2) when the supplier possesses a dependence advantage, and 3) 
using aggregated data, when a party possesses a dependence advantage (as has been 
done here). A larger sample size will also enable us to study in detail the unexplained 
relationship between levels of dependence asymmetry and power use. The sample so 
far is not large enough to build subgroups of sufficient sizes to test for various 
moderation effects. As a side note, given a sample size of 400, covariance-based SEM 
will probably be a more appropriate technique than PLS for hypothesis testing 
(Reinartz et al. 2009). 
Further research is needed to explain value appropriation under power use and to 
clarify under which circumstances or to what degree a dominant party might be able to 
benefit from exploiting its exchange partner. For this purpose, it may be advantageous 
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to include a more fine-grained construct of satisfaction rather than relying only on a 
high-level measure as was done in this study. This would allow exploring whether 
power use has different effects on various satisfaction facets. Interestingly, joint 
dependence was found to promote commitment, coordination effectiveness, and 
information sharing. Unlike trust and conflict, these facets capture ‘more than 
sentiments’ and present more active forms of collaboration. The findings suggest that 
under conditions of joint dependence, parties align their activities, but such 
configurations do not necessarily guarantee conflict-free and trusting relationships. As 
discussed earlier, further research might study whether this is unique to IS outsourcing 
relationships or whether it is generalizable to other kinds of exchange relationships. 
Overall, future IS outsourcing research is encouraged to pay more attention to 
interdependence and power use. Besides additional surveys, case studies especially 
might significantly advance our knowledge in this field and help explain some 
outstanding issues evolving from this and related research. 
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8 Conclusion and Summary of Key Findings 
The purpose of this thesis was to enhance our understanding of the management of 
client-supplier relationships, which is critical to exchange performance and overall 
outsourcing success. More precisely, this thesis aimed at achieving the following three 
goals using both qualitative and quantitative studies in a mixed-method approach (as 
described in section 1.2): 
• Increase our understanding of firm-level management of IS outsourcing relationships 
• Develop a conceptualization and operationalization of client and supplier 
dependence in IS outsourcing relationships 
• Analyze the impact of interdependence (i.e., combined client and supplier 
dependence) on relationship quality and exchange performance 
The studies presented in this thesis provided several theoretical and managerial-
related insights about IS outsourcing relationships. Section 8.1 briefly summarizes the 
theoretical contributions of these studies, while section 8.2 is devoted to the practical 
contributions and recommended actions. 
8.1 Theoretical Contributions 
This thesis started with a detailed study on the implementation of IT SRM in client 
firms (chapter 2), which was introduced as a critical success factor for clients in 
outsourcing arrangements. The firms that participated in the case study showed 
increased management attention to IT SRM that led to changes in the firms’ 
organizational design at the ‘client-supplier interface.’ The study therefore aimed at 
enhancing our knowledge about developments in IT SRM and its current shape in 
practice. We investigated IT SRM using a conceptual framework of organizational 
design – covering strategy, structure, and processes. In the strategy category, one key 
finding was that the case study organizations have in part significantly and abruptly 
reduced the number of their suppliers in recent years. We recalled Clemons et al.’s 
‘move to the middle’ hypothesis, which predicted a move to increased outsourcing but 
with fewer suppliers (Clemons et al. 1993). However, the two parts of this move – 
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increased outsourcing and a reduction in the number of suppliers – did not seem to 
occur concurrently. The study findings show that the investigated companies had 
increased their degrees of outsourcing more than five years ago and kept them at a 
high and rather constant level. In contrast, significant reductions in the IT supplier 
bases appear to have taken place only recently, with some still planned for upcoming 
years. Thus, the case study companies seem to have adjusted their sourcing strategies, 
striving for potential cost savings through supplier base reductions, rather than relying 
solely on an ‘optimal’ degree of outsourcing. With regard to structure, we found 
different organizational models for IT SRM, varying in the degrees of centralization 
and modes of sourcing. The predominant in-house model was a hybrid (centralized-
decentralized) structure in which IT organizations have established one or more 
centralized units for at least some of their IT SRM activities. With regard to process, 
the investigation identified IT SRM activities and formalization as well as lateral 
connections were presented as means to bridge barriers between different 
organizational entities (e.g., the purchasing and IT departments). Overall, this initial 
study pointed to important but barely researched issues in the field of outsourcing 
relationship management and formulated several directions for future research. 
The thesis then turned its focus to the client-supplier relationship in IS outsourcing 
arrangements and studied the role of interdependence in depth. It was argued that in 
good relationship management, interdependence between the parties should not be 
neglected but should instead be actively managed. Otherwise, companies are prone to 
be exploited or to remain in less favorable dependence structures. Despite its practical 
relevance, dependence was found to be understudied in IS outsourcing research. 
Therefore, qualitative and quantitative studies were conducted to fill important 
research gaps. 
First, as a major theoretical contribution, we drew on dependence research from 
reference disciplines and extended the prevailing simplistic view of dependence in our 
domain. Case studies were conducted to investigate dependencies on both sides of an 
outsourcing dyad (chapters 3 and 4). Given that most prior IS outsourcing research has 
focused on only one side (the client), this dyadic approach was able to draw a 
complete picture as suggested by traditional dependence research (Emerson 1962). 
The research efforts resulted in a dyadic conceptualization of client and supplier 
dependence and the identification of salient determinants (importance, substitutability, 
and spillover effects), as well as their influencing facets. In particular, spillover effects, 
which occur in settings with multiple exchange relationships between the same parties, 
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emerged as an unanticipated determinant that seemed to influence perceived 
dependence. Largely unnoticed in prior dependence research, this concept has the 
potential to advance the current state of dependence research and to contribute back to 
the reference disciplines.  
Second, given the lack of prior efforts to thoroughly conceptualize and 
operationalize ‘dependence’ in IS outsourcing arrangements, the case study findings 
were used as the foundation for the succeeding construct development process (chapter 
5). Two multidimensional second-order constructs, capturing client and supplier 
dependence, were developed and pre-validated through interviews, Q-sorting and a 
two-sided survey. For the future, a large-scale survey is planned that aims to provide 
final and conclusive validation for the developed constructs. These research efforts 
close an important research gap and should prove useful for future IS studies that 
require conceptualizations or measures of organizational dependencies. 
Third, relative and joint dependence, combinations of the individual firm-level 
dependencies, were investigated. These two constructs allowed us to study the 
consequences of inter-organizational dependence and to extend the current scope of IS 
outsourcing research. An initial descriptive analysis of 100 IS outsourcing 
relationships offered insights into ‘typical’ dependence structures from client and 
supplier perspectives. A research model encompassing effects of relative and joint 
dependence on relational facets and satisfaction with the exchange performance was 
then developed (chapter 6) and tested with structural equation modeling (chapter 7), 
extending prior related models in marketing channels (Kumar et al. 1995) and the 
automotive industry (Gulati and Sytch 2007). One unusual characteristic of this study 
is that we did not focus solely on client outcomes; rather, we considered the interests 
of both parties in outsourcing dyads. Furthermore, with the development of the 
‘PUSE’ (power use) construct, we were able to distinguish between mere power 
potentials and their actual use, and this newly developed scale opens up various 
opportunities for dependence and power research across disciplines. 
The survey results also provided theoretical contributions. The findings showed a 
positive effect of joint dependence on the relational facets of commitment, 
coordination effectiveness, and information sharing, thus supporting its posited value-
enhancing character. In contrast, exploitation of a dependence advantage was shown to 
diminish the dyadic relationship’s value-generating potential and decrease 
performance outcomes for both the weak and the dominant party. In addition, partial 
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support was found for a ‘value appropriation’ mechanism. While we were not able to 
provide evidence for a direct, positive effect of power use on the dominant party’s 
satisfaction, a significant negative effect on the weaker party’s satisfaction was 
evident, as expected. To summarize, this study explored the consequences of 
dependence asymmetry, power use, and joint dependence for outsourcing relationships 
and was largely able to provide evidence for their expected rival effects. 
There are many valuable opportunities for future IS research in the field of inter-
organizational relationships where the use of single or combined dependencies could 
provide a significant contribution. Promising research topics include, for example, 
dependence and innovation generation (Jean et al. 2012), as well as its impact on 
influence strategies, adoption, and compliance (Hart and Saunders 1998; Payan and 
McFarland 2005). Current research has not yet exploited the full potential of 
dependence research in the IS domain, and it is hoped that the findings and 
foundations laid by this thesis will inspire future work. 
8.2 Practical Contributions and Recommended Actions 
This thesis also provides practical contributions concerning the management of 
outsourcing relationships. The study on organizational design decisions in IT 
organizations provides a number of helpful insights for practitioners, especially for 
decision makers in client companies. With a detailed look at five large-scale 
organizations, recent advancements in IT SRM were presented, providing insights into 
effective ways to manage IT supplier relationships. The case study elaborated 
fundamental models and sourcing strategies which should benefit companies currently 
involved in organizing or improving their IT SRM activities. 
Equally, the thorough investigation of interdependence in IS outsourcing 
relationships produced findings of practical relevance. First, the conceptualization of 
client and supplier dependence offers insights for client and supplier firms into how to 
influence dependence positions. A list of dependence determinants and influencing 
facets was provided based on a comprehensive literature review and interviews with 
experts. The identified factors provide a basis that can be used by a firm to extensively 
assess its own dependence as well as its partner’s dependence in an outsourcing 
relationship. They can, in particular, serve as a checklist for the parties during all 
phases of the outsourcing lifecycle. For example, for client firms engaged in IS 
outsourcing, monitoring dependence and their own influencing factors is a relevant 
activity for all phases, from supplier selection to renewing/terminating a contract (see 
8.2 Practical Contributions and Recommended Actions 149 
 
IT SRM process, section 2.2.3). Even changes in sourcing strategies will frequently 
have an impact on the firm’s dependence position. Given the potential detrimental 
effects of a strong dependence (disadvantage), it appears to be important to regularly 
monitor changes in dependence positions and review all major management decisions 
(e.g., expansion of the contract volume and initiating or terminating other joint 
relationships with the exchange partner) with respect to their impact on the 
dependence structure. With relative and joint dependence, two facets that are critical to 
outsourcing success were presented, and practitioners are encouraged to pay more 
attention to those.  
As previously outlined, the dependence map used in this thesis might serve 
practitioners as a powerful visualization tool for portraying their own and their 
partner’s dependence positions, as well as for assessing relative and joint dependence. 
Further, a chart using the determinants ‘importance’ and ‘substitutability’ as 
dimensions might be useful for analyzing a firm’s own dependence in detail (see 
Figure 3-3 in section 3.5.2). Spillover effects might be added as a third dimension, if 
multiple relationships with the same exchange partner exist. Moreover, since a 
dependence on an exchange partner can change, capturing different data points and 
displaying the development of dependence over time might be useful for discovering 
unwanted developments at an early stage (see Kaiser and Buxmann 2012b for an 
example). 
The case studies also indicated that differences can potentially occur between the 
client and supplier firms’ perceptions of dependencies (see section 3.5.1), and 
therefore it might be crucial for firms to involve their exchange partners in the 
assessment of dependencies as well. Even though this will not be possible in every 
relationship, as it depends on the transparency and openness between the parties, it 
might safeguard parties from severely miscalculating the other’s behavior or acting on 
suboptimal decisions.  
It must be noted that dependence is only one of several crucial aspects in the 
management of outsourcing relationships. Successful relationship management must 
also keep an eye on many other outsourcing risks, such as hidden costs, security 
issues, and a loss of control over data (Lacity et al. 2009). Prior findings and the 
results of this thesis underline, however, the relevance of dependencies in outsourcing 
relationships. Among other effects, dependence 1) determines a company’s need to 
remain in a (possibly suboptimal) business relationship, 2) determines a firm’s 
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bargaining power in day-to-day operations and contract negotiations, 3) influences the 
evolution of the relationship’s quality, and 4) impacts the company’s exchange ratio 
and thus its satisfaction with the business relationship. 
Therefore, this study’s findings suggest that a dependence disadvantage should 
generally be either avoided or minimized, since it provides the potential for the 
dominant party to exploit its power in the situation. However, three points must be 
noted. First, avoiding a relative dependence disadvantage does not necessarily imply 
eschewing a medium or high dependence on an exchange partner. It has been argued 
in particular that balanced but high joint dependence relationships can lead to positive 
outcomes for both parties (‘enhancing the value pie’). Second, a party’s reducing of a 
dependence disadvantage by decreasing its own dependence might be cost-intensive 
and economically disadvantageous. An alternative strategy might therefore be to 
increase the partner’s dependence instead, in order to balance dependencies and 
increase joint dependence (see also Kumar et al. 1995). Third, another strategy might 
be to take countermeasures that hinder the powerful party from making use of its 
advantage. Actions that come to mind include, for example, implementing early 
contractual safeguards against various forms of exploitation (e.g., contractually 
securing favorable terms and conditions in case of contract extensions) or selecting an 
exchange partner known to act fairly or to be interested in a long-term relationship. 
The survey findings further suggest that on average dominant parties do not benefit 
from extensively exploiting a power position. Indeed, we found the opposite: their 
satisfaction with the exchange performance decreased significantly in such 
relationships. Dominant firms should therefore carefully weigh whether the use of 
power really serves their interest, or whether, if they attempt to obtain a bigger piece 
of the pie, detrimental side effects will occur and cause the firm’s exchange ratio to 
deteriorate. 
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Appendix 
Appendix to chapter 2 
Table A-1: Framework to Assess Descriptive Case Studies (adapted from Dubé and Paré 2003) 
Research Design 
Clear research questions Yes, ‘how’ 
Multiple-case design Yes, five cases 
Nature of single-case 
design Not relevant, due to multiple-case design 
Replication logic in 
multiple-case design Both theoretical and literal replication logic 
Unit of analysis Companies’ IT organizations with special focus on IT supplier relationship management 
Pilot case Not conducted, since it is recommended for studies with highly exploratory nature 
Context of the case study 
Research was conducted both off-site (questionnaire) and on-site 
(face-to-face interviews). The two data collection periods were well-
described and the period of investigation was reported (January to 
March 2011). Nature of data was retrospective and ongoing. 
Team-based research Yes 
Different roles for multiple 
investigators 
Author 1 and two research assistants in data collection  
Author 1, 2 and two research assistants in data analysis 
Data Collection 
Elucidation of the data 
collection process Yes 
Multiple data collection 
methods Yes, questionnaires, interviews and documents 
Mix of qualitative and 
quantitative data Yes, both qualitative and quantitative data 
Data triangulation Yes, for different sources 
Case study protocol Yes 
Case study database Yes 
Data Analysis 
Elucidation of the data 
analysis process Yes, see section ‘Data Analysis’ 
Field notes Yes 
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Table A-1 (continued)  
Coding and reliability 
check 
Reliability of study findings was tried to reach in several ways. First, 
evaluation of questionnaires and interview data were checked by 
research assistants to minimize errors and biases. Furthermore, 
interpretations were discussed in case analysis meetings. The use of a 
case study protocol and database present herein important 
prerequisites for ensuring reliability (Yin 2003). 
Data displays Yes 
Flexible & opportunistic 
process 
Yes. Since our data collection process overlapped with an initial data 
analysis, process flexibility was guaranteed. An initial analysis of the 
completed questionnaire data helped to make adjustments in the 
interview guide and to ask supplementary questions. 
Logical chain of evidence 
Yes. Our research questions lead to the conceptual framework of 
organizational design. Then the framework guided data collection 
and analysis that provided finally evidence to our initial research 
questions. 
Searching for cross-case 
patterns Yes 
Quotes (evidence) Yes 
Project reviews Yes, in form of case analysis meetings 
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Appendix to chapter 5 
Table A-2: Reflective Client-Side Items 
Construct 
and Source Items 
Importancea (based on Kumar et al. 1998) 
CIMP1 The IT service delivered by this supplier in this contractual relationship belongs to 
the top [1–5% (highest importance), 6–10%, 11–20%, 21–40%, 41–60%, 61–80%, 
81–100% (lowest importance)] with regard to importance for our business. 
CIMP2 The IT service that is delivered by this supplier is very essential to our business. 
CIMP3 The supplier’s IT service has a high value contribution to our business. 
CIMP4 There are only a few IT services that make a higher contribution to our business 
processes than this supplier’s IT service. 
CIMP5 The IT service delivered is very important to our company. 
Substitutabilitya (based on El-Ansary and Stern 1972; Kumar et al. 1998) 
CSUBST1 It would require great effort to replace this supplier in our contractual relationship 
with an alternative supplier.  
CSUBST2 Switching to an alternative supplier for such an IT service would hardly be possible. 
CSUBST3 It would be very difficult for our company to obtain this IT service from a different 
supplier. 
CSUBST4 Switching barriers to alternative suppliers are very high for this particular IT 
service. 
Spilloversa (newly developed) 
CSPILL1 If we terminated this particular contractual relationship to the supplier prematurely, 
we would have to expect adverse reactions (e.g., price increases) in other business 
relationships with this supplier. 
CSPILL2 The supplier would react to our disadvantage in other joint business relationships, as 
soon as we would switch here to another supplier. 
CSPILL3 In case we would dissolve this contract, the supplier could damage us a lot with 
negative reactions in other joint business relationships. 
CSPILL4 If we did not extend this contract, we would face high sanctions in other business 
relationships with this supplier. 
Client Dependencea (based on Frazier 1983; Hibbard et al. 2001; Kumar et al. 1998) 
CDEP1 In this contractual relationship, our company is very dependent on this supplier. 
CDEP2 To achieve our business goals, our company has to maintain this relationship to the 
supplier. 
CDEP3 A cancellation of this contractual relationship to the supplier could be very easily 
compensated by our company. R 
CDEP4 Our company would face great challenges if the supplier did not continue the 
contractual relationship. 
Notes: 
a except for CIMP1, a seven-point scale (completely disagree – completely agree) was used 
R reverse coded 
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Table A-3: Reflective Supplier-Side Items 
Construct 
and Source Items 
Importancea (based on Kumar et al. 1998) 
SIMP1 This contractual relationship belongs to the top [1–5% (highest importance), 6–
10%, 11–20%, 21–40%, 41–60%, 61–80%, 81–100% (lowest importance)] with 
regard to importance for our business. 
SIMP2 This contractual relationship with this client makes a significant contribution to our 
business success. 
SIMP3 This business relationship is very important to us. 
SIMP4 There are only a few other business relationships that contribute significantly more 
to our company’s success than this relationship. 
SIMP5 A termination of this contractual relationship would be a significant loss for our 
company. 
Substitutabilitya (based on El-Ansary and Stern 1972; Kumar et al. 1998) 
SSUBST1 We would face great difficulties in replacing the client in this business relationship 
with another client. 
SSUBST2 It would be very difficult for our firm to achieve financial and strategic goals 
associated with this relationship with alternative clients. 
SSUBST3 It would incur high costs to gain an alternative client that would purchase this IT 
service to the same extent as our current client. 
SSUBST4 Switching barriers to alternative clients are very high. 
Spilloversa (newly developed) 
SSPILL1 If we terminated this particular contractual relationship with the supplier 
prematurely, we would have to expect adverse reactions in other business 
relationships with this supplier. 
SSPILL2 The client would react to our disadvantage in other joint business relationships, as 
soon as we were to switch to another client in this relationship. 
SSPILL3 If we were to dissolve this contract, the client could damage us a lot with negative 
reactions in other joint business relationships. 
SSPILL4 If we did not extend this contract, we would face high sanctions in other joint 
business relationships. 
Supplier Dependencea (based on Frazier 1983; Hibbard et al. 2001; Kumar et al. 1998) 
SDEP1 Overall, maintaining the contractual relationship with this client is critical to the 
achievement of our firm’s organizational goals. 
SDEP2 With regard to this contractual relationship, our firm is very dependent on this 
client. 
SDEP3 Cancellation of this contractual relationship with our supplier could be very easily 
compensated by our company. R 
SDEP4 Our firm would face great challenges if the client did not continue the contract. 
Notes: 
a except for SIMP1, a seven-point scale (completely disagree – completely agree) was used 
R reverse coded 
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Table A-4: Correlation Statistics for Client and Supplier Dependence Constructs (Pre-study Data) 
Client Supplier 
Variables 
1 
CIMP 
2 
CSUBST 
3 
CDEP 
4 
CSPILL Variables 
1 
SIMP 
2 
SSUBST 
3  
SDEP 
4  
SSPILL 
1 CIMP 0.669    1 SIMP 0.894    
2 CSUBST 0.346 0.913   2 SSUBST 0.718 0.834   
3 CDEP 0.515 0.806 0.868  3 SDEP 0.876 0.756 0.884  
4 CSPILL 0.033 0.333 0.252 0.872 4 SSPILL 0.482 0.190 0.383 0.824 
Notes: Square roots of AVE (diagonal elements) and correlations between reflectively measured 
constructs (off-diagonal elements) 
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Appendix to chapter 7 
Table A-5: Survey Items 
Construct 
and 
Source 
Items Factor loadings α/CR/AVE 
Client Dependencea (based on Frazier 1983; Hibbard et al. 2001; 
Kumar et al. 1998)  0.818 / - / - 
CDEP1 In this contractual relationship, our company/the 
client‡ is very dependent on this supplier/our 
company. 
n/a 
Mean: 4.390 
Std. dev.: 1.118 CDEP 2 To achieve our/its business goals, our company/the 
client has to maintain this relationship to the 
supplier/our company. 
n/a 
CDEP 3 A cancellation of this contractual relationship with 
the supplier/our company could be very easily 
compensated by our company/the client.R 
n/a  
CDEP 4 If the relationship were to end earlier than contracted, 
our/the client’s business goals would be negatively 
affected. 
n/a  
CDEP 5 Our company/the client company would face great 
challenges if the supplier/our company did not 
continue the contractual relationship. 
n/a  
Supplier Dependencea (based on Frazier 1983; Hibbard et al. 
2001; Kumar et al. 1998)  0.904 / - / - 
SDEP1 With regard to this contractual relationship, the 
supplier/our firm is very dependent on our company/ 
this client. 
n/a Mean: 3.786 
Std. dev.: 1.380 
SDEP2 Overall, maintaining the contractual relationship with 
our company/this client is critical to the achievement 
of the supplier’s/our firm’s organizational goals. 
n/a  
SDEP3 Cancellation of this contractual relationship with our 
company/this client could be very easily 
compensated by the supplier/our company.R 
n/a  
SDEP4 If the relationship were to end earlier than contracted, 
the supplier’s/our business goals would be negatively 
affected. 
n/a  
SDEP5 The supplier/our firm would face great challenges if 
our company/the client did not continue the contract. n/a  
Relative Dependence (based on Casciaro and Piskorski 2005; 
Gulati and Sytch 2007; Kumar et al. 1995)  - / - / - 
RDEP Calculated as absolute difference between mean 
(CDEP) and mean (SDEP) n/a 
Mean: 1.352 
Std. dev.:1.052 
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Table A-5 (continued)   
Joint Dependence (based on Casciaro and Piskorski 2005; Gulati 
and Sytch 2007; Kumar et al. 1995) 
 - / - / - 
JDEP Calculated as sum of mean(CDEP) and 
mean(SDEP) 
n/a Mean: 8.176 
Std. dev.:1.930 
Power Useb (newly developed, inspired by Heide and Miner 
1992; Cook 1977; Emerson 1962) 
 0.931/0.956 /0.878 
PUSE1 In this business relationship, the dominant party 
uses its power advantage to influence the 
relationship to its own benefit. 
0.909 Mean: 2.990 
Std. dev.: 1.426 
PUSE2 The dominant contractual party uses the unequal 
balance of power to the detriment of the weaker 
party. 
0.941 
PUSE3 The more powerful party uses the relation of 
dependence to extract a greater benefit from the 
business relationship. 
0.960  
PUSE4 The less dependent contractual party can push 
through its own interests. R * 
n/a  
Commitmenta (adapted from Goo et al. 2009; Kumar et al. 1995)  0.839/0.879/0.553 
COM1 Both parties are willing to commit resources to 
sustain the business relationship. 
0.776 Mean: 5.321 
Std. dev: 0.917 
COM2 If we/the client requested it, our supplier/we would 
be willing to make a further investment to support 
our/its needs. 
0.631 
COM3 We/the client are/is willing to put more effort and 
investment into building this business relationship. 
0.564  
COM4 Even if they could, the client/ supplier would not 
drop our organization as a supplier/client because 
they like being associated with us.* 
n/a  
COM5 We want to remain a customer/supplier for the 
supplier/client because we genuinely enjoy our 
relationship with them. 
0.832  
COM6 The continuation of this relationship with the 
supplier/client is very important to us. 
0.844  
COM7 The supplier/client expects the relationship with us 
to continue for a long time. 
0.770  
Trusta (adapted from Fang et al. 2008a)   0.910/0.943/0.848 
TRU1 Both parties trust each other. 0.936 Mean: 5.333 
Std. dev.: 1.062 TRU2 Both parties are always frank and truthful in dealing 
with each other. 
0.909 
TRU3 Both parties believe that the other party would go 
out of its way to make sure the relationship is not 
damaged or harmed. 
0.916  
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Table A-5 (continued)   
Conflicta (adapted from Kumar et al. 1992)  0.899/0.937/0.832 
CON1 The relationship between us and the supplier/client 
can be best described as tense. 
0.925 Mean: 2.519 
Std. dev.: 1.367  
CON2 The client and the supplier have significant 
disagreements in their working relationship. 
0.925 
CON3 The supplier and the client frequently clash on issues 
relating to how the supplier should provide the IT 
service. 
0.886  
Coordination Effectivenessa (adapted from Fang et al. 2008b; 
Jap 1999) 
 0.847/0.907/0.765 
COEF1 This supplier/client and my company work together 
very effectively to exploit unique opportunities. 
0.898 Mean: 4.602 
Std. dev.: 1.127  
COEF2 Both companies are always looking for synergistic 
ways to do business together. 
0.830 
COEF3 We work effectively on joint projects tailored to our 
joint needs. 
0.895  
Information Sharinga (adapted from Goles et al. 2005; Lee and Kim 1999; 
Wüllenweber et al. 2008) 
0.777/0.869/0.691 
INFS1 We and our supplier/client provide each other with 
sufficient information to perform the IT service.* 
n/a Mean: 4.789 
Std. dev.: 1.085 
INFS2 We and our supplier/client effectively exchange 
information with each other. 
0.886 
INFS3 We and our supplier/client each share environmental 
information that affects the other's business. 
0.690  
INFS4 We and our supplier/client share information that 
helps establish business planning. 
0.901  
Client Satisfactiona (adapted from Kumar et al. 1992)  0.891/ - / - 
CSat1 The association with this supplier/our company has 
been very successful for our company/the client.  
n/a  
CSat2 Taking all the different factors into account, the 
supplier’s/our company’s performance is excellent. 
n/a  
CSat3 Overall, the supplier’s/our company’s performance 
has fallen far short of expectations.R 
n/a  
Supplier Satisfactiona (adapted from Kumar et al. 1992)  0.871/ - / - 
SSat1 The association with us/this client has been very 
successful for the supplier/us. 
n/a  
SSat 2 Taking all the different factors into account, this 
contractual relationship has gone extremely well for 
the supplier/our company. 
n/a  
SSat 3 The supplier’s/our company’s expectations for this 
relationship have been fully met. 
n/a  
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Table A-5 (continued)   
Dominant Party Satisfaction  0.880/0.926/0.807 
DSAT1 
If (client=dominant party) then DSAT=CSAT  
else DSAT=SSAT 
0.921 Mean: 5.067 
Std. dev.: 1.031 DSAT2 0.926 
DSAT3 0.846 
Weaker Party Satisfaction  0.870/0.920/0.793 
WSAT1 
If (client=weaker party) then WSAT=CSAT else 
WSAT=SSAT 
0.909 Mean: 5.105 
Std. dev.: 1.064 WSAT2 0.908 
WSAT3 0.854 
Relationship Duration (adapted from Goo et al. 2007)  - / - / - 
RelDur How many years has this contractual relationship 
lasted (including contract extensions where 
appropriate)? 
n/a Mean: 6.890 
Std. dev.: 5.223 
Contract Extensivenessa (adapted from Lusch and Brown 1996; 
Wuyts and Geyskens 2005) 
 - / - / - 
CEXT The relationship’s underlying contract clearly defines 
the roles and responsibilities of each partner. 
n/a Mean: 5.420 
Std. dev.: 1.350 
Contract Size (adapted from Lacity et al. 2010)  - / - / - 
CSIZ What is the total contract size in Euro? (logarithm) n/a Mean: 3.244 
Std. dev.: 1.054 
IS Specificityc (adapted from Alvarez-Suescun 2010; Saarinen 
and Vepsäläinen 1994) 
 - / - / - 
ISSP To what degree has the system been adapted to the 
client firm’s specific requirements? 
n/a Mean: 3.440 
Std. dev.: 1.157 
Notes:  
* dropped items 
‡ questionnaire version for clients / questionnaire version for suppliers 
• a   seven-point scale (completely disagree – completely agree) 
b seven-point scale (to a very small extent – to a very great extent) 
c   five-point scale (1 - standard solution (no modification), 2 - somewhat modified, 3 - moderately 
modified, 4 - strongly modified, 5 - individual solution) 
R reverse coded 
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